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This thesis responds to the following question: what might a close reading of the history of 
Nauru as an object of international legal administration reveal about the relationship between 
imperialism and international law that accounts focusing on more ‘central’ sites of 
international legal formation do not? The thesis takes the form of an historical narrative of 
the changing status of Nauru in international law since the island’s violent incorporation into 
the German protectorate of the Marshall Islands in 1888, described in relation to 
corresponding changes in local administrative form. Considering in turn the imposition of 
the protectorate, the designation of Nauru as a C Class Mandate by the League of Nations 
in 1920, its re-designation by the United Nations as a Trust Territory in 1947, and its 
recognition as a sovereign state independent of Australia in 1968, this thesis argues that while 
status shifts, form accretes: as the international status of Nauru has shifted in each phase, 
what has occurred at the level of the administrative form is an accretive process of internal 
bureaucratisation and external restatement according to the prevailing concepts of the 
period.  
In order to hold the history of Nauru and the history of international law together, the thesis 
develops a method of redescription that borrows from jurisdictional thinking and from 
Weberian social theory in order to focus on local administrative form as a site of international 
legal formation. The focus on administrative form offers detailed insight not only into the 
Nauruan case, but into the difference between ‘the’ history of international law as the 
development of an ideal conceptual framework for governing the world, and the histories of 
international law as actually practised in place. In this sense, this thesis is a work not of 
international law, but about the ways in which histories of international law are constructed, 
and is offered as a contribution to the genre of histories of imperialism and international law. 
In fixing a ‘marginal’ place as the site from which the historical formation of the international 
legal order is considered, the thesis aligns politically with the imperative to ‘provincialise 
Europe’ not only in histories of international law, but in imaginaries of the international order 
in the present. The political aim of the thesis is to demonstrate not only that presumptions 
of the centrality of certain places over others prefigures the narrative construction of histories 
of international law, but that it is possible - even within the confines of disciplinary practice 
- to see the international legal order from other perspectives.
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In 2009, I was briefly engaged by the Parliament of Nauru as a consultant legal adviser. I 
worked with a local team to formulate a public awareness campaign to ensure the Nauruan 
public was appropriately informed of the proposals to be put to them in a constitutional 
referendum the following February.1 The referendum was the culmination of a lengthy 
process of constitutional review that had been conducted with United Nations Development 
Programme funding.2 In its 2007 Report, the Constitutional Review Commission appointed 
by the Parliament of Nauru described what it understood to be the historical factors requiring 
address via constitutional reform – ‘what’, in other words, had gone ‘wrong’ with the 
Republic of Nauru:  
‘The failure of institutions due to defective or ineffective laws, including the Constitution and 
statutes.  
Lack of motivation or incentive to preserve wealth for the future, and account for its 
management and drawings upon it.  
Absence of machinery for enforcing accountability and transparency, and for punishing 
breaches.   
Failure of leaders to learn the principles of good governance and elements of the cabinet 
parliamentary system, and make a commitment to them.  
In planning for improvement in the above areas, a serious shortage of human capital, particularly 
people with appropriate skills, and accountants and lawyers.’3 
Failure of institutions, failure to learn good governance, shortage of people with appropriate 
skills. The implication was that the ‘problem’ of Nauru was to be understood as a problem 
of administration, to be solved with better institutions, better laws, and better training of 
leaders in the business of democratic governance. To effectively achieve these goals, Nauru 
required constitutional reform. It also required more ‘human capital’ – the shortage of which 
was, in the meantime, to be filled by people like myself, paid with international aid funding. 
The small Nauruan public service was interspersed at management level with Australians, 
many on secondment from the Australian public service.  
                                                            
1 The referendum team comprised Stella Duburiya, Tini Duburiya, Barina Waqa, Fimosa Temaki, Kristie Dunn, 
Catriona Steele, and Katy Le Roy - each of whom taught me things I needed to learn, for which I remain 
grateful.   
2 Government of the Republic of Nauru and United Nations Development Programme, Nauru Constitutional 
Reform Project, project document prepared in 2008, 
<https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/FJI/00058097_Nauru%20CRC_Prodoc.pdf>. 
3 The Nauru Constitutional Review Commission, Naoero Ituga: Report, Yaren, Nauru, 28 February 2007, 
<http://www.paclii.org/nr/other/Nauru_Constitutional_Review_Commission_Report_28Feb07.pdf>,   3-4. 
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Armed with comparative constitutional studies of Pacific island states, the Commission 
recommended a suite of amendments to bring the Nauruan constitution in line with 
‘internationally recognised principles and standards’.4 The 1968 Constitution had been 
drafted rapidly, two years after proposals for resettlement of the Nauruan people on Curtis 
Island in Queensland under some form of self-government had failed, for want of agreement 
on whether this ‘self-government’ would attract sovereign status, as the Nauruans demanded, 
or status as a municipal council within Australian sovereign territory, as the Commonwealth 
maintained.5 Proposed amendments were designed to strengthen the separation of the 
legislature and the executive, particularly with respect to financial transparency, which had 
proven an issue in executive management of the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust; to 
recognise at constitutional level the status of customary law as ‘continuing to have effect as 
part of the law of Nauru, to the extent that such law is not repugnant to the Constitution or 
to any Act of Parliament’;6 and to introduce social and economic rights into the Constitution 
– a proposal which would have made Nauru’s Constitution one of the most progressive in 
the world.  
The constitutional review process had commenced in 2004, when the first iteration of 
Australia’s offshore detention regime was in full swing. In 2001, the Australian federal 
executive under Liberal Prime Minister John Howard had alighted upon what it labelled a 
‘Pacific solution’ to Australia’s ‘asylum seeker crisis’. This ‘crisis’ consisted of the arrival of 
comparatively small numbers of asylum seekers in the north-eastern waters of Australia, most 
then from Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.7 The last asylum seekers of the Howard era were 
relocated from Nauru to Australia in 2007, by the federal executive under new Labor Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd. When I arrived in late 2009, the detention centre had been repurposed 
as a government storage depot. Yet that group of hangar-sized sheds is now in use again as 
a detention centre. In 2012, the offshore detention regime was recommenced by the federal 
executive under Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard. Asylum seekers who arrive by sea in 
                                                            
4 Nauru Constitutional Review Commission, above n 3, 3.  
5 Nancy Viviani, Nauru: Phosphate and Political Progress (Australian National University Press, 1970) 140-147. 
6 The 1968 Constitution made no reference to the effect or status of ‘customary law’ in Nauruan law; although 
custom was recognised in legislation and frequently applied with respect to land ownership and usufruct, the 
Report noted that ‘the Supreme Court has at times been ambivalent about the application and proof of custom’. 
Nauru Constitutional Review Commission, above n 3, 13. 
7 On the ‘Pacific Solution’, see Janet Phillips, ‘The ‘Pacific Solution’ Revisited: A Statistical Guide to the Asylum 
Seeker Caseloads on Nauru and Manus Island’, Background Note published 4 September 2012, Department 





Australian waters are detained and sent to Nauru, and to Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, 
ostensibly for ‘processing’ of their asylum claims.8 According to the Australian government, 
the Nauruan ‘regional processing centres’ are run not by Australia, but by private contractors 
under Nauruan sovereign control - albeit on Australia’s instigation and with Australian 
funding.9 In February 2016, the High Court endorsed this interpretation of the offshore 
detention regime: asylum seekers on Nauru are not detained by the Australian executive, 
because they are detained by the Nauruan executive.10 In 2009, however, offshore detention 
seemed to be in the past. Nauru – in extreme foreign debt, without a bank, and owing years 
of back pay to its public servants – had been left to raise revenue in other ways.     
My Nauruan story is minor, and a common one: ambitious student from a privileged first 
world law school takes up a temporary international position, nigh on oblivious to the 
historical and political context in which they are working. But the experience nagged at me. 
What I learnt of Nauru whilst on the island was enough only to make me aware of my 
ignorance. Beyond the clichés picked up in my white Australian childhood – phosphate 
island, poor then rich then poor again – I knew next to nothing about Nauru. A Nauruan 
boarder at my secondary school, there for the first years of the 1990s then suddenly gone. A 
geography subject called ‘Our Pacific Neighbours’, which in its determination to orient 
Australian high school students as to their geographical whereabouts was actually quite 
radical. In that class, I had learnt a little of Nauru’s ‘phosphate wealth’, amid textbook 
sketches of the Dutch colonisation of Irian Jaya, Australia’s role in the Portuguese handover 
to Indonesia of East Timor in 1976, and the import of Indian indentured labourers to Fiji. 
If I was taught anything about German imperialism in the Pacific in that high school class, I 
don’t remember it. I had a German great-grandfather who had left Kiel, north of Hamburg, 
before the First World War to ‘escape conscription’ by the Wilhelmian Reich; and a 
grandfather who had fought in Papua New Guinea against the Japanese in the early 1940s. 
But the connection between the inadequacy of my grasp of Pacific history and what I was 
doing in Nauru as a legal adviser has only become apparent through this project.    
                                                            
8 Between September 2013 and January 2017, 1,355 ‘illegal maritime arrivals’ were sent to Nauru, and 770 to 
Manus Island. See Department of Immigration and Border Protection, ‘Operation Sovereign Borders Monthly 
Operational Update’, January 2017, <http://newsroom.border.gov.au/channels/Operation-Sovereign-
Borders/releases/monthly-operational-update-january-2>. 
9 Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Others (2016) 327 ALR 369, 375. 
10 Plaintiff M68 v Commonwealth of Australia (2016) 327 ALR 369; Gordon J dissenting.  
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In Nauru, I did my best to fulfil what I understood to be the professional and ethical 
imperatives of the role. I attended meetings with ‘H.E.’ - His Excellency, the President - then 
Marcus Stephen. I visited the house of the ambassador of the Republic of Taiwan. I shared 
a hotel corridor with a Russian delegation, as Nauru announced it would recognise the 
independence of the Georgian provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and receive AUD$50 
million in development aid from the Russian Federation.11 I ate at ‘Chinese’ restaurants, never 
sure whether ‘Chinese’ Nauruans identified as Chinese or Nauruan, or both, or neither. I 
drove a Japanese car, donated as part of the Japanese aid programme to Nauru; Nauru, I was 
informed, voted with Japan in the International Whaling Commission.12  
But mostly, I walked. Before work I walked along the beach, separated from the open ocean 
of the Pacific by the limestone reef that fringes the entire coast. After work I walked up to 
topside, following the paths that meandered through the limestone pinnacles and the noddy 
bird carcasses. On the weekends I walked Nauru’s perimeter road, passing unprepossessing 
monuments marking the Japanese occupation of Nauru in the early 1940s. If I walked 
clockwise from the hotel, I would pass the cantilever hulking from the shoreline across the 
reef to the deep water, built in the 1920s to cart phosphate from topside right down into the 
holds of cargo ships moored offshore. If I walked anti-clockwise, I would pass Anibare Bay, 
blown out of the limestone reef with dynamite in the early twentieth century by the Pacific 
Phosphate Company to create a harbour for the otherwise harbourless island. One day I 
bumped into the Australian High Commissioner out the front of Parliament House. He 
advised me to quit it with the walking. I didn’t understand, he told me. My walking routine 
was attracting attention. The stray dogs were dangerous; and despite appearances, the 
Nauruans too would prove dangerous given the opportunity, especially after dark. The 
exchange bristled with Forsterian subtext. One hundred years ago, the High Commissioner 
would have warned me that a white woman in the colonies shouldn’t be alone with the 
natives.     
                                                            
11 Luke Harding, ‘Tiny Nauru Struts World Stage by Recognising Breakaway Republics’, The Guardian (online) 
15 December 2009 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/14/nauro-recognises-abkhazia-south-
ossetia>. 






I had an uncanny slip in perspective one day, out walking in defiance of the High 
Commissioner’s advice. Standing on a beach watching a container ship disappear over the 
horizon, I nearly lost my balance. In that moment, I felt I had not simply boarded a plane 
and shifted location in a fixed world; had not simply flown from one point to another in the 
same world I had worked so hard to discipline into order through my studies in international 
history, politics and law. Rather, the world itself unfolded differently from the point at which 
I stood. I didn’t recognise it. The net of historical encounters cast by Nauru over the world 
created a different structure of the international to the one I knew.13 The one I knew was 
already, or so I had thought, an alternative to Eurocentrist imaginaries of the international; 
already disciplined in the imperialism of European knowledge structures, sensitive to the 
legacies of colonial violence and the contemporary politics of difference. But for all my 
studies of postcoloniality, it had never occurred to me that the periphery has a periphery, 
that there are margins to the margins. I have since travelled to many other parts of the world, 
as white professionals tend to be free to do, and I’ve never felt that sensation so strongly 
again. Standing on that beach, it simply made no sense to think of Nauru as peripheral, as an 
anomaly in the international order. As much as The Hague or New York, or India or South 
Africa or Australia, Nauru was what was. It was me with my UNDP-funded contract that 
had it all wrong.  
The 2010 referendum failed. The Nauruan people voted against the proposed constitutional 
changes. I left Nauru with an uncanny memory of that slip in perception, caused by simply 
being in the place. Only in retrospect have I been able to gain an appreciation of the 
referendum, and my minor role in it, as a contemporary episode in the administrative history 
of Nauru.14 This thesis began as an attempt to think through two things I learnt from my 
experience of Nauru: firstly, that as contemporary as it may have seemed in 2009, the 
disjuncture between international ideals and administrative practice in Nauru took root in 
                                                            
13 Doreen Massey describes the world-making effect of imagining space as a surface across which the discoverer 
moves: ‘the way we imagine space has effects – as it did, each in different ways, for Moctezuma and Cortés. 
Conceiving of space as in the voyages of discovery, as something to be crossed and maybe conquered, has 
particular ramifications…It differentiates Hernán, active, a maker of history, who journeys across this surface 
and finds Tenochtitlan upon it…this way of imagining space can lead us to conceive of other places, peoples, 
culture simply as phenomena ‘on’ this surface. It is not an innocent manoeuvre, for by this means they are 
deprived of histories’. Doreen Massey, For Space (London: SAGE Publications, 2005), 4. 
14 As Pahuja has written, ‘if we are interested in the idea of taking responsibility for our own role in the conduct 
of law and legal relations, then it is useful to understand what it is we might actually be engaged in’. Sundhya 
Pahuja, ‘Laws of Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account of International Law’ (2013) 1 London Review of 




the context of German imperialism in the late nineteenth century; and secondly, that the 
international order one perceives is radically determined by the place in which one stands. 
The thesis has ended as a history of the changing status of Nauru in international law that is 
also a history of modern international law as it has been administered in Nauru. I dedicate it 
to Stella, for whom I was just one in a long line of iburbur to wash up on her island.  
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Chapter 1  
Nauru: international status, imperial form and the histories of international law 
‘A beautiful little island, perhaps four miles long (by double altitude) Lat. 0.20 S. Long, 
167.18 East. This solitary spot was found extremely populous, although the nearest 
known land is placed by the charts above six equatorial degrees distant. The want of a 
meridional observation may have caused some error in latitude, but it is hoped not a 
great one. I named it ‘Pleasant Island’’.  
- Captain John Fearn of the Hunter, 8 November 1798 on a voyage from New 
Zealand to the South China Sea, reproduced in The Naval Chronicle, Volume II, 
1799, p 536. 
 
1. Introduction: thesis statement 
This thesis began as a response to an apparently simple question: how did the tiny island of 
Naoero in the Western Pacific become the Republic of Nauru in 1968? It has developed into 
a response to a more complex question: what might a close reading of the history of Nauru 
as an object of international legal administration reveal about the relationship between 
imperialism and international law that accounts focusing on more ‘central’ sites of 
international legal formation do not? The thesis takes the form of an historical narrative of 
the changing status of Nauru in international law since the island’s violent incorporation into 
the German protectorate of the Marshall Islands in 1888, considered against the 
corresponding changes in the administrative form of Nauru at the local level. Considering in 
turn the imposition of the protectorate, the designation of Nauru as a C Class Mandate by 
the League of Nations in 1920, its re-designation by the United Nations as a Trust Territory 
in 1947, and its recognition as a sovereign state independent of Australia in 1968, I argue that 
while status shifts, form accretes: as the international status of Nauru has shifted in each 
phase, what has occurred at the level of the administrative form is not structural change, so 
much as an accretive process of internal bureaucratisation and external restatement according 
to the prevailing concepts of the period. Rejecting assumptions both of the anomalousness 
of the Nauruan state to the international legal order, and of sovereign territorial statehood as 
the natural and final expression of political self-determination,1 this thesis offers insight not 
only into the Nauruan case, but into the way that writing from a specific place ‘up’ to 
                                                            
1 See Vasuki Nesiah, ‘Placing International Law: White Spaces on a Map’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 1; Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008); and 
Deborah Whitehall, ‘A Rival History of Self-Determination’ (2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 719. 
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‘international law’, as opposed to writing from ‘international law’ ‘down’ to the world, 
radically reconfigures the perspective of ‘international law’ that emerges.      
The project is offered as a contribution to - or perhaps more accurately as a counterpoint 
within - the genre of histories of imperialism and international law. In order to hold the 
history of Nauru and the history of international law together, this thesis adopts a method 
of redescription that borrows from jurisdictional thinking and Weberian social theory in 
order to focus on local administrative practice as a site of international legal formation.2 The 
focus on administrative form distinguishes this project from conceptual histories of 
imperialism and international law, and constructs a particular archive around two categories 
of source: firstly, the primary legal instruments and decisions that effected changes in the 
status of Nauru in international law; and secondly, contemporaneous accounts of how and 
why those instruments were created. This project does not privilege recourse to ‘the’ sources 
of international law as recognised today - namely treaty, custom, principle, judicial decisions 
and received juridical writings - except as they fall within either category of source described 
above. In this sense, this thesis is a work not of international law, but about international law; 
and in fixing a ‘marginal’ place as the site in which the formation of the international legal 
order is considered, it aligns politically with the imperative to ‘provincialise Europe’3 not only 
in histories of the formation of the international order, but in imaginaries of the international 
order in the present.4  
                                                            
2 The reception of critical redescription in international legal scholarship owes much to the varied contributions 
of Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh, Anne Orford and Sundhya Pahuja on how we might understand 
the construction of legal authority through attention to practices of authorisation. See section 3.2.1. 
‘Intersections with Jurisdictional Thinking’ below. This vein of work on ‘redescription’ is one branch of a 
number of cross-disciplinary lineages of the term. Quentin Skinner’s seminal formulation of ‘rhetorical 
redescription’ as historical method in the 1970s deals primarily with approaches to conceptual change. See 
Quentin Skinner, ‘The Techniques of Redescription’ in Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); Quentin Skinner, ‘Rhetoric and Conceptual Change’ (1999) 3 Redescriptions: Yearbook of 
Political Thought and Conceptual History, 60–73; and Kari Palonen, ‘Rhetorical and Temporal Perspectives on 
Conceptual Change: Theses on Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck’ (1999) 3 Redescriptions: Yearbook of 
Political Thought and Conceptual History, 41–59. 
3 For Chakrabarty, ‘European thought is at once both indispensable and inadequate in helping us to think 
through the experiences of political modernity in non-Western nations and provincialising Europe becomes 
the task of exploring how this thought – which is not everybody’s heritage and which affects us all – may be 
renewed from and for the margins’. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton University Press, 2nd ed, 2008) 16. Drawing on Foucauldian and postcolonial traditions, 
David Scott urges ‘an approach to colonialism in which Europe is historicized, historicized in such a way as to 
bring into focus the differentials in the political rationalities through which its colonial projects were 
constructed’. David Scott, ‘Colonial Governmentality’ (1995) 43 Social Text, 191, 214.  
4 The point on imaginaries of the international order thinks with critical geographer Doreen Massey, and 
specifically with her observation of the world-making effect of imagining ‘space’ as ‘open’ and ‘abstract’ and 
‘place’ as ‘fixed’ and ‘lived’. Doreen Massey, For Space (SAGE Publications, 2005).  
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2. Arriving at the question   
This project proceeded from an intuition that the Republic of Nauru is not anomalous to 
but somehow symptomatic of the international legal order. The intention of the project is to 
reconsider the emergence of Nauruan statehood as indicative of the way in which the 
international system of states has developed in continuation of European imperial 
administrative practices of the late nineteenth century. While rejecting the presumption of 
Nauru as anomaly, I was equally suspicious of the ‘Nauru-as-metonym’ trope that is often 
substituted for historical research in accounts of the island. Since the early 1990s, ‘Nauru’ 
has often been figured as a parable in essays warning of impending environmental collapse 
due to unsustainable resource use practices, or alternatively of economic collapse due to poor 
governance practices.5 Since the early 2000s, ‘Nauru’ has also been cast as the scene-setting 
dystopia to essays damning the cruelty of Australia’s policy of offshore detention of asylum 
seekers who arrive by sea.6  
Given the international attention that offshore detention has attracted since it was re-
implemented in 2012, the common elements of the ‘Nauru-as’ trope will now be familiar to 
most. 7 Tiny coral atoll, around 21 square kilometres in area, in the Western Pacific south of 
the equator; smallest state by area and population, if one discounts the Holy See; strip-mined 
for phosphate under the control of Australia, Britain and New Zealand from the early 1920s 
to the late 1960s, when Nauru gained independence; high GDP per capita throughout the 
1970s and into the 1980s due to the nationalisation of the phosphate industry; economic 
collapse in the mid-1990s due to almost comically corrupt economic mismanagement;8 a 
series of revenue-raising schemes from the unconventional to the bizarre throughout the 
                                                            
5 See for example Carl N McDaniel and John M Gowdy, Paradise for Sale: A Parable of Nature (University of 
California Press, 2000); Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism versus the Climate (Penguin Group, 2014), 
161–169; John Connell, ‘Nauru: The First Failed Pacific State?’ (2006) 95(383) The Round Table, 47; David 
Kendall, ‘Doomed Island’ (2009) 35 Alternatives Journal 1, 34–37.  
6 See for example Martin McKenzie Murray, ‘The Dysfunction of Offshore Detention on Nauru’, The Saturday 
Paper (Melbourne), 27 August 2016; and Stephen Charles, ‘Our Detention Centres are Concentration Camps 
and Must be Closed’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 4 May 2016. Nauruan President Baron Waqa 
responded to such characterisations of Nauru in Baron Waqa, ‘Media Mudslingers Distort the Image of Nauru’, 
The Australian (Sydney), 22 August 2016. 
7 Examples include The Economist, ‘Paradise Well and Truly Lost’, The Economist (London), 20 December 2001; 
ABC Radio National, ‘How Nauru Threw it All Away’, 11 March 2014 
<http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/how-nauru-threw-it-all-away/5312714>; Tony 
Thomas, ‘The Naughty Nation of Nauru’ (2013) Quadrant 30. 
8 Rowan Callick, ‘Conmen's Paradise’, The Australian (Sydney), 19 January 2007. 
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1990s, including money laundering, passport sales, and erratic clientelism;9 and from the early 
2000s, self-interested complicity as a rented site in Australia’s offshore detention regime.10 
This narrative is so regularly recycled in popular discourse that it creates an impression that 
there is nothing else to say. But Nauru is not a parable of future collapse or an island dystopia. 
Nauru is not out of time, nor out of place. Nauru is a place that belongs in the contemporary 
moment, in the international order, in the global environment. Stated another way, the 
intention of the project was to find a way of narrating the history of Nauruan statehood that 
could take seriously the contemporaneity of Nauru and Versailles, of Nauru and The Hague, 
of Nauru and New York, as sites of international legal formation.    
The broad strokes of the legal history of Nauru are reasonably well known. The island was 
incorporated into the German protectorate of the Marshall Islands in 1888 under a 
contractual arrangement between the Bismarckian Reich and a Hanseatic trading company 
from Hamburg, the Jaluit Gesellschaft. It was designated as a C Class Mandate of the British 
empire by the League of Nations in 1920, and administered by Australia pursuant to an 
agreement between the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Nauru was re-
designated as a trust territory under Australian administration by the United Nations in 1947, 
and gained sovereign status in 1968 - after Australia had attempted to resettle the entire 
population of Nauru in Queensland as Australian citizens, as a cheaper alternative to 
remedying the severe environmental damage caused by phosphate mining and handing over 
self-government.11 The protectorate, the mandate and the trust territory were iteratively 
developed modes of external administration, and the Eurocentrism of the concepts of 
protection, mandate, trust and sovereignty that informed that development has been well 
traversed.12  
                                                            
9 Jon Henley, ‘Pacific Atoll Paradise for Mafia Loot’, The Guardian (online), 23 June 2001 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/jun/23/jonhenley>; Glenn R Simpson, ‘Tiny Island Selling 
Passports Is Big Worry for U.S. Officials’, The Wall Street Journal (online), 16 May 2003 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB105303631570539800>; Joy Su, ‘Nauru Switches its Allegiance back to 
Taiwan from China’, Taipei Times, 15 May 2005 
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/05/15/2003254718>. 
10 Michael Koziol and Michael Gordon, ‘UN Slams Australia's Regional Processing Centres in Nauru’, Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney), 7 October 2016.  
11 Nancy Viviani provides a good summary of the negotiation process in Nancy Viviani, Nauru: Phosphate and 
Political Progress (ANU Press, 1970), 141–155. Weeramantry reconsiders the primary sources on resettlement 
and rehabilitation in Christopher Weeramantry, Nauru: Environmental Damage under International Trusteeship 
(Oxford University Press), 265–305.  
12 See for example Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500–2000 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014); W Ross Johnson, Sovereignty and Protection: A Study of British Jurisdictional Imperialism in the Late 
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Yet the administrative form to which the changing status of protectorate, mandate and trust 
territory attached deviated in basic ways from the ideal form of each mode as conceived at 
the international level. As instantiated in Nauru, the protectorate, mandate and trust territory 
defied clear articulation according to fundamental concepts or principles of international law. 
Examination of the primary sources relevant to the transition to protectorate, mandate, and 
to a lesser extent the trust territory, revealed that in each instance, the constituent sources of 
authority effectively formalised ambiguity as to where the various elements of ‘sovereignty’ 
resided, over which elements of ‘territory’ such power could be exercised, and the basic 
principles according to which administrative authority was constituted and exercised. From 
the perspective of Nauru, the history of international law from the period of imperial 
competition in the late nineteenth century through to universalisation of the state form in 
the later twentieth century does not unfold as a conceptually driven process in which each 
key phase marked a progressive advance in international legal thought.13 It appears rather as 
a process of experimentation in imperial administration driven by commercial and 
geopolitical imperatives, in which the state is recast as a phase in the development of an 
administrative form established in the late nineteenth century, rather than a radical shift in 
type.  
With this insight, the research question descended from the realm of conceptual history and 
into the mundane business of local administration: resisting reversion to conceptual 
explanations, how did the island of Nauru become a protectorate, a mandate, a trust territory, 
and then a state, and how were these shifts in the international status of Nauru reflected in 
local administrative practice? More generally, what might a close reading of the history of 
Nauru as an object of international legal administration reveal about the relationship between 
imperialism and international law that accounts focusing on more ‘central’ sites of 
international legal formation do not? What emerges most strongly in this narrative is a sense 
of the difference between ‘the’ history of international law as the development of an ideal 
conceptual framework for governing the world, and the histories of international law as 
actually practised in place.  
                                                            
Nineteenth Century (Duke University Press, 1973); Gerrit Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society 
(Oxford University Press, 1984). On Eurocentrism, see section 5.2.2 ‘The problem of ‘Eurocentricity’ below.  
13 Many international law textbooks commence with accounts of the history of international law that posit this 
form of progressive conceptual development; see for example Alina Kaczorowska-Ireland, Public International 
Law (Routledge, 4th ed, 2010), 3–4.  
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3. Methodology  
3.1 The sources  
The narrative method adopted in this project emerged from my attempt to bring these 
questions to bear on a particular set of sources relating to the historical formation of Nauru 
as an object of international law. The sources drawn upon in this project fall into two 
categories, one narrowly and the other broadly construed. The first narrowly cast category 
comprises the primary legal instruments that effected changes in the international status and 
in the administrative form of Nauru. This category traverses contemporary distinctions 
between public and private law, and includes contracts, agreements, legislative instruments, 
executive ordinances, treaties and constitutions. The second category comprises 
contemporaneous sources that offer insight into how and why those legal and official 
instruments were created. These include administrative correspondence, legislative papers 
and transcripts, commission reports, newspaper articles, and scholarly works. I have not 
privileged recourse to the ‘traditional’ sources of international law – treaty, custom, principle, 
judicial decisions and received juridical writings – drawing on them only when they deal with 
the legal status or administrative form of Nauru. I have done so as the primary means of 
holding the island of Nauru, rather than ‘international law’, at the centre of the narrative. 
 
My initial observations of these two categories of source created interesting problems in 
thinking through how to order an historical narrative around them. The first was the 
centrality of the company to the administrative formation of Nauru. The line from Hanseatic 
firm Goddefroy & Sohn, through the Jaluit Gesellschaft, the Pacific Phosphate Company, and the 
British Phosphate Commission to the Nauru Phosphate Corporation was as significant to 
the administrative formation of Nauru as the line of ‘public’ officials and bodies to which 
international status officially attached. The second observation was that shifts in international 
status did not necessarily result in or correlate with substantive changes in administrative 
form. This highlighted a need to attend to status and form as related but distinct phenomena. 
The third observation was that most of the instruments and decisions that purported to 
effect major changes in the status of Nauru – such as the official declaration of protectorate 
status, or the Mandate for Nauru - were brief, if not cursory. Such document therefore 
required contextualisation within their site of production. Regulations and ordinances of the 
Bismarckian Reich required placement in the Reichstag and the Rechtskolonialamt (the German 
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Colonial Office); decisions of the Pacific Phosphate Company required placement in its 
company offices; and so on. It was in finding a way to address these issues whilst resisting 
the temptation to simply contextualise the history of the formation of Nauru within received 
narratives of the history of imperialism and international law that a method developed for 
this project. In this sense, the focus on Nauru required that administrative practice in place 
be taken seriously as an historical phenomenon. There was thus a real recursivity between 
the sources, the method, and the argument constructed in this project.      
3.2 Theoretical influences 
This project builds upon literatures and traditions that have been formative in my own 
training across the disciplines of law, history, and social theory. The theoretical influences 
that proved most helpful in engaging with the Nauruan sources were critical redescription as 
developed within the renewed jurisprudential tradition of jurisdictional thinking, and 
Weberian sociological analysis. Each is considered in turn here.    
3.2.1 Jurisdictional thinking 
In this project, ‘jurisdictional thinking’ is understood less as a theory of law than as a 
sensibility that attends to the practices of authorisation that precede the articulation of law, 
rather than to the content of the law that is articulated.14 Dorsett and McVeigh describe 
‘jurisdictional thinking’ as ‘giv(ing) us a distinct way of representing authority’ through 
attending to the forms that law takes, as a question precedent to the content of that law. In 
their treatment, jurisdictional thinking reveals the way in which the ‘abstractness and 
immateriality of law is greatly exaggerated’.15 Jurisdictional thinking thus emphasises aspects 
of law as a social phenomenon that are often relegated to introductory paragraphs on the 
‘history’ of a particular area of law, or otherwise to the deceptively dry realm of ‘procedural’ 
law; the ritualised behaviours, the forms of words and the symbolic vocabularies that mark 
out the ‘legal’ from other registers of socio-political conduct.16 Stated another way, paying 
                                                            
14 Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Laws of Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account of International Law’ (2013) 1 London Review 
of International Law 63. 
15 See Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh, Jurisdiction (Routledge, 2012), 5–6. See also Shaunnagh Dorsett 
and Shaun McVeigh, ‘Questions of Jurisdiction’ in Shaun McVeigh (ed), Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction (Routledge 
Cavendish, 2007), 3–18. 
16 Dorsett and McVeigh, ‘Jurisdiction’ above n 15, 24–25; Shaun McVeigh and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Rival 
Jurisdictions: The Promise and Loss of Sovereignty’ in Charles Barbour and George Pavlich (eds), After 
Sovereignty: On the Question of Political Beginnings (London: Routledge Cavendish, 2011), 97–114.  
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attention to jurisdiction requires paying attention to the thresholds across which the political 
becomes legal, and to the material forms those thresholds take.17 
   
Jurisdictional thinking is particularly relevant to the study of international law, which 
struggles more than municipal law to establish its identity as law.18 This difficulty is often 
understood by critical legal scholars theoretically – for example, as a result of the radical 
indeterminacy of international law as a mode of reasoning19 - rather than politically, as a 
result of the failure of the proponents of international law to normalise its legitimacy as an 
‘international’ law or supranational jurisdiction. This is so even though the procedural 
question of whether or not a matter is ‘within jurisdiction’ – or in other words, has passed 
over the threshold from the political to the legal, or alternatively from the municipal to the 
international – repeatedly proves contentious in cases before international courts.20 For the 
postcolonial and the decolonial scholar, jurisdictional thinking is useful in that it holds at 
arms’ length the question of the ‘correct’ legal interpretation of a given conflict, allowing for 
the recognition of non-European legal traditions and practices of authorising ‘international’ 
conduct that are often practised by non-European subjects, but do not lend themselves to 
characterisation in legal submissions as ‘proper’ legal argument or ‘proper’ legal method.21 In 
so doing, jurisdictional thinking reveals the colonial violence inherent in the equation of the 
subjective ‘mastery’ of international legal technique with some objective standard of virtue, 
reason or competence. It also, and most importantly, creates the possibility of imagining 
                                                          
17 Dorsett and McVeigh, ‘Jurisdiction’ above n 15, 11–12. 
18 See Umut Özsu, ‘Legal Form’ in Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh (eds), Fundamental Concepts for International 
Law: The Construction of a Discipline (Edward Elgar, 2017), forthcoming. 
19 As Koskeniemmi describes, the claim of the radical indeterminacy of international law is not that all legal 
terms are semantically ambivalent, but that international law is ‘based on contradictory premises’, and that this 
contradiction in purpose is ‘an absolutely central aspect of international law’s acceptability’. Martti 
Koskeniemmi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 590–591.  
20 See generally Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2015). For an 
account of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case of 1951 that argues for renewed attention to the significance 
of historical struggles over international jurisdiction in the context of decolonisation, see Sundhya Pahuja and 
Cait Storr, ‘Rethinking Iran and International Law: The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case Revisited’ in James 
Crawford, Abdul G Koroma, Alain Pellet & Said Mahmoudi, The International Legal Order: Current Needs and 
Possible Responses. Essays in Honour of Djamchid Momtaz (Martinus Nijhoff, 2017), forthcoming. 
21 An example, albeit a highly attenuated one, of this kind of recognition is the allowance of ‘cultural artefacts’ 
as evidence in native title cases in Australia. See Kirsten Anker, ‘The Truth in Painting: Cultural Artefacts as 
Proof of Native Title’ (2005), 9 Law Text Culture, 91–124. See also C F Black, The Land is the Source of the Law: A 
Dialogic Encounter with Indigenous Jurisprudence (Routledge, 2011). 
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modes of engaging with different legal traditions – of creating spaces of ‘encounter’22 - that 
do not assume the universality of European legal rationalities.    
 
In terms of methodology, jurisdictional thinking deploys methods more readily associated 
with historical or sociological analysis, whilst insisting on the propriety of those methods to 
the study of law. The method deployed in this project is that of critical redescription. The 
reinvigoration of critical redescription as international legal method owes much to the 
contributions of Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh, Anne Orford, and Sundhya Pahuja 
on how we might understand the construction of legal authority through attention to 
practices of authorisation. This vein of work on ‘redescription’ is one branch of a number of 
cross-disciplinary lineages of the term, many of which inherit from historian Quentin 
Skinner’s influential formulation of ‘rhetorical redescription’ as historical method in the 
1970s.23 Pahuja defines critical redescription as ‘an attempt to redefine through narrative, a 
world we take for granted, inviting it to be seen differently as a mode of political 
engagement’.24 The implication here is that all international legal analysis relies on 
foundational narratives of ‘international law’ – of beginnings, of central characters, of 
formative events, of central places – in order to legitimise its status as legal; and that those 
foundational narratives are not universally shared. Critical redescription offers a potential 
means of responding to a radical plurality of perspective without either imposing or 
purporting to transcend one’s own.  
 
In a different rendering of the term, Orford describes the method developed in her key text, 
International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, as ‘re-description’ that ‘attempt(s) to 
describe practice whilst recognizing that the choice of what to include in such a description 
is always value-laden’.25 In ‘start(ing) with practices and mov(ing) on to their systematization 
and articulation in the form of the responsibility to protect concept’, Orford borrows from 
Foucault’s mode of describing - as opposed to explaining - transformations in structures of 
knowledge and power.26 In Orford’s treatment, critical redescription offers a means of 
                                                          
22 Pahuja asserts that the project of international law might productively be redescribed as a history of encounter 
between rival jurisdictions. See Pahuja, ‘Laws of Encounter’ above n 14. 
23 See Quentin Skinner, ‘The Techniques of Redescription’ above n 2; Quentin Skinner, ‘Rhetoric and 
Conceptual Change’ above n 2, 60–73; and Kari Palonen, above n 2, 41–59. 
24 Pahuja, ‘Laws of Encounter’ above n 14, 65.  
25 Anne Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law, 609, 624–625. 
26 Ibid 615–616. 
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understanding legal concepts and principles not as abstract or philosophical phenomena that 
exist prior to their application to the ‘real’ world, but as often retrospective justifications of 
administrative practices that develop iteratively in response to material or even mundane 
problems of governance.  
3.2.2 Weberian sociological analysis  
In addition to this vein of work on critical redescription as a method of jurisdictional 
thinking, the methodology and writings of German sociologist Max Weber have influenced 
the sensibility of this project. The concepts and terminology that Weber developed to 
describe European modernity not only remain foundational to the discipline of sociology but 
have taken on afterlives of their own across the humanities and social sciences.27 Weber 
understood his methodology as a science of economics that built upon the work of Karl 
Marx, yet from an anti-Hegelian perspective that rejected dialectical materialism as an 
unscholarly reduction of the complexity of historical fact.28 Marx was not Weber’s only or 
even his primary interlocutor; Weber rejected any form of structuralism that sought to 
describe historical phenomena according to singular causal explanations.29 As such, for 
Weber Marx’s dialectical materialism was not intrinsically wrong; in fact, Weber understood 
it to describe very well the socioeconomic conditions that prevailed in western Europe in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.30 But dialectical materialism could not be held as a 
universal truth; it was not sufficient as a universal explanation of history, or as an 
historiographical method.31  
                                                          
27 The journal Max Weber Studies publishes two issues a year, available at http://www.maxweberstudies.org/.  
28 See H H Gerth and C Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Routledge, 2009), 34; and 
Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in 
the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought’ (2004) 55 Hastings Law Journal 1031, 
1036–1037. 
29 Max Weber, ‘The ‘Objectivity’ in the Social and Economic Sciences’ in Hans Henrik Bruun and Sam 
Whimster (eds), Max Weber: Collected Methodological Writings (Routledge, 2012 [first published in Aarchiv Für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 1904]), 100, 111. Weber was particularly critical of Rudolf Stammler’s 
philosophy of law in his ‘Sociology of Law’ in Economy and Society; see Max Rheinstein (ed), Max Weber on Law 
in Economy and Society (Harvard University Press, 1954), 27–29. Kennedy notes that Weber positioned himself 
in counterpoint to both Marxist and ‘social’ critiques of mainstream legal thought. See Kennedy, above n 28, 
1034–1076. 
30 ‘Weber thus tries to relativize Marx’s work by placing it into a more generalized context and showing that 
Marx’s conclusions rest upon observations drawn from a dramatized ‘special case’, which is better seen as one 
case in a broad series of similar cases. This series as a whole exemplifies the comprehensive underlying trend 
of bureaucratization. Socialist class struggles are merely a vehicle implementing this trend’. Gerth and Mills 
above n 28, 46, 50; see also 65–69.  
31 ‘Anyone who has ever worked with Marxist concepts will be aware not only of the eminent, indeed unique, 
heuristic importance of those ideal types, when they are used as comparisons with reality, but also of how dangerous 
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Whilst to contemporary sensibilities, Weber’s writing can feel oddly mechanistic in its 
attempt to outline what is in effect a critical epistemology, his work relates to the questions 
posed by this thesis in a number of productive ways. Firstly, Weber’s career as a scholar 
spanned the period covered in the first two chapters of this history, from the early 1880s to 
his death in 1920.32 His work therefore offers an immanent insight into German 
administrative practice of this period, and a reading that is not anachronistically 
overdetermined by the effects of the Versailles settlement, the rise of National Socialism and 
the expansionism of the Third Reich on the German state, as many accounts of pre-war 
German imperialism tend to be.33 Secondly, his methodology of ideal types offers a way of 
considering the historical detail of local administrative practice without either assuming or 
foreclosing structuralist explanations of the development of international law. Thirdly, 
Weber’s account of bureaucratisation across public and corporate practice as a significant 
modern European phenomenon offers a way of holding together the mutual development 
of company and public office in the Nauruan story. The latter two contributions are 
considered in further detail below.              
Firstly, however, it is important to note that Weber is perhaps best known for his account of 
the relationship between the ‘Protestant’ ethic and the character of modern capitalism in the 
United States, and for his definition of the state as monopolising the legitimate use of force 
within a given area.34 Whilst neither formulation is deployed in this project, some clarification 
is warranted. In his essay, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber develops the 
concept of ‘elective affinity’ to describe the connection between political ideology and 
                                                          
they can be whenever they are presented as empirically valid, or even as real (which in fact means: 
metaphysical)…’ Weber, ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences’, above n 29, 132–133. Kevin Anderson has recently 
written that in Marx’s later notebooks, many of which are yet been published in English, Marx engaged with 
the fact of cultural difference of non-Western societies subject to colonial and imperial rule, including India, 
Indonesia, and Algeria. Anderson argues that this engagement had an effect on Marx’s formulation of historical 
materialism, which shifted from the fixed unilinearity of the Communist Manifesto toward a more nuanced, non-
reductionist critique of capitalist expansion. See Kevin B Anderson, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity 
and Non-Western Societies (University of Chicago Press, 2016), 237–245.  
32 For a good biographical summary, see Gerth and Mills, above n 28, 3–31. 
33 On Weber, see generally Wolfgang Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics 1890–1920 (Michael S Steinberg 
trans, University of Chicago Press, 1984) [trans of: Max Weber und die deutsche Politik, 1890–1920 (2nd ed, 1974)]. 
For treatments of the complex debate over historiography and the German state, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The 
German Empire 1871–1914 (Kym Traynor trans, Berg Publishers, 1985) [trans of Deutsche 
Gessellschaftsgeschichte 1871–1914 (first published 1973)]; cf Michael Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The 
Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany (Oxford University Press, 
1984); Theodore S Hamerow, ‘Guilt, Redemption and Writing German History’ (1983) 88 The American 
Historical Review 1, 53; and Sven Oliver Muller and Cornelius Torp (eds), Imperial Germany Revisited: Continuing 
Debates and New Perspectives (Berghahn Books, 2011).  
34 See Wilhelm Hennis, Max Weber’s Central Question (Keith Tribe trans, 2nd ed, Threshold Press, 2000), 10.  
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material interests.35 In contradistinction to Marx, Weber argued that it was not the case that 
the political subject’s material interests determined their ideological position, producing fixity 
of class; rather, the political subject would tend to adopt ideological positions that aligned 
with their interests construed broadly, and including religion and culture, which he regarded 
as wrongly minimised by strict application of dialectical materialism.36 Although Weber’s text 
sought to explain the differences between the trajectories of modern capitalism as practiced 
in western Europe and in the United States whilst remaining critical of both as modes of 
legitimised domination,37 reductive interpretations of Weber’s work have been subsequently 
instrumentalised to support universalist theories of development.38 Similarly, Weber is 
known for the definition of the state initially offered in his essay Politics as a Vocation as a 
‘human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory’39, a formulation taken up to various ends in political theory, 
international relations, and international law. Weber himself however did not hold this 
formulation of the state to be universally true across time and space.40 Whilst this project in 
one sense comprises an account of postcolonial state formation, it does not take up 
interpretations of Weber that hold his work out as offering a template of state development.41   
3.2.2.1 Weber on causal analysis 
Rather, this project borrows most readily from aspects of Weber’s methodological approach 
to causal analysis, and from his account of bureaucratisation. Each is considered here in turn. 
In his later writings, Weber outlined a methodology he described as ‘singular causal 
                                                          
35 Max Weber, Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Talcott Parsons trans, Routledge, 1992 [trans of Die 
protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus (first published 1904)]; Gerth and Mills, above n 28, 61–
63.  
36 See generally Weber, Protestant Ethic, above n 35, 2–12; 102–125. As Chantal Thomas notes, Weber cautioned 
against a reductive interpretation of his thesis in the Protestant Ethic via the simple substitution of cultural and 
religious causes for the economic causes he regarded as overdetermined in Marx’s theory of history. Chantal 
Thomas, ‘Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and the Sociology of Legal Reform: A Reassessment with Implications 
for Law and Development’ (2006) 15 Minnesota Journal of International Law 2, 383, 391, 412–414.  
37 Weber’s use of Goethe to effectively denounce the effects of modern capitalism in the United States is 
famously damning: ‘Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that is has attained 
a level of civilisation never before achieved’. Weber, Protestant Ethic, above n 35, 124.  
38 Thomas, above n 36, 410. 
39 Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, reproduced in H H Gerth and C Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology (Routledge, 2009) [trans of: Politik als Beruf (first published 1921)], 77, 78, 82–83. 
40 ‘The assumption that a state ‘exists’ only if and when the coercive means of the political community are 
superior to all others, is anti-sociological’. Rheinstein, above n 29, 16; also Weber, above n 29, 130.  
41 See Thomas above n 36, 423–424.  
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analysis’.42 For Weber, what was singular was the historical event, object or process to be 
described, and the ‘causal analysis’ was the method to be applied to its description. Weber’s 
notion of causal analysis relied on the use of what he termed the ‘ideal type’.43 The ideal type 
was not a normative or evaluative ideal of how a thing should be, but rather an abstracted 
conceptualisation of what a thing is.44 Weber used the phrase interchangeably with ‘concept’ 
and ‘principle’.45 However, Weber’s point was not that his ideal types were essential 
renderings of concepts as generally deployed in scholarly discourse. His point was that a 
scholar should make explicit the ideal types or concepts with which they work, and deploy 
them not as explanations of social phenomena, but heuristic devices against which social 
phenomena could be described.46 In this way, the practitioner was forced to make explicit 
the conceptual assumptions which they necessarily brought to bear on purportedly objective 
descriptions of fact.47 In some contexts, the ideal type and the historical reality would accord 
very well; in others, they would be at odds.48  
What Weber offered in his methodology was one means of navigating the task of historical 
description without either assuming structural explanation, or foreclosing any possibility of 
structural explanation in favour of radical contingency.49 Weber’s care to avoid reductive 
ascription of causation allows for numerous causal processes to intersect in historical 
description, without abandoning the scholarly imperative of bringing an organising 
conceptual framework to bear on the object of study. The possibility of structural or 
metaphysical explanation for historical processes is not disavowed by Weber; indeed his 
concept of ‘rationalisation’, although deployed in different senses in his work, grounds his 
account of the historical development of European modernity.50 But his insistence on causal 
complexity and on the discontinuities between heuristic ‘ideal types’ and historical reality 
allowed for divergences from type to be kept within description.51 As such his methodology 
                                                          
42 Weber, ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences’, above n 29, 125–126; also Frtiz K Ringer, Max Weber’s Methodology: 
The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences (Harvard University Press, 1998), 1–6.  
43 Weber, ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences’, above n 29, 125; Bruun and Whimster,  above n 29, xxiv–xxv. 
44 Weber, ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences’, above n 29, 116; Gerth and Mills, above n 28, 59–60. 
45 Weber, ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences’, above n 29, 116–138. Bruun and Whimster note that Weber’s use 
of his own terminology was not always consistent. Bruun and Whimster, above n 29, xvi. 
46 Ringer, above n 42, 5. 
47 Weber, ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences’, above n 29, 126; Ringer, above n 42, 5–6. 
48 Weber, ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences’, above n 29, 127. 
49 Gary Wilder describes the risk of ‘descriptive empiricism...masquerad(ing) as theoretical insight’ in Gary 
Wilder, ‘From Optic to Topic: The Foreclosure Effect of Historiographic Turns’ (2012) 117(3) American 
Historical Review 723, 730. 
50 Gerth and Mills, above n 28, 51; 57–58. 
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engenders a praxis in which actually existing reality can be ever better described, but never 
perfectly ‘explained’.52 The purpose of sociological analysis was not ‘evaluation’, or normative 
judgment, of social phenomena; as Kennedy describes, ‘Weber is famous for his insistence 
on a sharp distinction between the sociological is and the ethical or political ought’.53 The 
purpose was rather to acknowledge the inevitability of the gap between the analytical 
concepts deployed by the scholar in the register of historical description, and the actually 
existing reality of what was described.54 That acknowledgement created the possibility of 
better appreciating how and in what circumstances our conceptual understanding of 
historical development differs from historical reality.55  
Weber was trained as a lawyer.56 He completed his academic and his legal professional 
training concurrently.57 Weber’s legal training seems to have influenced both his 
methodology and his account of the modern European state as given in his sociology of 
law.58 With respect to methodology, there is much in his account of the use of the ideal type 
as a heuristic tool for constructing analyses of historical phenomena that resonates with legal 
doctrinal methodology of the application of legal rules and principles to fact scenarios.59 The 
difference is that, unlike the doctrinal lawyer, Weber was not seeking to reach a conclusive 
interpretation of fact situation according to legal principle; he was not, in other words, 
seeking to reduce the mess of historical reality to conformity with concepts.60 The stated 
intention of Weber’s methodology was precisely the inverse. His use of the ideal type - of 
the concept, the principle - as a heuristic tool was designed not to describe historical 
phenomena in conceptual terms, but rather to better apprehend the gap between analytical 
concept and historical fact, a task taken up in this project.       
                                                          
52 Weber, ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences’, above n 29, 11. 
53 Kennedy, above n 28, 1036; Weber in Rheinstein, above n 29, 12.  
54 Gerth and Mills, above n 28, 60. 
55 Weber, ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences’, above n 29, 113–114. 
56 Gerth and Mills, above n 28, 10–12. For the seminal biography of Weber, see Marianne Weber, Max Weber: 
A Biography (Harry Zohn trans, Wiley, 1975) [trans of: Biografie de Max Weber (first published 1926)]. 
57 Gerth and Mills, above n 28, 10–12. 
58 Weber’s student, Max Rheinstein, extracted the lengthy chapter on the sociology of law included in the 
posthumously published in Economy and Society in Rheinstein, above n 29. Panu Minkkinen has more recently 
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59 Weber in Rheinstein, above n 29, 11–12. 
60 Weber, ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences’, above n 29, 116. 
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Weber’s sociology of law is grounded in his account of modern legal authority as constituted 
not by objective legitimacy, but by legitimised or legitimate domination.61 Legality was the 
type of legitimised domination that characterised the European modern condition.62 Weber’s 
treatment of legal authority was at odds with liberal legal thought of his time, which held the 
Rousseauian concept of voluntary consent to be the foundation of legitimate rule.63 For 
Weber, the authority of the modern European state – as a ‘relation of men dominating 
men’64, supported by means of violence – was upheld by ‘belief in the validity of legal statute 
and functional ‘competence’ based on rationally created rules’.65 It followed that in order to 
describe legal authority as an historical phenomenon, one looked not to principles of 
democracy, monarchy or theism, but to practices of legitimisation. In this sense, Weber’s 
account of law is not dissimilar to the rendering of jurisdictional thinking given above, in 
directing attention to the practices of legitimisation that occur prior to the law being given 
content, rather than focusing exclusively on the content of that law.66     
3.2.2.2 Weber on bureaucracy 
In addition to his methodological approach to the relation between concept and practice, 
this project aligns with Weber’s insistence on the significance of bureaucracy as central to 
the modern European condition.67 Weber defined modern bureaucracy as possessing a set 
of characteristics, comprising fixed and official jurisdictional areas ordered by rules; the fixed 
distribution of authority to give commands, and the fixed hierarchical distribution of 
activities as official duties; the primacy of written documents or ‘files’; the separation of 
public official activity from private activity; and the development of expertise in the 
execution of official activity.68 Weber considered the emergence of modern bureaucracy as 
common to both ‘public’ and ‘private’ organisations of authority: ‘bureaucratic authority’, in 
                                                          
61 Rheinstein, above n 29, 8–9, 333–337; Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, above n 39, 78–79; Kennedy, above n 
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65 Ibid 78–79. 
66 Dorsett and McVeigh, ‘Jurisdiction’ above n 15, 10–12. 
67 Max Weber, ‘Bureaucracy’, reproduced in H H Gerth and C Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber: Essays in 
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the sense of public administration, and ‘bureaucratic management’, in the sense of corporate 
hierarchy, were facets of the same modern phenomenon.69  
For Weber, the emergence of modern bureaucracy was related to economic and political 
developments more commonly associated with European modernity, namely capitalism and 
democracy.70 The development of a money economy that allowed the regular payment of 
wages to officials was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of 
bureaucracy. The initial stages of bureaucratisation were dependent on the security of income 
payable to officials, which enabled the separation of official service as an exclusive vocation.71 
The emergence of ‘modern mass democracy’ was another necessary condition, although it 
should be noted that Weber’s understanding of democracy was not consistent with the 
contemporary liberal connotations attached to the term;72 for Weber, democratisation was 
synonymous with the depersonalisation of authority and its attachment to public offices, and 
is thus more akin to the contemporary notion of the ‘rule of law’.73 In Weber’s schema, there 
was therefore no necessary contradiction between democratic structure of government and 
autocratic rule.74  
This project is particularly interested in Weber’s understanding of bureaucratisation. For 
Weber, democratisation and bureaucratisation in western Europe had occurred in tandem, 
the former depersonalising political power and levelling traditional status-based power 
relations, the latter producing organisational complexity that favoured hierarchy and the 
development of expertise.75 Once instantiated, bureaucratic organisation tended to prevail as 
a means of administering authority, for its comparative efficiency or ‘technical superiority’ in 
executing authoritative command.76 At the same time, in consonance with Weber’s notion 
of elective affinity, officials themselves tended to identify their power as justified by objective 
                                                          
69 Ibid 196, 214–215; Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’,  above n 39, 91. Weber submitted his doctoral thesis on 
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76 Weber, ‘Bureaucracy’, above n 67, 214. 
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ideals in order to maintain that power.77 Once established, bureaucracy was incredibly hard 
to dismantle: ‘where the bureaucratization of administration has been completely carried 
through, a form of power relation is established that is practically unshatterable’.78 
‘Bureaucratisation’ referred to the qualitative intensification of bureaucratic activity once 
established, rather than quantitative increase in the scope of tasks.79 For Weber, there was 
thus a contradiction in the parallel emergence of ‘mass’ democracy and bureaucratic 
organisation of the state in modern Europe. What tended to occur in response to democratic 
pressures on authority was change in the identity of the persons in office, but not shifts in 
the power relation institutionalised in bureaucratic form.80 Bureaucratisation was therefore a 
process of ‘societalising’ relations of domination.81  
3.3 The method deployed in this project 
Weber’s methodology is not deployed slavishly in this project, which tends to privilege an 
aesthetic sense of historical narrative. Rather, Weber’s understanding of law as legitimised 
domination and his account of bureaucratisation inform the emphasis of the redescription 
that is offered here. In that sense, this thesis demonstrates Kennedy’s assessment of the 
diffuse influence of Weber on critical legal studies as the ‘reinvention, or adaptation to non-
Weberian purposes, of Weberian wheels’.82 If the approach adopted in this project is 
articulated in Weberian terms, the ‘object of analysis’ is the administrative form applied to 
the island of Nauru. The ‘ideal types’ against which I am tracing the administrative form 
applied to Nauru are the status designations of protectorate, mandate, trust territory and 
state. Articulated in my terms, this project redescribes administrative practice in Nauru as a 
key site of international legal formation. The thesis describes the shifts in the international 
status of Nauru and shifts in administrative form at a local level as related but distinct 
phenomena.  
What emerges is not a continuous chronological account of the administration of Nauru 
since its incorporation into the German protectorate of the Marshall Islands in 1888, but 
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rather a detailed account of four fundamental shifts in the status of Nauru in international 
law, and the impact of those shifts at the level of local administration: the shift into German 
administration with the incorporation into the Marshall Islands protectorate in 1888 (Chapter 
2); the shift to ‘mandatory’ international administration with the creation of the C Mandate 
in 1920 (Chapter 3); the shift to international ‘trusteeship’ with the creation of the Trust 
Territory of Nauru in 1947 (Chapter 4); and the shift to Nauruan administration with the 
creation of the Republic of Nauru in 1968 (Chapter 5). In this account, a particular quality 
of the relationship between imperialism and international law comes into focus. The 
insistence on the centrality of Nauru demands that attention be paid to administrative 
practice; and the attention to administrative practice reveals a disjuncture between 
international status and imperial form. Stated simply, while status shifts, form accretes. As 
significant changes in the status of Nauru take place, the form of administration does not 
radically change structure so much as undergo a process of internal bureaucratisation and 
external restatement according to the prevailing concepts of the period. 
Before elaborating this argument, certain key terms require some definition. For the purposes 
of this project, I use the term ‘administration’ rather than ‘bureaucracy’, as in contemporary 
English usage the former better encapsulates Weber’s reference to both public and private 
authority than does ‘bureaucracy’, which is more readily associated with public office.83 I use 
the term ‘status’ simply to denote status recognised in international law.84 I use ‘form’ not in 
a philosophical sense, but borrow from Dorsett and McVeigh’s work on jurisdiction to define 
form simply as practice that takes on shape and meaning in its repetition.85 For the purposes 
of this project, I draw heuristic parallels between status and concept on the one hand, and 
form and practice on the other. I use ‘administration’ simply to mean the collective execution 
                                                          
83 Weber himself used the terms bureaucracy and administration to similar effect; see Weber in Rheinstein, 
above n 29, 330–337.  
84 I am sidestepping a literature on international legal personality, which reads status as more constitutive than 
I do in this project. See Fleur Johns (ed), International Legal Personality (Ashgate, 2010); Janne Elisabeth Nijman, 
The Concept of International Legal Personality: An Inquiry into the History and Theory of International Law (TMC Asser 
Press, 2004); Rose Parfitt, ‘Empire des Nègres Blancs: The Hybridity of International Personality and the 
Abyssinia Crisis of 1935–36’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law, 849; Natasha Wheatley, ‘New Subjects 
in International Law and Order’ in Patricia Clavin and Glenda Sluga (eds), Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century 
History (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 265.  
85 Dorsett and McVeigh, ‘Jurisdiction’ above n 15, 139. This approach also sidesteps the literature on legal 
formalism; for a recent helpful treatment, see Umut Özsu, ‘Legal Form’ in Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh 




of authoritative command.86 I use the term ‘authority’ in the Weberian sense of legitimate 
domination, rather than objectively constituted legitimate authority.87 This approach reflects 
the influence of jurisdictional thinking, which directs attention to the practices of 
authorisation that make possible the articulation of law.88  
3.3 Limitations of the methodology 
As described above, this project deals primarily with two categories of source: the primary 
legal instruments that effected changes in the status of Nauru in international law, and 
contemporaneous sources which offer insight into how and why those legal and official 
instruments were created. There is obviously a significant degree of subjective judgment 
brought to bear in determining the scope of the second category, and certain deviations 
require acknowledgment here. Firstly, the requirement of contemporaneity has not been 
applied strictly where I faced limitations in the availability of contemporaneous sources in 
English translation. This was particularly the case in Chapter 2, which deals with German 
administrative practice, and I rely more heavily on subsequent historical analyses of the 
period here than in Chapters 2 and 3. I acknowledge this as a limitation of the methodology 
and indeed of the content of this chapter. Secondly, there are extended sections where the 
historical narrative takes recourse to sources and themes that seem to stretch the requirement 
of relation to instruments in the first category. Examples include the passage on the history 
of the Hansa in Chapter 2; and the passage on the relationship between the emergence of 
agricultural chemistry as a discipline, the commodification of phosphate, and comparative 
mining law in Chapter 3; and the passage on the war of the Pacific in Chapter 4. These 
choices follow from holding the Nauruan case at the centre of the narrative, which shifts the 
emphasis of historical context deemed ‘necessary’ to understanding each period in question. 
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4. The argument  
The argument offered in this thesis is twofold, and can be stated as follows. Sovereign 
statehood is the latest stage in a series of shifts in the status of Nauru in international law 
which commenced with the German declaration of protectorate status over the island in 
1888, and continued through the designation of Nauru as a C Mandate in 1920, the re-
designation of Nauru as a United Nations Trust Territory in 1947, and to the recognition of 
Nauru as a sovereign state in 1968.  Each shift has been justified according to international 
legal principles of protection, mandate, trust, and then self-government, yet was preceded by 
commercial and geopolitical instabilities in the maintenance of imperial control over the 
island. Throughout this series of shifts in status, the administrative form applied to the island 
has not radically changed structure so much as undergone a process of internal 
bureaucratisation and external restatement according to the prevailing concepts of the 
period. The first element of the argument then, is that while international status shifts, 
imperial form accretes; the shift in the international status of Nauru from trust territory to 
sovereign state in 1968 corresponded at the level of local administration to a stage in the 
bureaucratisation of an imperial administrative form instantiated in the late nineteenth 
century. 
A particular relation between form and status – between local administrative practice and 
international legal concept - emerges in this history. In response to commercial and 
geopolitical imperatives, an existing administrative form is applied outside of the context in 
which it developed. The application of existing form to novel circumstance is effected by 
legal instruments that, insofar as they are held to effect law outside of sovereign territorial 
jurisdiction, not only renovate administrative form, but innovate legal authority. Each 
innovation of legal authority is retrospectively justified in terms of legal concepts that support 
the recognition of a shift in status in international law. As the administrative form becomes 
institutionalised over time, however, what occurs at the administrative level in response to 
commercial and political pressure is a bureaucratisation of the existing administrative form. 
Stated another way, whilst status shifts, form accretes. The relations of authority established 
by forms of imperial administration, and the external relations that imperial administrative 
forms facilitate, are not dismantled by shifts in status. Rather, administrative form originally 
set up to facilitate imperial extraction of resources without regard for place or people is 
gradually bureaucratised in accordance with the concepts developed in support of status. 
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Administrative tasks and practices intensify, are restated and renamed, but the form in which 
they are organised holds.   
The second element of the argument is that this relationship between legal status and 
administrative form becomes visible in the attempt to hold Nauru at the centre of the 
narrative of a history of international law from the late nineteenth century to decolonisation 
in the 1960s. The fixing of Nauru at the centre of the narrative produces an account that 
reveals a disjuncture between status and form. This argument about the effect on historical 
perspective of fixing one place over another as central to the construction of narrative is the 
fundamental point gestured toward in this thesis. All histories of international law require 
narrative choices that centralise certain sites of international legal formation over others. This 
privileging of place, whether it occurs intentionally or not, affects the narrative that is 
constructed, perhaps as significantly as does ideological presumption. It follows from this 
simple methodological point that histories that privilege the received ‘centres’ of 
international law – Berlin, Versailles, San Francisco, The Hague, New York – may well work 
to erase as much about the international legal order as they reveal.  
The choice to centralise a place habitually regarded as peripheral to or anomalous within the 
international order is thus both a methodological and a political one. What emerges from 
this project is a better sense of the difference between ‘the’ history of international law as a 
mode of conceptual reasoning – the international law of negotiated agreements, treaty 
interpretation, judicial decisions and juridical writings – and the histories of international law 
as actually practised in place, in the exercise of administrative powers, the allocation of 
budgets, the writing of reports, and the ad hoc practices of rule that develop in the gaps 
between ‘ideal’ concepts and local circumstance. The political intention of the project is to 
encourage a greater understanding of the partiality of all histories of international law, and to 
suggest that there is a need for greater nuance in the way the Eurocentricity of international 
law is understood. As discussed below at 5.2.1, Eurocentricity is quite literally a geographic 
conceit, as well as an epistemological, normative and protagonal one; and it is a 
Eurocentricity that can be resisted.    
5. Locating this project in the literature on imperialism and international law 
Any description of the formation of the international legal order is necessarily an act of 
intervention in the field which operates within its own conditions of possibility, as Craven 
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has observed.89 This project is offered as a contribution to - or perhaps more accurately as a 
counterpoint within - the genre of histories of imperialism and international law.90 
Treatments of the relationship between imperialism and international law have expanded 
into something of a transdisciplinary phenomenon over the last few decades.91 As Susan 
Marks has usefully sketched out, accounts of the relationship between imperialism and 
international law tend to fall within three broad narrative tropes, which are distinguished by 
what ‘empire’ is assumed to mean.92 Where ‘empire’ is equated with colonialism in the sense 
of direct imposition of administrative control, contemporary international law is figured as 
defeating imperialism in its centrality to the decolonisation project of the later twentieth 
century.93 Where ‘empire’ is equated with political hegemony such as that of the post-Cold 
War dominance of the United States, contemporary international law is figured as defeated 
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by imperialism.94 Where ‘empire’ is equated with economic globalisation, international law 
and imperialism are figured as mutually constituted.95 Within Marks’ broad schema, this 
project falls most readily within the third approach, in that it holds modern European 
imperialism and international law to be mutually constitutive. The definition of imperialism 
adopted in this project is prosaic: imperialism is simply defined as the institutionalisation of 
practices that authorise extraterritorial conduct, whether commercial, political or otherwise.96 
This is an enabling definition that allows the content of ‘imperialism’ to change over time 
and space and allows for difference between empires to emerge from the sources, without 
foreclosing the possibility of structural explanations of why and how imperialism takes 
certain forms.97  
This project bears obvious familial resemblance to the work of Antony Anghie on the 
relationship between the case of Nauru and the history of international law, and has benefited 
from Anghie’s key interventions in the field.98 Anghie’s work is most readily identified with 
the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement.99 The political 
                                                          
94 The prominent example here is Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire (Harvard University Press, 2000).  
95 Marks, ‘Three Concepts’, above n 92, 903. See also Akbar Rasulov, ‘Writing About Empire: Remarks on the 
Logic of a Discourse’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 449, 461–468. 
96 This definition obviously owes a debt to jurisdictional thinking; see Anne Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without 
Territory: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 30 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 981.  
97 As Marks suggests, for international lawyers the definition of imperialism one adopts is intimately related to 
presumptions about the nature of the relationship between imperialism and international law. On 
Koskeniemmi’s reckoning, this suggests a fundamental ‘imperial ambivalence’ in international law. See Martti 
Koskeniemmi, ‘Introduction: International Law and Empire: Aspects and Approaches’ and in Martti 
Koskeniemmi, Walter Rech and Manuel Jimenez Fonseca (eds), International Law and Empire: Historical 
Explanations (Oxford University Press, 2017), (forthcoming). For a thoughtful treatment on the role and 
importance of historical narrative in constructing this relationship, see Walter Rech, ‘International Law, Empire 
and the Relative Indeterminacy of Narrative’ in Martti Koskeniemmi, Walter Rech and Manuel Jimenez Fonseca 
(eds), International Law and Empire: Historical Explanations (Oxford University Press, 2017), (forthcoming).  
98 Antony Anghie, ‘‘The Heart of My Home’: Colonialism, Environmental Damage and the Nauru Case’ (1993) 
34 Harvard International Law Journal 445; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 1–12. 
99 See generally Antony Anghie and B S Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflict’ in Steven R Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds), The Methods of 
International Law (American Society of International Law, 2004), 185; Antony Anghie, ‘TWAIL: Past and Future’ 
(2008) 10(4) International Community Law Review 479; and James Thuo Gathii, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its 
Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography’ (2011) 3 Trade, Law and Development 26. For 
an excellent overview and indicative bibliography of the TWAIL movement, see Gathii, above n 99, 26–64. 
The political origins of the movement are often located in the advocacy and writings of international legal 
practitioners active in the 1960s–1980s who broadly identified as ‘Third World’, including R P Anand, 
Mohammed Bedjaoui, M Sornarajah, J J G Syatauw, and others. Key collections in the TWAIL movement as 
restated from late 1990s include Antony Anghie, B S Chimni, Karin Mickelson (eds), The Third World and 
International Legal Order: Law, Politics and Globalization (Bill Publishers, 2003); the symposium introduced in B S 
Chimni, ‘The World of TWAIL: Introduction to the Special Issue (2011) 3 Trade, Law and Development 1, 14–25; 
and most recently, the symposium introduced in Usha Natarajan, John Reynolds, Amar Bhatia and Sujith 
Xavier, ‘Introduction: TWAIL — On Praxis and the Intellectual’ (2016) 37(11) Third World Quarterly 1946. 
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sensibility of this project aligns broadly with TWAIL. In its insistence on Nauru as a case of 
analytical significance, the departure point of this thesis is similar to that of Anghie in 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, yet the path traversed from that point 
is different: this project emphasises administrative practice as instantiated in Nauru, rather 
than the development of fundamental concepts of international law.100 As a result, the 
continuity between imperialism and international law is traced not through concepts of the 
civilizing mission and cultural difference that condition postcolonial sovereignty, as Anghie 
argues with such effect, but through grounded practices of administration.101 The intention 
is not to query the significance of Anghie’s work, or of conceptual analyses of sovereignty 
and international law more generally.102 It is rather to give sustained critical attention toward 
similar political ends to the administrative forms to which sovereign status has been 
attached.103       
This project also owes a debt to the vein of literature I broadly group under the banner of 
conceptual histories of imperialism and international law, whilst remaining somewhat apart 
in its methodological attention to practice over concept. For present purposes, I define the 
category of ‘conceptual history’ as those accounts that take as their primary objects of analysis 
the written attempts of jurists and practitioners to define a coherent structure of legal 
concepts as animating the historical development of international law; a prominent example 
here is the work of Koskeniemmi in Gentle Civilizer of Nations.104 If the category was defined 
in theoretical rather than methodological terms, it might be termed ‘structuralist’, as 
Koskeniemmi has defined his own work; however my emphasis here is on method.105 The 
                                                          
100 Anghie, ‘Imperialism, Sovereignty and International Law’, above n 98, 1–2; Anghie, ‘The Heart of My 
Home’, above n 98.  
101 Anghie, ‘Imperialism, Sovereignty and International Law’, above n 98, 3, 311–315. 
102 Examples of works that have critiqued concepts of sovereignty in international law include Richard Joyce, 
Competing Sovereignties (Routledge, 2012); Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the 
International Legal Order (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
103 The state of course receives much attention in other scholarly registers; see for example Gerry Simpson, 
‘Something to Do With States’ in Orford and Hoffman (eds), Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2016), 564; Antonio Cassese, ‘States: Rise and Decline of the Primary Subjects of the 
International Community’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), Oxford Handbook of the History of 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), 49; and the contemporary classic on statehood: James 
Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2007).  
104 Martti Koskeniemmi, Gentle Civilizer of Nations, above n 91. Another example is Stephen C Neff, Justice Among 
Nations: A History of International Law (Harvard University Press, 2014).  
105 I am intentionally sidestepping a field of literature here on structuralist legal history and its relation to critical 
legal history. In a recent treatment which serves as a useful entry point into the field, Justin Desautels-Stein 
figures ‘structuralist legal history’ as counterposed to ‘critical legal history’, where the former describes the 
attempt to ‘generate intelligibility’ through conceptual structure, and the latter the ‘elaboration of a never-ending 
series of social contexts’. See Justin Desautels-Stein, ‘Structuralist Legal Histories’ (2015) 78 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 37. However this distinction deploys US-centric interpretations both of structuralism and 
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emphasis of practice over concept in this project might be held to simply rehearse a well-
traversed theoretical debate over the relation between the ideal and the material in historical 
analysis.106 However emphasis on practice over concept has developed pragmatically, as a 
means of holding Nauru at the centre of the inquiry, which the conceptually focused method 
with which I commenced would simply not allow me to do.  
5.1 The issue of ‘Eurocentricity’  
A persistent issue that arises in the field of histories of imperialism and international law is 
the problem of ‘Eurocentricity’. The tendency of conceptual histories of international law, 
even where offered as critiques of Eurocentrism, to reinscribe Eurocentric narratives, values, 
knowledge practices, is a commonly identified problem.107 Indeed, Koskeniemmi has 
suggested it is an insurmountable one.108 However as suggested above, there are various 
senses of ‘Eurocentricity’ in international legal thought which are not necessarily co-
extensive. It is important to parse these various senses in order to determine which might 
and which might not be resisted by scholars trained in a European epistemological tradition. 
The first sense of Eurocentricity is epistemological. Scholars writing in the disciplinary 
tradition inherit knowledge practices that are inescapably Eurocentric in their privileging of 
a highly particular mode of knowledge production.109 To that extent, the scholar’s choice to 
remain within the confines of disciplinary practice is itself a choice of Eurocentric medium 
that relegates non-European laws and modes of knowledge production.110 A second sense 
                                                          
of critical approaches to law. For an alternative rendering in a European tradition that figures structuralism as 
a mode of critique, see Martti Koskeniemmi, ‘What is Critical Research in International Law? Celebrating 
Structuralism’ (2016) 29 Leiden Journal of International Law 727.  
106 For one prominent line of this debate, see E P Thompson, The Poverty of Theory (Monthly Review Press, 
1978); and Bryan Palmer, ‘Critical Theory, Historical Materialism and the Ostensible End of Marxism: The 
Poverty of Theory Revisited’ (1993) 38 International Review of Social History 133. 
107 Martti Koskeniemmi, ‘Histories of International Law: Significance and Problems for a Critical View’ (2013) 
27 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 215, 222–224. Arnulf Becker Lorca, ‘Eurocentrism in the 
History of International Law’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), Oxford Handbook of the History of 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), 1034; Akbar Rasulov, ‘Writing About Empire: Remarks on 
the Logic of a Discourse’ (2012) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 449; and Pahuja, ‘Laws of Encounter’ 
above n 14, 95–98. 
108 Koskeniemmi, ‘Histrories of International Law’, above n 107, 222. 
109 Chakrabarty notes that postcolonial engagement with European thought is disciplined by the fact that ‘the 
so-called European intellectual tradition is the only one alive in the social science departments of most, if not 
all, modern universities…this is the genealogy of thought in which the social sciences find themselves inserted.’ 
Chakrabarty, above n 3, 5. Koskeniemmi, ‘Histories of International Law’, above n 107, 222. 
110 Kombumerri/Munaljahlai scholar Christine Black offers an account of Korumberri law and knowledge in 
C F Black, The Land is the Source of the Law: A Dialogic Encounter with Indigenous Jurisprudence (Routledge, 2011). See 
also Raewyn Connell, Southern Theory: The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in Social Science (Polity, 2007); and Linda 
Tuiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (Zed Books, 2012).  
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of Eurocentricity is normative, in that it ascribes universality to the particular configuration 
of secularised Christian, liberal, and democratic values that characterise European 
modernity.111 Although related to the first, strong critiques of the development project and 
of human rights discourse, for example, have demonstrated that this is a mode of 
Eurocentricity that can be resisted by scholars working within the disciplinary tradition.112 A 
third sense of Eurocentricity is protagonal, in that it concerns the omission of non-European 
jurists, practitioners and leaders from conceptual histories of international law. This is a mode 
of Eurocentricity that Chimni identifies as a target of the TWAIL movement, and which 
Lorca works to correct in Mestizo International Law.113 It is possible to resist protagonal 
Eurocentricity whilst remaining epistemologically and normatively Eurocentric, and the 
recovery of the contributions of non-European protagonists in histories of international law 
is a necessary corrective.     
The Eurocentricity that this project works to reveal is simply geographical. Geographical 
Eurocentricity here describes the presumptive privileging of European sites of international 
legal formation as more important than others.114 By focusing on practice in ‘marginal’ place, 
the aim is to resist so far as possible the assumption of a ‘view from nowhere’ in the narration 
of a history of the development of international law, which in content invariably replicates a 
‘view from Europe’.115 In this project, I place Nauru at the centre of an historical account of 
international legal formation. The account that emerges is in parts unfamiliar for the 
‘international’ events it reveals, and in others contestable for the interpretation of 
‘international’ events it produces. The point is precisely to demonstrate that presumptions 
of the centrality of certain places over others prefigures the scope of a history of the 
                                                          
111 Chakrabarty, above n 3, 45; Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and 
the Universality of International Law’ (2011) 3 Trade Law and Development 103. See also David Scott, Conscripts of 
Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (Duke University Press, 2004); and Immanuel Wallerstein, European 
Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power (New Press, 2006).  
112 For key examples, see Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the 
Politics of Universality (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 
(Harvard University Press, 2010).  
113 B S Chimni, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach’ (2007) 
8 Melbourne Journal of International Law 499, 511; Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual 
History 1842–1933 (Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
114 Significant accounts of this form of Eurocentricity within the discipline of geography include J M Blaut, The 
Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History (Guilford Press, 1993); Thongchai 
Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (University of Hawaii Press, 1994); and Doreen 
Massey, For Space (SAGE Publications, 2005).  
115 For Chakrabarty, the aim of ‘provincializing Europe’ is ‘precisely to find out how and in what sense 
European ideas that were universal were also, at one and the same time, drawn from very particular intellectual 
and historical traditions that could not claim any universal validity. It was to ask a question about how thought 
was related to place’. Chakrabarty, above n 3, xiii.  
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relationship between imperialism and international law. This project does not transcend 
epistemological Eurocentricity, as in most respects it is a conventionally disciplinary historical 
narrative. Nor does it transcend protagonal Eurocentricity, as it focuses on what men of 
European heritage – for they are all men – said, did, and wrote. However, in its politics it 
resists normative Eurocentricity; and in its method, it resists geographical Eurocentricity.  
6. Contributions and limitations of the project 
To summarise, then, the focus on administrative practice in the ‘periphery’ over legal concept 
in the ‘centre’ allows for productive re-orientations in historical perspective.116 Firstly, it 
orients the narrative toward the historical continuities between the protectorate, the mandate, 
the trust territory and the state as variations in administrative form, rather than treating them 
as conceptually different phenomena separated by epochal shifts in international legal 
thought. Secondly, it de-emphasises the categorical distinction between corporate and public 
authority that can be assumed in contemporary taxonomies of international law, and allows 
for the recurrent continuities between company and state rule to be appreciated not as 
exceptional but as fundamental to the development of the contemporary international legal 
order.117 Thirdly, it orients the narrative toward the way in which grounded administrative 
form functions as the site in which the disjunctures between ‘universal’ legal concepts 
promulgated in the received sites of international law and ‘local’ commercial and geopolitical 
contingencies are negotiated, or simply institutionalised.118 In this respect, the sorts of 
‘deviations’ from the ideal that Nauru-as-legal-object has demonstrated are not at all 
anomalous. Nauru is simply representative of the fact that while status shifts, form accretes; 
that power relations established by form, and the relations that form facilitates, are not easily 
or necessarily dislodged by shifts in international legal thinking at the conceptual level.  
                                                          
116 In a related point, John Haskell has warned of the risk to the contemporary international legal academic of 
the ‘over-prioritization of concepts and ideals over institutional apparatuses in relation to production as the 
movers of history’. John Haskell, ‘From Apology to Utopia’s Conditions of Possibility’ (2016) 29 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 667, 675.  
117 Critical treatments of the role of commerce and the company in the history of international law include 
Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Harvard 
University Press, 2011); Fleur Johns, ‘Theorizing the Corporation in International Law’ in Anne Orford and 
Florian Hoffmann (eds) Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 635; 
Pahuja and Storr, above n 20. 
118 Orford makes a related point in relation to the development of the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept in 
practices of international administration, noting that it is in ‘the prosaic and everyday practices’ that the ‘political 
effects of the responsibility to protect concept would be determined’. See Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’, 
above n 25, 614. 
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The focus on administrative practice in Nauru as a site of international legal formation yields 
significant insights which warrant identification. First is the re-placement of German 
imperialism in the narrativisation of international legal formation. Histories of imperialism 
and international law, at least in English, have not yet considered in much detail the 
significance of the practice and abrupt curtailment of German imperialism for those peoples 
and regions that came under German control between the 1880s and the European War of 
194-1918.119 A number of historical narratives are recovered, or re-collected, through the 
focus on Nauru during the German imperial period. At the ‘international’ level, focus on the 
German cases demonstrates that the language of ‘civilisation’ that circulated during the 
Versailles negotiations and was codified into Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations was a cypher that invoked the ‘barbarism’ of German imperial practice just as readily 
as it did the ‘barbarism’ of non-European peoples.120 The concept of a standard of civilisation 
thus operated not only to inscribe a division between European and non-European modes 
of socio-political organisation, but between acceptable and unacceptable modes of 
imperialism.121   
Another insight this approach yields is into the nature of Australian colonialism. German 
imperialism in the Pacific was a significant impetus for the project of federation of the 
Australian colonies.122 There was close relation between the assumption by the British 
                                                          
119 As Koskeniemmi has observed of the focus on the British empire in histories of imperialism and 
international law, ‘Germany’s own colonial period (1880–1919) is still largely untreated from the perspective of 
international legal history’. Martti Koskeniemmi, ‘A History of International Law Histories’ in Bardo 
Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2012), 944. Exceptions in English, largely the work of German scholars who are linguistically adroit enough to 
write in or translate works into English, include Jörg Fisch, ‘Law as a Means and as an End: Some Remarks on 
the Function of European and Non-European Law in the Process of European Expansion’ in W J Mommsen 
and J A De Moor, European Law and Expansion: The Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in 19th and 20th Century 
Africa and Asia (Berg, 1992), 15; and Felix Hanschmann, ‘The Suspension of Constitutionalism in the Heart of 
Darkness’ in Kelly L Grotke and Markus J Prutsch, Constitutionalism, Legitimacy and Power: Nineteenth Century 
Experiences (Oxford University Press, 2014), 243. 
120 The so-called ‘colonial guilt’ argument that supported the removal of German colonies in the Versailles 
settlement was a source of great consternation to German jurists and publicists who, in support of the 
Wilhelmian Reich and later, the Third Reich, held the Allied Powers’ condemnation of German imperial 
practice to be hypocritical and self-justificatory. See Heinrich Schnee, German Colonization Past and Future: The 
Truth about the German Colonies (George Allen and Unwin, 1926); and G L Steer, Judgment on German Africa 
(Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1939). 
121 For renderings of the ‘standard of civilisation’ that emphasise the ‘European versus non-European’ inflection 
of the term over the ‘British and French imperialism versus German imperialism’ inflection, see Anghie, ‘The 
Heart of My Home’, above n 98; Gerrit Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984); and Brett Bowden, ‘The Colonial Origins of International Law, European Expansion 
and the Classical Standard of Civilization’ (2005) 7 Journal of the History of International Law 1. 
122 See section 10 ‘Concern in Australian colonies over German imperial expansion’ in Chapter 2, ‘From Trading 
Post to Protectorate, 1888’. 
35 
 
Dominions of Australia, South Africa and New Zealand of administrative control over the 
occupied German territories in Africa and the Pacific, and their shift toward sovereign status 
in international law.123 This is a surprising recovery made in this project, and my own 
perspective on the nature and legacy of Australian colonialism has shifted as a result. 
‘Australian colonialism’ was not simply about the essentially linear interaction of pre-existing 
‘settler’ and ‘indigenous’ subjects within the geographic limits of what is now known as the 
sovereign territory of Australia, but a densely relational historical phenomenon in which each 
of these categories was produced.124 That process of stabilising the basic relational categories 
that comprise ‘Australia’ is still underway, and still exceeds the geographic limits of 
‘Australian’ territory. As a geopolitical region, the ‘Australia-Pacific’ has its origins in the 
avowedly ‘sub-imperial’ policies through which the Australian government sought to 
substantiate its sovereign status in the early twentieth century.125 It still requires constant 
effort on behalf of the Australian state to stabilise, as demonstrated by the current legal 
conflict over the oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea, by the excision of Australian islands 
and then the mainland itself from the Australian migration zone, and by the imbrications of 
Australian and Nauruan sovereignty in the legal framework of the offshore detention 
regime.126   
A third insight concerns the interrelations between natural resource commodification and 
the formalisation of imperial administration in the global South. The fixing of place as 
narrative frame allows for geological as well as geographic particularities to be considered as 
relevant to processes of legal formation, and for the post-independence effects of the 
structuring of imperial administration for the purposes of resource extraction to be better 
                                                          
123 See section 10 ‘Nauru, the European war and Australian ‘sub-empire’ in the Pacific’ in Chapter 3, ‘From 
Protectorate to Mandate, 1920’. In some respects, Anghie presaged the need to tell this story: ‘(t)here is, then, 
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Pacific: The Expansionist Era 1820–1920 (Melbourne University Press, 1980).  
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Arbitration, Case 2013-16). On the excision of the mainland from the migration zone, see Migration Amendment 
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understood. Of course, it is hardly new to note the significance of phosphate to the legal 
formation of Nauru; most of the scholarly treatments of Nauru place phosphate at the centre 
of their analysis.127 The phosphate interlude written into Chapter 3 tells this story in a 
different way, and owes a debt to the field of science and technology studies (STS), which 
requires materiality to be considered in a far more nuanced, relational way than might a 
Marxist approach.128 The basic premise of this passage is that the relationship between 
phosphate and administrative form in Nauru cannot be well understood without a 
consideration of the commodification of phosphate in the later nineteenth century, the effect 
of that commodification on the development of agricultural chemistry, and on the modes of 
authorising imperial expansion into the Pacific.129 As such, this passage seeks to hold together 
agricultural chemistry, natural resource commodification and imperial expansion in order to 
better understand the context in which phosphate exploitation rights were transferred from 
the Hanseatic company, the Jaluit Gesellschaft, to the British firm, the Pacific Phosphate 
Company, a key moment in the legal formalisation of Nauru.130  
The implication here is that the exploitation of the natural resources of the post-colonised 
South to the benefit of the post-colonising North persists not only through the normalisation 
of the neoliberal development project in international institutions like the World Trade 
Organisation and the World Bank, but also through the structural continuities in 
administrative form from the imperial through to the contemporary era.131 Stated another 
way, the outward flow of natural resources is structured into the administrative form of the 
postcolonial state, and is not undone simply by the substitution of local for imperial 
executives. Post-independence attempts in postcolonial states to interrupt that outward flow 
                                                          
127 Nancy Viviani, Nauru: Phosphate and Political Progress (ANU Press, 1970); and Christopher Weeramantry, 
Nauru: Environmental Damage under International Trusteeship (Oxford University Press, 1992).  
128 Texts that influenced the consideration of phosphate in this project include Bruno Latour, The Politics of 
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Global Ecological History (Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Katerina Martina Teaiwa, Consuming Ocean 
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130 See section 7, ‘The Pacific Phosphate Company and its Agreement with the Jaluit Gesellschaft’ in Chapter 3, 
‘From Protectorate to Mandate, 1920’. 
131 On the persistence of the North-South divide in the neoliberal development project, see Sundhya Pahuja, 
Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011); Sumudu Atapattu and Carmen C Gonzalez, ‘The North-South Divide in International 
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through the restructuring of public and private relations at the local level have tended to 
reveal just how heavily conditioned the exercise of postcolonial sovereignty is.132        
A fourth insight relates to the question of how to historicise the state form at a time when 
statehood appears variously in retreat and resurgence. It may seem untimely to reconsider 
the universalisation of the state as the form of administration to which territorial sovereignty 
attaches, when the direction of interest in international law has been toward the ways in 
which the state has been displaced as the primary subject of international law.133 Since the 
end of the Cold War, much literature has argued that state sovereignty is steadily being 
undermined: both from without, with the rise of regional institutions including courts;134 and 
from within, with the rise of the city, the company and the person as international legal 
subjects.135 Setting aside the question of whether state sovereignty has ever been as integral 
or absolute as these theses can presuppose, it is precisely because the universalisation of the 
state as the teleological endpoint to ‘the’ history of international law is squarely in doubt that 
now is an opportune moment to reconsider the state as an administrative form in a series of 
forms. The triumphalist narrative of the universalisation of the nation-state in the post-Cold 
War era may well itself be historicised as a period in the development of what we now call 
international law. My argument in this thesis suggests that the postcolonial state might be 
periodised as a stage in a longer process of the bureaucratisation of imperial administration, 
rather than a departure from that process.    
There are also inherent limitations in the approach adopted in this project which require 
acknowledgment. The first is the historical period considered. The focus on transitions in 
status in international law means that this story ends with Nauruan independence in 1968. 
This is now half a century ago. It would be trite to summarise the immense significance of 
what has occurred for Nauru environmentally, financially, and politically in the intervening 
period.136 Whilst certain of those developments are relevant to the concerns of this thesis – 
                                                          
132 See Pahuja and Storr, above n 20.  
133 See generally Cassese, above n 103; and Simpson, above n 103.  
134 See for example Karen J Alter, James T Gathii and Laurence R Helfer, ‘Backlash against International Courts 
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most notably the dysfunction in practice of the administrative form entrenched in the 1968 
Constitution, which is discussed in the Prologue - that form has not substantively changed 
since. The 2009 referendum proposed structural changes to power relations in the 
administrative form of the Nauruan state that would have fallen squarely within the scope of 
this project - for example, relations between the executive and the legislature, and between 
the executive and the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust.137 However, as covered in the 
Prologue, the referendum failed. The second limitation is a matter of language. In its 
treatment of German materials, this thesis relies heavily on extant English translations of 
German legal instruments and correspondence. This is a clear limitation on the analysis 
offered in this thesis, which I can defend only by observing that translation is a significant 
methodological problem for international lawyers in general, and I understand this chapter 
to be the one of the few treatments of German imperial administration in the Pacific 
produced within the genre of histories of international law.138 Much more remains to be 
done, and better than I have managed in this project.  
The third limitation, which is the most profound, is the absence of the Nauruan people from 
much of this story. This is not a history of the island of Naoero and the Nauruan people and 
is not offered as such. It is a story about ‘Nauru’ as an object of international law, as reflected 
in a particular set of imperial sources, as constructed by an Australian international lawyer. 
There are other versions of the story of Nauru as an object of international law, told through 
other sources, to be constructed by other voices. Whilst this has been one of the hardest 
limitations to reckon with, there are pragmatic and political reasons why the project has been 
constructed this way. On a pragmatic level, I have not been able to return to the island since 
2009. When I conceived of this project, I intended to visit Nauru to work with the archive 
of the pre-independence period that remains, undigitised, on the island. The Australian 
government’s decision in August 2012 to recommence offshore detention on Nauru and on 
Manus Island in Papua New Guinea of asylum seekers that arrive by sea in Australian waters 
                                                          
120(3) Journal of Polynesian Society 3. For a recent case in the High Court of Australia related to the Republic of 
Nauru’s debt crisis, see Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru (2015) 326 ALR 396. On Nauru’s 
environmental precarity, see Government of Nauru, ‘National Assessment Report for the Third International 
Conference on Small Island Developing States’ (17 May 2013) 8–16.  
137 Nauru Constitutional Review Commission, ‘‘Naoero Ituga’: Report’ (28 February 2007) 
<http://www.paclii.org/nr/other/Nauru_Constitutional_Review_Commission_Report_28Feb07.pdf>. 
138 Koskeniemmi briefly considers German imperial law in Martti Koskeniemmi, ‘Colonial Laws: Sources, 
Strategies and Lessons?’ (2016) 18 Journal of the History of International Law 248, 275–276; Nuzzo offers a helpful 
overview of German imperial law in the African protectorates; see Luigi Nuzzo, ‘Colonial Law’ (16 April 2012) 
European History Online <http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/europe-and-the-world/european-overseas-
rule/luigi-nuzzo-colonial-law>. Neither have occasion to consider the Pacific.  
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precipitated a series a policy decisions in Nauru that rendered it politically impossible to carry 
out that research.139 Many of those with whom I worked in 2009 have since left the island, 
either voluntarily or under duress of the current executive.140    
However the political reason why I have constructed the project this way is far more 
important. The simple fact is that a Nauruan story is not mine to tell. I do not presume that 
I can represent Nauruan experiences of imperialism or of sovereignty, and have carefully 
sought to avoid doing so. What I can do is reconsider - as an Australian international lawyer 
of German and British lineage – the actions of Europeans who presumed themselves to be 
justified in imposing administrative control on Nauru, and the ways in which law was used 
as a means of authorising that imposition. Stated another way, the gesture of representation 
I have chosen to engage in here is not a representation of Nauruan experiences of - or 
resistance to - imperialism, but a representation of how Europeans have understood their 
imperialism to be authorised by law. To that end, the project is offered as a way those of us 
who inherit both Eurocentric narratives of international law and the responsibility of colonial 
lineage in a postcolonial place might provincialise ourselves, in order to make room for 
others.  
7. The chapter outline  
Each of the chapters that follow redescribes a shift in the international status of Nauru and 
the accretions of administrative form that accompany that shift. Chapter 2, ‘From Trading 
Post to Protectorate, 1888’, traces the appearance of ‘Nauru’ on the plane of European 
imperial administration, first as a point in the Pacific trading network of the Hanseatic firm, 
Goddefroy & Sohn, and then as a German protectorate under the administration of the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft company. A brief history of the Hansa is offered as a means of redescribing the 
contemporaneous formation of the German Reich under Bismarck, the regime of 
protectorates that proliferated after the Berlin Conference on the Congo in 1884, and 
                                                          
139 See Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Nauru Media Visa Fee Hike to 'Cover up Harsh Conditions at 
Australian Tax-payer Funded Detention Centre', ABC (online), 9 January 2014 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-09/nauru-visa-fee-increase-censorship/5191108>. 
140 See Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Nauru Gives Reasons for Sacking Magistrate’, ABC (online) 21 
January 2014, <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2013/s3929597.htm>; Cameron Atfield, ‘Former TV 
and Radio Host Rod Henshaw Deported from Nauru’, Brisbane Times (online) 29 January 2014 < 
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/former-tv-and-radio-host-rod-henshaw-deported-from-
nauru-20140129-31n6w.html>; Daniel Flitton, ‘Escape from Nauru: How Ex-MP Roland Kun Slipped the Net 




‘international law’ as a discipline. The administrative formation of the German protectorate 
of the Marshall Islands, and the incorporation of Nauru into that protectorate as a means of 
protecting German trading interests in the Pacific, are considered against the attempts of 
British and German jurists to conceptually define the legal basis of the protectorate form. 
The chapter concludes that the divergences between the protectorate as instantiated by the 
Reich as a form of company administration in Nauru and the attempts at juridical clarification 
of the protectorate as a matter of international law were significant, and institutionalised in 
the administrative structure imposed on the island.        
Chapter 3, ‘From Protectorate to Colony to Mandate, 1920’, opens with an account of the 
administrative development of Nauru as an office of the Marshall Islands protectorate, and 
its subsequent subsumption into direct colonial administration as part of the colony of 
German New Guinea in 1906. The chapter diverts to consider the relationship between the 
commodification of phosphate, the industrialisation of agricultural production, and imperial 
competition in the Pacific, as a means of providing context to the sale in 1900 of the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft’s phosphate exploitation rights to a British firm, the Pacific Phosphate Company. 
The development of the Company’s Nauru operation under the joint administration of the 
Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Reich Colonial Office is redescribed in relation to the militarisation 
of the Reich under Wilhelm I, the influence of German activity in the Pacific on Australian 
federation, and the development of ‘Dominion’ status in the British Empire.  
The chapter moves to consider the effects on Nauru of the war of 1914 to 1918 and the 
subsequent formation of the League of Nations. The Australian occupation of Nauru on 
British request was one of the first taken by Australia in the war, and an action which 
Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes subsequently argued during the Versailles 
negotiations grounded a claim to territorial annexation. Although Hughes failed in this 
gambit and Nauru was placed under the international oversight of the League – as was South 
West Africa - the creation of the C Class Mandate was directly related to the ‘sub-imperial’ 
policies of Australia and South Africa as British Dominions as prosecuted by Hughes and 
Smuts at Versailles. The chapter argues that the shift from protectorate to mandate status 
was accompanied at the local level by an accretion in administrative form. Under the Nauru 
Island Agreement, Britain, Australia and New Zealand agreed to establish a tripartite 
monopoly over Nauruan phosphate. The Pacific Phosphate Company’s assets vested in the 
new British Phosphate Commission with exclusive power over phosphate operations; and 
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administrative control vested in an Australian Administrator, responsible for meeting 
mandatory obligations. The chapter concludes that in the transition from protectorate of the 
Reich to mandate of the British empire, the basic administrative form established in the 
protectorate period remained intact.       
Chapter 4, ‘From Mandate to Trust Territory, 1947’, opens with an account of the 
bureaucratisation of Nauru as a C Mandate under Australian Administration, as reflected in 
Reports of the Administration to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the new League 
of Nations. The ambivalent status of the C Mandate as codified in Article 22 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations is considered, as argued by jurists, avoided by the PMC, and 
practised in Nauru; and the Australian claim to satisfy mandatory obligations via payment of 
royalties and the implementation of a secondary education program for Nauruan men is 
assessed. The development of the Nauruan phosphate industry under the British Phosphate 
Commission and the impact of Nauruan phosphate on Australian agriculture is traced in 
context of international debates on population growth and food security prompted by the 
global depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s. In Australia, these debates were framed 
racially as risks to the white Australia policy that required proactive response to prevent Asian 
immigration.  
Growing tension between Australia and Japan over economic access in the C Mandates is 
considered in context of the failing legitimacy of the League of Nations over the 1930s; and 
the war of 1939 to 1945 is redescribed against the occupation of Nauru and New Guinea by 
Japan from 1942. The reconstitution of the League as the United Nations is considered with 
a focus on the expansion of Article 22 of the Covenant into three Chapters of the Charter 
of the United Nations at the San Francisco Conference of 1945. The finalisation of the 
Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru is considered in context of the reconstitution of the 
Permanent Mandates Commission as the Trusteeship Council, with significantly increased 
powers of review. The chapter concludes that although the transition from mandate to trust 
status significantly recast the conceptual framing of international administration, and 
sharpened the legal obligations owed by the Administration in the shift from C Mandate to 
trust territory, the shift in status was met with accretions in form at the local level.     
Chapter 5, ‘From Trust Territory to State, 1968’, opens with an account of the re-
establishment of Australian administration of Nauru as a trust territory. The increased 
obligations of trusteeship and the increased powers of the Trusteeship Council provide in 
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the Charter, and the presence on the Council of Soviet and post-colonial states is redescribed 
through the formalisation of Nauruan protest over Australian administration, particularly 
with respect to the issues of royalty calculations and land disposition.  The creation in 1951 
of the Nauru Local Government Council in response to criticisms of the lack of provision 
for ‘political advancement’ proved a significant administrative development; even though the 
NLGC lacked any substantive power, under Head Chief Hammer DeRoburt it came to 
function as vehicle for prosecution of the Nauruan case for self-government in the 
Trusteeship Council and the UN General Assembly.  
The chapter diverts to consider the effects of the South West Africa cases in the International 
Court of Justice on the United Nations General Assembly’s position on independence for 
all trust territories. The UN’s subsequent embrace of the cause of Nauruan independence 
forced a series of protracted negotiations between the NLGC and the Australian Department 
of Territories in the 1960s over political independence and control of BPC operations, in 
which the Department of Territories proved intransigent on the issues of ownership of 
Nauruan phosphate and assets, and liability for rehabilitation of the island’s central plateau. 
In the rapidly negotiated transition to independence over 1966-1967, the latter issue 
remained unresolved. The chapter closes with a consideration of the drafting of the Nauruan 
Constitution, and concludes that although sovereign independence of the Republic of Nauru 
in January 1968 was a significant achievement of the Nauruan people as represented by 
Hammer DeRoburt and the NLGC, the Constitution introduced further accretions in an 
administrative form that remained essentially continuous with the imperial iterations that had 
preceded it.  
Chapter 6 is the Conclusion of the thesis. It summarises the research question and the 
argument, and concludes that the now notorious dysfunctionality of the contemporary 
Nauruan state should be understood as continuous with imperial administrative practices of 
the pre-independence era. It reiterates the particularity of the account of international legal 
formation produced by the methodology adopted in this project, and concludes with 
reflections on the analytical and political significance of focusing on practice in marginalised 
places for histories of imperialism and international law.  
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8. Conclusion  
This thesis is an historical account of how the island of Naoero became the Republic of Nauru. 
Drawing together primary legal instruments that effected changes in the status of Nauru in 
international law, and contemporaneous sources that illuminate how and why those 
instruments were created, this thesis develops a method of critical redescription that brings 
to bear jurisdictional thinking and a Weberian sensibility to construct a narrative of four key 
shifts in the legal history of Nauru: the shift into German administration as a protectorate in 
1888, into international administration as a C Class Mandate in 1920, then as a Trust Territory 
in 1947, and finally into sovereign territorial administration in as the Republic of Nauru in 
1968. Whilst each shift was retrospectively justified according to international legal concepts 
of protection, mandate, trust, and then self-determination, each was preceded by commercial, 
political and geographic instabilities in the maintenance of imperial control over the island. 
Throughout this series of shifts in status, the administrative form applied to the island has 
not radically changed structure so much as undergone a process of internal bureaucratisation 
and external restatement according to the prevailing concepts of the period. The implication 
is that the shift in the international status of Nauru from trust territory to state was 
accompanied at the local level not by a departure from but an accretion of an imperial 
administrative form instantiated in the late nineteenth century. 
This thesis is a contribution to the genre of histories of imperialism and international law, 
and asserts that the method deployed in this project offers insight not only into the Nauruan 
case, but into the relationship between ‘the’ history of international law as the development 
of an ideal conceptual framework for governing the world, and the histories of international 
law as actually practised in place. This is not a history of the island of Naoero and the Nauruan 
people and is not offered as such. It is a story about the formation of ‘Nauru’ as an object of 
international law, as reflected in a particular set of imperial sources, as constructed by an 
Australian international lawyer of German and British lineage. The history that follows is in 
parts unfamiliar for the ‘international’ events it reveals, and in others contestable for the 
interpretation of ‘international’ events it produces. The point is precisely to demonstrate that 
presumptions of the centrality of certain places over others prefigures the narrative 
construction of histories of imperialism and international law; and that it is possible, even 




Chapter 2  
From Trading Post to Protectorate, 1888 
1. Introduction 
This chapter redescribes the declaration of protectorate status over Nauru as part of the 
German protectorate of the Marshall Islands in the Western Pacific in 1888, and the adoption 
of an administrative form to govern the island. Commencing with an account of the 
commercial activity of Hanseatic trading firms in the Pacific and in Africa, the chapter 
redescribes the commercial, political and geographic pressures on the new German Reich 
under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck that led to the declaration of ‘protectorate’ status over 
regions not already claimed by other European powers. German protectorates included 
South West Africa, East Africa, German New Guinea, and the Marshall Islands in the 
Western Pacific. The chapter moves to consider the classical conceptualisation in the law of 
nations of protectorate status as deriving from an agreement between unequal sovereigns for 
‘protection’ of the weaker party, and argues that the German protectorate form as envisaged 
by the Bismarckian Reich differed significantly from existing concepts of protection; not only 
was contemplation of local sovereignty absent, the German protectorate was explicitly 
intended to ‘protect’ German trading interests in regions outside German sovereign territory, 
whilst minimising the expenditure of direct administration by the Reich. As such, 
administrative control of the German protectorates was in most cases vested in German 
companies, with minimal subsidisation or legislative oversight by the Reichstag.       
The island of Naoero, known then in English as ‘Pleasant Island’, was incorporated into the 
German protectorate of the Marshall Islands as ‘Nauru’ on the request of Hamburg firm 
Goddefroy & Sohn, in order to quell Nauruan ‘civil’ war which interfered with the company’s 
copra trade. The conquering of Nauru was achieved with a show of German naval force, 
without any pretence of agreement or consideration of the legal status of the Nauruan people. 
At the same time, disquiet in the Australian colonies at British diplomatic acquiescence in 
the formalisation of German commercial imperialism in the Pacific amplified the political 
momentum toward federation and assumption of the external affairs power. The chapter 
concludes that whilst juridical attempts to define the ‘protectorate’ in the 1880s and 1890s 
failed to produce a settled definition, the pragmatic arrangement decided upon by agreement 
between the Reich and the Jaluit Gesellschaft, the company created by Goddefroy & Sohn with 
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German capital to take on the administration of the Marshall Islands protectorate, laid the 
foundations of the administrative form of Nauru. That form worked to structure property 
relations, phosphate exploitation rights, and jurisdictional delineations between private and 
public authority.      
2. 1884: the DHPG pays its first dividend 
In the context of German imperial history, 1884 was a significant year. For the new German 
Reich, confederated in 1871 with Minister-President of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck, as its 
first Chancellor, 1884 was arguably the debut of its notoriously late entry into the imperial 
arena of the late nineteenth century. German intervention in Africa was formally 
consolidated in April 1884. The German imperial flag was hoisted in the port of Angra 
Pequeña north of the Cape Colony on the request of the Bremen tobacco merchant and 
adventurer F.A.E. Lüderitz, making ‘Lüderitzland’, later South West Africa, the first 
protectorate of the German Reich.1 In July 1884, the German protectorates of Togo and 
Cameroon were declared. The Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation or ‘Company for German 
Colonisation’ was founded in Berlin by Carl Peters, an organisation which became the 
German East Africa Company and in 1885 was granted an imperial charter with authority to 
administer a protectorate over those regions pursuant to which Carl Peters claimed treaties 
with local rulers – a region that eventually took in contemporary Rwanda, Burundi and areas 
of Tanzania.2 On the other side of the earth in the Pacific, New Guinea was declared a 
German protectorate in November 1884. The Berlin Conference on the Congo was held 
between the ‘Powers’ of Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, the Ottoman Empire and the United States from November 1884 to February 
1885. The culmination of the Conference in the General Act of 1885 purported to provide a 
legal framework for further imperial expansion of European states in Africa, whilst at the 
same time recognising the Congo Free State as the private property of Leopold’s Congo 
Society.3  
However, the reason 1884 is chosen as the point of entry into this account of Nauru’s 
formation as an object of international law is less obvious. In 1884, a Hamburg trading firm 
                                                          
1 William Osgood Aydelotte, Bismarck and British Colonial Policy: The Problem of South West Africa 1883–1885 
(Russell and Russell, 2nd ed, 1970).  
2 Woodruff D Smith, The German Colonial Empire (University of Carolina Press, 1978), 92–99. 
3 General Act of the Conference of Berlin Concerning the Congo (entered into force 26 February 1885) reproduced in 
The American Journal of International Law (1909) 3(1) 7.  
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operating in Samoa and the Marshall Islands chains in the Western Pacific paid out its first 
dividend of 4% to holders of preference shares, five years after its establishment.4 The firm, 
the Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft der Südsee-Inseln, or ‘German Trading and 
Plantation Company of the South Sea Islands’ (‘DHPG’) had been established to take over 
the Pacific interests of Godeffroy & Sohn, the largest of a group of Hamburg trading firms 
that had been operating in the Pacific since the mid-nineteenth century.5 This chapter argues 
that the commercial activity of the DHPG in the western Pacific region was instrumental in 
the inclusion of Nauru in the German ‘sphere of influence’ in the Pacific. Historians of the 
period have observed that were it not for the established presence of the DHPG and other 
Hanseatic firms in the western Pacific, the region would have been of little to no interest to 
the new German confederation at all.6 The financial success or otherwise of the Hamburg 
firms in the region is therefore taken as the key condition of possibility of the establishment 
of the German protectorate of the Marshall Islands in 1885, in which Nauru was included in 
1888.  
As this choice of entry indicates, the intention of this chapter is not to rehearse an account 
of European imperial expansion as a coherent project informed by international legal 
reasoning, but rather to redescribe the events that led to the incorporation of Nauru into the 
German Protectorate of the Marshall Islands, and thus into the nascent international order. 
By resisting a narrative of the colonisation of Nauru that assumes the inevitability of 
European imperial expansion into the Pacific and attending to the material contingencies 
that influenced the decisions taken by the Reich as to how to protect commercial enterprise 
outside the geographical bounds of the new German state, a sense emerges of the dynamic 
interplay of commercial, political and geographical pressures that shaped the administrative 
formation of Nauru as an object of international law – a process in which, it is argued, 
international legal thought played a minor role.   
                                                          
4 Stewart Firth, ‘German Firms in the Western Pacific Islands 1857 – 1914’ (1973) Journal of Pacific History 8, 10–
28.  
5 Stewart Firth, New Guinea under the Germans (Melbourne University Press, 1983); and A E Bollard, ‘The 
Financial Adventures of J C Godeffroy and Son in the Pacific’ (1981) 16 Journal of Pacific History 1, 3–19. 
6 See for example Florence Mann Spoehr, White Falcon: The House of Godeffroy and its Commercial and Scientific Role 
in the Pacific (Pacific Books, 1963), vi–vii.  
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3. The reticence of the new Reich  
On account of its ponderous title, the DHPG was mocked by Robert Louis Stevenson as 
‘the Long Handle Firm’.7 Stevenson’s weak jest in A Footnote to History: Eight Years of Trouble 
in Samoa is not without insight. The firm’s name is an intriguing historical artefact. The 
‘German Trading and Plantation Company of the South Sea Islands’ was not a public 
enterprise but a private company, hastily recapitalised in March 1878 by Hamburg banker 
Adolph von Hansemann.8 The company had formed solely for the purpose of taking over 
the Pacific interests of flailing Hamburg trading firm Godeffroy & Sohn.9 Godeffroy, a merchant 
company of longstanding repute, had been instrumental in inscribing a maritime network of 
European trading posts across the western Pacific, having set out west from Valparaiso in 
Chile to install their first Pacific agent in Apia Bay, Samoa, in 1857.10  
It is tempting to seize on this shift in company identity from ‘Godeffroy & Sohn’ to the 
‘German Trading and Plantation Company of the South Sea Islands’ as representative of the 
consolidation of the German confederated state in 1871. Stevenson at least seems to have 
regarded the DHPG as a German nationalist enterprise, describing Hansemann’s acquisition 
of the Godeffroy interests as a move to prevent those interests falling into the hands of 
London finance house, Baring Brothers.11 Notwithstanding Stevenson’s opinion, the political 
power Hansemann sought to protect by taking over Godeffroy’s Pacific interests in this way 
was not necessarily that of the new German confederation. The family bank he managed 
after inheriting the role from his father was a Hamburg institution that predated German 
confederation. The Disconto-Gesellschaft was comfortable in involvement with high politics. 
Hansemann’s father David was not only its director but had served as the Prussian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs prior to confederation in 1871; Karl Marx had written of David 
Hansemann in 1858 that ‘(a)t a time when the joint-stock company was still a rara avis in 
Germany, he had the ambition of becoming a German Hudson, and proved perfectly adept 
in that sort of jobbery…’.12 Under the ‘German Hudson’, the Disconto-Gesellschaft assisted 
                                                          
7 Robert Louis Stevenson, A Footnote to History: Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1895), 
29. 
8 Firth, above n 5, 11–13.  
9 W O Henderson, The German Colonial Empire 1884–1919 (Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1993), 24–25. 
10 Firth, above n 5, 11; Henderson, ‘The German Colonial Empire’, above n 9, 22. 
11 Stevenson, above n 7, 14; Henderson, ‘The German Colonial Empire’, above n 9, 68. 
12 Karl Marx, ‘The New Ministry’, The New York Tribune (New York), 27 November 1858, reprinted in Karl 
Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works: Volume 16, 1858–1860 (Richard Dixon, Henry Mins and Salo 
Ryazanskaya trans, Lawrence and Wishart, 2010) 102. 
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Bismarck in financing the French indemnity after the Franco-Prussian War of 1868 – 1870.13 
Hansemann’s bank was also involved in financing colonial entrepreneurs, German and 
otherwise in their fledging colonial turns in Africa - including Lüderitz in Angra Pequeña.14 
In 1929, the Disconto-Gesellschaft merged with the Deutsche Bank.15  
Yet when Adolph Hansemann approached Bismarck in 1880 with a plan to save the 
Godeffroy interests in the Pacific that included modest state funding, the proposal was voted 
down by the Reichstag.16 In 1880, the prospect of official support of commercial activity 
outside sovereign territory was politically unpalatable to the new Reich. With his Hanseatic 
pedigree, Hansemann proceeded to raise equity privately to establish the DHPG, only later 
managing to secure a modest shipping subsidy for the company’s Pacific activity via direct 
representations to Bismarck.17 Despite its title, then, the interests of the DHPG were thus 
not clearly or necessarily aligned with those of the new German state.18 It is more accurate 
to surmise that Hansemann and the DHPG were continuing to further the shared interests 
of the community of Hamburg investors, traders, bankers and entrepreneurs to which both 
the Disconto-Gesellschaft and Goddefroy & Sohn belonged, a community whose collective 
conduct was informed not by the new German confederation but by five centuries of 
organisation under the Hansa.   
4. Hamburg trading firms and the legacy of the Hansa 
The word ‘Hansa’ has Gothic origins, with instances of usage indicating a dual meaning of a 
troop or company, and a tax on commodities.19 As a proper noun, it refers to the medieval 
organisation of northern German towns which began to record itself as the Hansa 
Theutonicorum or ‘Teutonic Hansa’ in the thirteenth century, waxing and waning over a 
lifespan that officially ended with its final council in Lübeck in 1669, twenty years after the 
                                                          
13 See John Martin Kleeberg, The Disconto-Gesellschaft and German Industrialization: A Critical Examination of the 
Career of a German Universal Bank 1851–1914 (Doctoral thesis, University of Oxford, 1988) 195.  
14 The South West Africa Company was part-financed by the Disconto-Gesellschaft. Richard A Voeltz, German 
Colonialism and the South West Africa Company, 1894–1914 (Ohio University Center for International Studies, 
1988), 1, 83. 
15 Both banks’ annual reports for this period are available in German via the Historical Association of the 
Deutsche Bank: http://www.bankgeschichte.de/en/content/2448.html.  
16 Henderson, ‘The German Colonial Empire’, above n 9, 68. 
17 Mary Henderson, Origins of Modern German Colonialism (Howard Fertig, 1974), 115–6. 
18 As Mary Henderson notes, ‘(i)t was of course to be expected that the German bankers, already much 
interested in South Sea enterprises, would intervene and come to the rescue; but that they would do so purely 
on patriotic and national grounds was unlikely’. Ibid 115.  
19 E Gee Nash, The Hansa: Its History and Romance (Bodley Head, 1929), 1; Rolf Hammel-Kiesow, ‘The Early 
Hanses’ in Donald J Harreld (ed), Companion to the Hanseatic League (Brill, 2015), 15–63. 
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peace of Westphalia.20 The history of the Hansa and its status and function in medieval 
Europe is underexplored in English historical texts – a curiosity in itself, as noted by those 
historians who have written on it, given the organisation’s longevity and importance to the 
commercial development of a significant swathe of the northern hemisphere.21  
As a mode of medieval European political authority, the Hansa was unique. Its institutional 
specificity has been so eclipsed by the subsequent rise of the modern nation-state that 
historical accounts tend to fall prey to one of two historiographical risks – either to narrate 
the Hansa’s development as a precursor to modern federalism, or to characterise its function 
as a merely economic concern.22 In broad scope, the Hansa was a self-selecting organisation 
of towns across northern Germany that spread into Scandinavia, Belgium, central Europe, 
and at its furthest reaches, to England and Russia. German sailors and merchants from the 
towns of Lübeck, Cologne, Bremen and Hamburg had long engaged in North Sea and Baltic 
trade, facilitated by their location around the Rhine, Weser and Elbe riverine region around 
the isthmus of Schleswig between the two seas.23 Over the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
these German merchants’ trade consisted largely of the import and export of low-value-
added products. Wine and cloth was exported to England and northern Europe in exchange 
for wool and salt, which was in turn traded to eastern Europe in exchange for including wax 
and furs, and occasionally luxury goods from East Asia.24 In Marx’s figuring, this form of 
merchant or commercial capitalism preceded capitalist modes of production, defined by the 
creation of surplus value in commodity production via exploitative labour relations.25 The 
Hansa did not engage in the regulation of labour relations at all, or in production. Hanseatic 
business was commodity circulation.   
                                                          
20 For the seminal history of the Hansa in English, see Phillipe Dollinger, The German Hansa (Routledge, 1999), 
see esp. Chapter 3 ‘Towards the Hansa of the Towns (c.1250 – c.1350)’ and Chapter 14 ‘Renewal and Eclipse 
(1550–1669)’. See also Justyna Wubs-Mrozewicz, ‘The Hanse in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: An 
Introduction’ in Stuart Jenks and Justyna Wubs-Mrozewicz (eds) The Hanse in Medieval and Early Modern Europe 
(Brill, 2012), 1. 
21 Dollinger, above n 20, xvii–xxii; and Donald J Harreld, ‘Introduction’ in Donald J Harreld (ed), Companion to 
the Hanseatic League (Brill, 2015), 1–5. 
22 For an early history that celebrates the Hansa as an ‘early representative of that federal spirit…best 
understood and most thoroughly carried out’ in the United States, see Helen Zimmern, The Hansa Towns (T 
Fisher Unwin, 1891). For a recent treatment of historiographical issues, see Stuart Jenks, ‘Conclusion’ in Stuart 
Jenks and Justyna Wubs-Mrozewicz (eds) The Hanse in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Brill, 2012), 255–281.  
23 Carsten Jahnke, ‘The Baltic Trade’ in Donald J Harreld (ed), Companion to the Hanseatic League (Brill, 2015), 
194–240. 
24 Dollinger, above n 20, 5–7; Johannes Schildhauer, The Hansa: History and Culture (Edition Leipzig, 1985), 42.  
25 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production (Frederick Engels ed) (Samuel Moore and Edward 
Aveling trans, Appleton & Co., 1889), 166–174; also Lars Maischak, German Merchants in the Nineteenth Century 
Atlantic (Cambridge University Press, 2013), xix. 
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The Hansa’s internal authority co-existed seemingly without overt conflict with both the 
Holy Roman Empire and the feudal system of kings and lords.26 Yet the nature of the 
organisation’s authority is not easily reducible to a mere mercantile function, supplementary 
or subject to political rule from elsewhere.27 At its peak in the fourteenth century, the Hansa 
was an institution regulating the internal affairs and external relations of an estimated two 
hundred towns across Northern Europe. Spruyt thus argues that the Hansa was not simply 
an economic association but an institutional competitor to the mode of state sovereignty that 
developed, in his schema at least, in Capetian France over a similar historical period.28 The 
Hansa was not a territorial form of authority in the modern jurisdictional sense, yet regulated 
the relations of towns from Dinant in contemporary Belgium to Dorpat in contemporary 
Estonia, with stations from London to Moscow.29 Nor was it a sovereign power, in either a 
pre-territorial or territorial sense. Its authority was not regarded as mutually exclusive with 
the authority of the Holy Roman Empire, and many of its member towns continued to owe 
allegiance to local lords (which, as Spruyt argues, formed jurisdictional entities that were far 
stronger than the kings).30  
From the legal perspective, then, the logic of Hanseatic authority was juridically unique.31 
The essential nature of the Hansa was its radical plurality; Hanseatic law consisted of 
dispensations that ‘were in a position to create or did create a joint, uniform system for the 
economic activity of the Hansa, complementary to, mediating between or superior to the 
individual charters of Hanseatic towns’.32 What is certain about the Hansa is that it created 
and maintained a detailed culture of regulations concerning commercial practice, communal 
trade protections, and common modes of measure and comparative statistics.33 The 
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Hanseatic community sustained a continuous existence into the seventeenth century, albeit 
with a gradually shrinking constituency. By 1603, member towns numbered only fifty.34 Its 
functional demise is usually attributed to the interruption to trade during the Thirty Years 
War from 1618.35 By the time of the peace of Westphalia in 1648, the Hanseatic community 
had shrunk back to its three core towns of Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg. The last Diet was 
held in Lübeck in 1669, and delegates of other towns and cities attended primarily to give 
official notification of their withdrawal from the Hansa.36 Its demise seems to have been met 
with indifference by the Westphalian states, but the Hansa was not without its mourners. In 
1670, Leibnitz counselled the imperial authorities to foster its revival in order to bolster 
German trade, which was recovering only slowly after the War.37  
The relevant historical point for this discussion is that despite the demise of the Hansa as a 
functioning collective in the mid-seventeenth century, certain Hanseatic towns managed to 
maintain almost unbroken independence well into the nineteenth century, against a series of 
imperial and confederate advances. After the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 
by Napoleon, Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg were briefly annexed into the Napoleonic 
Empire.38 After his defeat, the three towns officially regained independence in the Congress 
of Vienna in 1815. Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck achieved recognition among the thirty-
five German states and one additional free city, Frankfurt, that formed the first German 
confederation or Deutscher Bund, enshrined in the German Federal Act of 8 June 1815.39 The 
1815 confederation echoed key elements of the Hanseatic structure: it had no head of state 
or parliament, only a Diet which wielded no power over the sovereign rulers of each state.40   
Between the decline of the Holy Roman Empire in the early nineteenth century and the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, partisan efforts to unite German-speaking states, 
provinces and towns in a stronger body politic had gained political momentum. Between 
1867 and 1871, Prussia under Kaiser Wilhelm I established a smaller union of northern 
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German provinces than had been attempted in the 1815 Deutscher Bund, excluding Austria-
Hungary altogether.41 In 1871, Minister-President of Prussia Otto von Bismarck was installed 
as Prime Minister and Chancellor of the new Confederation.42 In the new Imperial 
Constitution, the last three Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck were 
recognised as distinct political entities, and were each given a single representative seat in the 
new Bundesrat.43 These were the only cities to be so recognised among the collection of 
Prussian and states and districts that comprised the new lower house of the legislature.44 
Article 34 of the Imperial Constitution provided that ‘(t)he Hanseatic towns of Bremen and 
Hamburg, with so much of their own or of the adjacent territory as may be needful for the 
purpose, remain as free ports outside the common customs area until they apply to be 
admitted therein’.45 Hamburg and Bremen did not cede control of their economic affairs to 
the German federation until 1888 – four years after the DHPG paid its first dividend – and 
indeed maintained their Hanseatic identity despite this final annexation. As Zimmern wrote 
in 1891, ‘to this day, though despoiled and shorn of their honour, the cities call themselves 
proudly the Hanseatic towns’.46 Despite Stevenson’s mockery, then, the interests of the 
DHPG cannot be said to be entirely continuous with the new German imperial state. The 
company that Hansemann bought had a far deeper knowledge and experience of foreign 
trade through its Hanseatic inheritance than through the hesitant imperialist projects of the 
German confederation.    
5. Hanseatic firms in the Pacific  
The key point for this chapter is that the incursion of Hamburg firms into the western Pacific 
are better understood not as a minor frontier in the rapid expansion of ‘the German empire’ 
in the late nineteenth century, but as a late episode in a longer history of the shift from a 
Hanseatic, non-centralised trade network toward the establishment of the German state 
itself. Bismarck himself noted in a speech to the Reichstag that Hanseatic enterprise had 
prompted German imperial expansion: ‘(w)e were first induced, owing to the enterprise of 
the Hanseatic people – beginning with land purchases and leading to requests for imperial 
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protection – to consider whether we could promise protection to the extent desired’.47 As 
Giordani stated in 1916, ‘the origins of German colonial expansion are undoubtedly to be 
sought in the Hanse or Hanseatic League’,48 an observation moderated by Smith in 1978: ‘when 
colonial acquisition did occur after 1883, the locations of Hanseatic trading interests often 
provided guides to the territories to be claimed’.49   
Hanseatic companies had established trade networks reaching far beyond the Hansa’s 
European purview well before unification in 1871. By 1866, Hamburg firms alone maintained 
a web of 279 trading outposts around the world.50 Godeffroy & Sohn entered the Pacific 
westward from Valparaiso in 1857, although the scope of its network was such that it could 
also have come east from South East Asia. By the mid-nineteenth century, the firm had 
travelled from the Hanseatic ports westward around the Horn of Africa to South America, 
and eastward to Cochin China (now Vietnam), leaving only the Pacific to traverse 
latitudinally.51 In 1857, Johann Cesar Godeffroy IV, figurehead of the company, instructed 
its representative in Valparaiso to begin making preparations to set up a factor in Samoa.52 
The new trade Godeffroy had set his sights upon was copra, the dried meat of the coconut, 
a raw material which yielded two products of increasing value in mid-nineteenth century 
trade - coconut oil and coconut meal.53 Both products were of particular value in the context 
of agricultural industrialisation in the later nineteenth century. Coconut oil, used primarily in 
cooking, is slow to rancidify, making it an ideal export-import product; and copra meal found 
a market as high-energy feed for livestock.  
The Godeffroy agent first installed at Apia Bay in Samoa, experienced trader August Unshelm, 
set up a network in which the company installed as many agents as possible across the smaller 
islands of the western Pacific, including islands that already had a European presence.54 In 
this manner, Godeffroy agents spread thinly but widely across the islands of the Pacific, 
including Samoa, Tonga, Wallis and Futuna, Niue, the British Gilbert and Ellice groups, the 
Spanish Carolines, and the Marshall Islands.55 Whereas initial trade was in coconut oil pressed 
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by local islanders and barrelled by the company, Godeffroy & Sohn quickly shifted to exporting 
copra itself in sacks, as the dried copra price was commensurate to that of oil.56 The firm’s 
Pacific agents built lines of supply by demonstrating a kiln-based drying technique to local 
islanders, and offering to trade arms and alcohol for the dried copra produced.57 Where local 
stores had not been established by other companies, Godeffroy set up stores that offered credit 
to islanders in exchange for future copra yields, and for securities over copra-producing 
land.58 Exports were sent out in three directions: to Hamburg, to Valparaiso, and to Sydney.59  
The initial decade of Godeffroy’s copra trade in the western Pacific thus relied on the ability of 
local islanders to produce copra surplus to their own needs, as well as their willingness to 
trade that copra for Godeffroy-imported goods, namely arms and alcohol.60 The absence of 
any initial attempts by Godeffroy agents to secure local labour, or to engage in plantation, is 
most likely a reflection of the firm’s Hanseatic inheritance: the Hansa had never engaged in 
labour control or regulation of production, operating almost exclusively in practices of 
circulation.61 The Godeffroys regarded the purchase of property and infrastructure ‘beyond 
what was absolutely necessary’ as undesirable, as it impinged on the flow of the company’s 
capital, which needed to be liquid enough to exploit trading opportunities where and when 
they arose.62  
Yet the firm’s practices began to change in the Pacific over the 1860s and 1870s. The firm 
established its first plantation in Samoa in 1865, not just in copra but in cotton, the price of 
which had increased sharply due to the drop in American production during the Civil War.63 
Coconut palms, which take around a decade to mature, were planted between the cotton 
rows. Samoans were recruited as plantation labourers, yet their apparent ‘reluctance to work’ 
frustrated Godeffroy’s agents, and a practice of shipping labour from the eastern islands of 
New Guinea developed.64 Indentured labour practices in the Pacific, which came to be 
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known as ‘blackbirding’, persisted as late as the 1940s.65 By 1877, Godeffroy’s trade dominated 
import and export on Samoa and Tonga, making it the strongest German firm in the Pacific 
region.66 The firm’s success in the Pacific is attributed in some historical accounts to its 
decentralised mode of operations and its ingenuity in raising the end value of copra, yet most 
note its comparatively easy access via Hanseatic banks - like Hansemann’s Disconto-Gesellschaft 
- to the investment finance required to set up those operations.67  
The firm’s outlook took a turn for the worse under the management of Johann Cesar 
Godeffroy VI, who took a more bullish approach to the family business than had his 
predecessors.68  Goddefroy VI’s change in commercial approach was a matter of desperation: 
the firm had simply invested too heavily and too late in Pacific trade.69 The British had 
colonised Australia over 70 years previous to Godeffroy’s entrée into the Pacific, following 
with New Zealand in 1840, and Fiji in 1874. The French were established in Tahiti to the 
east of Samoa and New Caledonia to the west, the Spanish in the Philippines and the Caroline 
Islands to the northwest, and the North Americans in Samoa and the Sandwich Islands (later 
Hawai’i) to the north. Each imperial power had developed not only trading links but also 
plantations, infrastructure and even protectorates by the time German firms arrived.70 
In 1878, Goddefroy VI invested heavily in the European speculative mining market. At the 
same time, the firm’s Pacific interests were consolidated into a single company, the Deutsche 
Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft der Südsee-Inseln, and a public share offer was made. Interest, 
however, was weak, even in Hamburg.71 Unable to secure the private capital, Godeffroy VI 
sought support from the Imperial Foreign Office in the form of a mid-term guarantee on 
the DHPG share price. Bismarck supported the idea enough to allow a Bill to go before the 
Bundesrat, where it was defeated.72 Staring down insolvency, Godeffroy accepted a loan offer 
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from Barings London, secured against DHPG shares.73 Only at the point of collapse was the 
DHPG rescued by Hansemann, who fronted the 5 million marks required to buy Barings 
out of the DHPG.74 
It took the DHPG the five years to 1884 to pay a dividend on its shares, still owned primarily 
by Hansemann, his Hamburg banking associates and members of the Godeffroy family.75 
That the DHPG was able to phoenix out of the ruins of Godeffroy & Sohn and survive to turn 
around a profit, at a time when Godeffroy’s Pacific interests were already on the wane, was 
a notable achievement. The company managed to reinvigorate itself not simply as a result of 
the financial cunning of Hansemann, son of the ‘German Hudson’, but of a significant 
change in direction in German foreign policy over these years. Whereas political support for 
German enterprise in the Pacific had proven difficult for Godeffroy VI to secure in 1878, 
the attitude of both Bismarck and the Reichstag toward the function of German presence 
outside the Reich had shifted in tone by 1884.  
6. The Reich, imperial expansion and the Berlin Conference of 1884 
That it was Bismarck, famously underwhelmed by the prospect of German imperial 
expansion outside of Europe, who convened the Berlin West Africa Conference in 
November 1884, indicates at the very least the significance of the debate over the law of 
acquisition of territory for European realpolitik. In August 1884, Bismarck had capitulated to 
Lüderitz’s request for official recognition of his interests in Angra Pequeña, issuing a 
declaration designating the areas around Angra Pequeña that Lüderitz claimed on the basis 
of ‘treaties’ obtained from local ‘chiefs’ as under the ‘protection’ of the German Reich.76 The 
legal content of the ‘protection’ provided for in the declaration was unclear, due both to the 
novelty of the protectorate form in German administrative practice, and a lack of clarity in 
the European law of nations as to the legal basis, mode of establishment and rights and 
obligations pertaining to protectorate status. The Berlin Conference was convened primarily 
to settle by diplomatic means the legitimacy or otherwise of the European powers’ various 
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imperial claims in Africa, which variously took the form of colonial occupation, and 
declarations of protection.77  
As Craven has observed, the historical and legal significance of the Berlin Conference is a 
matter of ongoing debate.78 The General Act with which it concluded, however, provided one 
of the only collective European agreements on the legal concept of the protectorate.79 Whilst 
the agenda of the Conference dealt only with questions of free trade in the Congo basin, and 
freedom of navigation on the Congo and Niger Rivers, the question of the legal distinction 
between the categories of occupation and protection was an issue of common concern. In 
the context of the Conference, the debate centred primarily on the formal means by which 
‘new occupations on the African coasts’ were to be deemed ‘effective’80; however, the rights 
and obligations pertaining to declarations of protection became the comparator against 
which those of occupation were defined. 
Similarly to the German Reich, the British were loath to extend formal colonial status to 
company-driven concerns in Africa, demonstrating a preference for consular jurisdiction as 
a means of protecting chartered companies.81 In effect, the British sought to prolong the 
practices of ‘informal’ or economic empire that had long facilitated British imperial 
expansion, formalised under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843.82 However, consular 
jurisdiction was commonly recognised as insufficient to claim rights over foreign territory 
sufficient to exclude other European powers, a position insisted upon by Bismarck in 
negotiations with Britain over Southern Africa.83  This difference of approach placed highly 
leveraged commercial enterprises in Africa and the Pacific in a position of uncertainty 
regarding competition from other European companies, an added commercial risk of which 
they increasingly complained.84    
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The General Act of 1885 only indirectly addressed the question of the legal distinction 
between occupation and protection. Article 34 provided that notification was to be given to 
the other Signatory Powers of any new claims of possession or protectorate on the African 
coasts. Article 35 provided that Powers claiming occupation recognized an obligation to 
‘insure the establishment of authority’ in occupied areas ‘sufficient to protect existing 
rights’.85 The exclusion of protectorates from the obligation of ‘effective occupation’, as it 
came to be known, agreed upon in Article 35 was the extent of agreement on the distinction 
between colony and protectorate in the General Act.86 This was sufficient to prompt the 
proliferation of the protectorate model not only across Africa but across the Pacific and Asia 
from 1884 onward.  
7. The concept of the protectorate  
The protectorate was not a novel creation of the late nineteenth century. As Lindley noted 
in 1926, ‘(t)he assumption by a comparatively powerful State of the duty of protecting a 
weaker State is an institution of considerable antiquity’.87 Twiss located the origin of treaties 
of protection with the agreement entered into by the Numidians with the Romans, by which 
they regarded themselves to have maintained their independence whilst placing themselves 
under a relation of Roman patronage.88 In the classical law of nations, a treaty of protection 
was a treaty of unequal alliance.89 However, the concept seems to have been re-enlivened in 
the context of high imperialism in the legal space between consular and colonial jurisdiction. 
The former protected the rights of sovereign subjects in foreign territory which remained 
under the sovereignty of another state; and the latter purported to extend sovereignty over 
colonial territory, and was thus exclusive both to claims of local sovereignty and of 
annexation by other powers.  
Over the 1880s and 1890s, the European powers executed a wave of treaties of protection 
in Africa, the Pacific and parts of Asia. However, the legal content of the concept remained 
poorly defined.90 The basic characteristic of the protectorate was the assumption by the 
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‘protecting’ power of the conduct of the ‘protected’ region’s foreign relations – or of what 
was termed the ‘external sovereignty’ of the protected region.91 By implication, the protected 
region maintained notional control of its internal affairs, but was prevented from engaging 
in diplomatic or other relations with other European states.92 Jenkyns described the division 
as a matter of sources of law: the ‘external sovereignty’ of a state, meaning ‘the independence 
of one political society in respect to all other political societies’, derived from the law of 
nations; whereas ‘internal sovereignty’ denoted that power ‘inherent in the people of any 
state or vested in its ruler by its municipal constitution’.93 
Despite the simplicity of the classical definition, the term came to be used over the late 
nineteenth century to label a spectrum of legal relationships, from the classical protectorate 
at one end to effective colonial rule at the other. The argument made here is that in this 
period, the ways in which the protectorate concept was deployed as grounds of an 
administrative form exceeded the logic of treaty of unequal alliance in the European law of 
nations from which it was derived. Late nineteenth century protectorates thus blurred two 
distinctions now assumed to be self-evident. The first is the distinction between cession and 
conquest as legal justifications for acquisition of foreign territory. The second is the 
distinction between European commercial activity in non-European areas and the imposition 
of formal administrative rule on non-European peoples. As European powers sought to 
divide the economic resources of Africa and the Pacific amongst themselves by ‘peaceable’ 
means after the wars of the nineteenth century, they innovated the concept of protection to 
ground modes of extra-territorial jurisdiction that sought to exert political and economic 
control over non-European regions whilst eschewing the legal responsibility and cost of 
direct colonial administration.  
Protectorates were declared on differing bases. Some assertions of protectorate status 
conformed to the classical model in that they were justified on the basis of treaty agreements 
with local ‘rulers’, however obtained. In others – including in Nauru – protectorate status 
was simply imposed, whether unilaterally by a European state on request of national traders 
in the region, or by agreement with other European states.94 That protectorates could be 
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imposed in the absence of a treaty, or expanded across regions pursuant to which no treaties 
had been obtained, was sometimes justified on the basis of the absence of sovereignty in the 
local populations on whom such impositions were made. In this sense, the protectorate 
without treaty was the legal means of expanding res nullius as a basis of territorial acquisition 
to include territorium nullius, a canon law concept repurposed by Twiss and Martitz in the 
1880s to denote areas over which independent tribes were capable of holding rights in private 
property, but which were without sovereign due to the incapacity of such tribes to possess 
sovereignty themselves.95 On this reasoning, protectorates declared in the absence of treaty 
were thus predicated not on agreement with but on the inferior legal capacity of the peoples 
over whom they were declared. Such peoples were capable of occupation in the sense 
required to ground private rights in property, but not in the sense required to ground 
sovereign rights.96  This ambivalence in the legal basis of protectorate status is reflected in 
the susceptibility of the term itself to multiple interpretations. In the later nineteenth century, 
British political discourse tended to refer to the operative relation of protection as a political 
agreement between the stronger and the weaker region even where sovereignty of local 
peoples was not recognised, reflecting the legal lineage of the treaty of unequal alliance.97 
German discourse, on the other hand, tended to frame the relation of protection as one of 
commercial protectionism between the Reich and German traders, with the local population 
rendered almost an irrelevance; the operative agreement was between the trading firm and 
the Reich.98  
Whilst declarations of protectorate status most reliably entailed the assumption of exclusive 
conduct of the ‘protected’ region’s foreign relations, beyond this the extent of jurisdiction 
assumed by the ‘protecting’ state varied considerably.99 At one end of the spectrum were 
protectorates that simply expanded upon consular jurisdiction to the extent of assuming the 
‘external sovereignty’ or exercise of foreign relations of the protected territory, leaving local 
political authority to administer the affairs of the local population.100 An example here is the 
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British protectorate established on the Somali coast in 1886 by treaty with the ‘Elders of the 
Habr Toljaala’, the two provisions of which extended the ‘gracious favour and protection of 
Her Majesty the Queen-Empress’ in exchange for an undertaking ‘to refrain from entering 
into any correspondence, Agreement, or Treaty with any foreign nation or Power, except 
with the knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty’s Government’.101 At the other end of the 
spectrum were protectorates which functioned as effective colonies, with the protecting state 
assuming both the ‘external’ sovereignty and local administration of the protected region. 
Whilst the protected region would maintain nominal international personality, the protecting 
State assumed the rights and obligations of administration of the local as well as the foreign 
population.102 Examples include the British protectorate of Bechuanaland, declared in March 
1885, and of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, declared in 1892.103  
8. The ‘colonial protectorate’ 
The latter extreme blurred the distinction between the protectorate and the colony such that 
the concept of the ‘colonial protectorate’ arose: such entities were established by treaty and 
therefore logically reliant on the sovereign capacity of the local authority, yet in practice 
assertive of direct administration that evacuated putative local sovereignty of legal 
substance.104 Later interpretations of the escalation of protection by company administration 
toward occupation by public administration rendered the movement as intentional, however 
it is not at all clear that any such foresight was at work. Writing in 1919 in the United States, 
Snow regarded the colonial protectorate as a cynical device used by the European powers to 
establish colonial rule: ‘these ‘protectorates’ were legally nothing more than colonies in which 
the native organization was temporarily utilized as a mean of administration until the growth 
of a body of colonists and the development of ways of communication made possible the 
direct administration of the aborigines by the colonizing State’.105 However, in 1902 French 
economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu had seen the expansion of jurisdiction occasioned by the 
protectorate model as the undesired but inevitable consequence of attempting to protect 
                                                          
101 Lindley, above n 84, 183–184; Jenkyns, above n 91, 165. 
102 Snow, above n 98, 87: Lindley, above n 84, 182. 
103 On British Bechaunaland, see Lindley, above n 84, 187–188; on the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, see Doug 
Munro and Stewart Firth, ‘Towards Colonial Protectorates: The Case of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands’ (1986) 
32 Australian Journal of Politics and History 63.  
104 Munro and Firth, above n 103, 69. 
105 Snow, above n 98, 87. Lindley too asserted that the colonial protectorate functioned as a step toward full 
colonial administration, although he is equivocal on whether the European powers were working toward that 
outcome with intent. Lindley, above n 84, 182. 
62 
 
commercial activity in foreign territory without assuming administrative control. In his 
criticism of Bismarck’s distinction between the German model of the ‘pacific’ commercial 
protectorate and the ‘French’ model of the militaristic administrative colony, Leroy-Beaulieu 
suggests that such assessments of the protectorate model as motivated by colonial intent 
wrongly attributed design to expansions of jurisdiction that happened in ad hoc response to 
the impracticability of the model itself:     
‘when citizens of a great civilized State are dispersed in the midst of savage or barbarous 
populations which have no fixed governments and no exact idea of the power of the 
European peoples, it is inevitable that sooner or later incidents will occur which make it 
necessary for the colonizing State to intervene in the internal affairs of the aboriginal 
population in order to impose upon them a reign of law and an orderly administration…It 
is therefore, to be expected, - doubtless not within the next few years but at some later time 
– that the German will do more or less as the French have done, and following out to its 
logical consequences the colonizing policy will end by administering more or less directly 
and completely the barbarous peoples in the midst of whom they have established their 
flag’.106  
9. The establishment of German protectorates 
The financial viability of the DHPG was thus directly related to the formalisation of empire 
in the Western Pacific region in which it operated. In 1881, Goddefroy’s Pacific network was 
in danger of collapse, and had been refused official support. Bismarck’s early stance against 
colonial enterprise has been well documented.107 His view that foreign presence was of little 
use to the project of German nation-building, in that it benefited only ‘a handful of 
merchants and manufacturers’,108 had been established before Confederation in 1871.109 With 
Hansemann’s assistance, the DHPG phoenixed out of the assets of Goddefroy & Sohn long 
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enough to exist until 1884, when Bismarck’s attitude to German imperial expansion in the 
Pacific warmed. Yet the firm’s position in the ostensibly laissez faire trading environment of 
the imperial Pacific was weak enough to require support from the Reich to secure the trade 
network it had established.  
Due to its late adoption of formal imperial expansion outside of Europe, the German Reich 
was in a position to assess the respective merits of the colonial policies adopted by France, 
Britain, Spain and Holland. The Franco-Prussian War had occurred during a depression that 
had only deepened for Germany, and the Chancellor of the new Reich was primarily 
concerned with consolidating political power in Europe to shore up its expanded French 
borders.110 This early distaste for expenditure on colonial enterprise was demonstrated in 
Bismarck’s initially negative responses to requests for official recognition and financial 
assistance from German entrepreneurs including, in the Pacific, from Goddefroy in Samoa, 
and Hansemann in New Guinea;111 and in Africa, from Gustav Nachtigal in Togo and the 
Cameroons, Carl Peters in East Africa, and Lüderitz in the port of Angra Pequeña.112 The 
initial response to Lüderitz, who sought declarations of protection as early as 1882, was that 
he would be afforded protection only ‘in the manner and in the degree in which the empire 
generally allows protection to extend to the interests of its citizens living abroad’113 – in effect, 
that he would be protected to no greater extent than what was provided by consular 
jurisdiction.   
By the early 1880s, however, Bismarck’s rhetoric toward German imperial expansion outside 
of Europe had begun to shift. On the international front, the German government seems to 
have reconsidered participation in ongoing diplomatic debates over the rules of acquisition 
and occupation of foreign territory not as a distraction from European high politics but as a 
means of consolidating the diplomatic strength of the new German state.114 On the domestic 
front, the prospect of German imperial expansion had attracted champions in the form of 
Carl Peters’ Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation, and Friedrich Fabri’s Deutsche Kolonialverein or 
‘German Colonial Society’.115 The colonial societies framed German imperial expansion as 
in the interests not only of the ‘handful of merchants and manufacturers’ that Bismarck had 
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dismissed a decade previous, but also of the working classes displaced by the industrialisation 
of agriculture and the long depression that followed the Franco-Prussian War.116 The 
growing popularity of the colonial movement as a vehicle for nascent German nationalism 
offered Bismarck an opportunity to consolidate his position in domestic politics amid tension 
with the Reichstag; Bismarck went so far as to state in 1885 that ‘public opinion in Germany 
so strongly emphasizes colonial policy that the position of the German government 
essentially depends on its success’.117 
Both Bismarck’s changing attitude to the formalisation of German empire and the 
experimental nature of the juridification of colonialism were evident in comments made in 
correspondence with German ambassador in London Count Georg Herbert zu Münster in 
December 1883. In deciding on a response to Lüderitz’s repeated request that the Reich take 
steps to protect his interests in Angra Pequeña from annexation by Britain, in extension of 
the Cape Colony, Bismarck wrote to Münster, ‘for that we must either take possession, or 
recognise Lüderitz as sovereign’.118 The latter alternative was of course what was in fact 
decided upon at the Berlin Conference in recognition of the claims of King Leopold II over 
the Congo basin; Leopold’s Association internationale du Congo or ‘International Association of 
the Congo’ was recognised as sovereign on the basis of over 450 treaties obtained by Henry 
Morton Stanley with local rulers, and became known as the Congo Free State in May 1885.119  
By late May 1884, however, the German prevarication over Lüderitz’ requests was forced to 
an unexpected conclusion by the self-governing Cape Colony’s declaration of its intention 
to annex the entire region of South West Africa, a declaration that Germany refused to 
recognise.120 On 4 June 1884, Germany communicated to the British government that it 
would be extending protectorate status over the area claimed by Lüderitz, a declaration that 
seems to have surprised the British government, whom Münster had assured up until early 
June of Germany’s lack of interest in formal colonial expansion.121 The diplomatic dispute 
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over Angra Pequeña stemmed in part from Bismarck’s equivocal use of the term 
‘protectorate’ at different times over the preceding year in his communications with British 
Secretary of State Lord Granville: at times, the implication of ‘protection’ was of a classical 
protectorate; and at others, of effective colonial rule.122  
By 26 June 1884, the German government had consolidated its position such that Bismarck 
was able to speak in detail to the Reichstag on its new stance. In this speech, Bismarck was 
at pains to distinguish between a colony and a protectorate, and to make his preference for 
the latter clear:  
‘I repeat that I am opposed to colonies – I will say rather to the colonial system, as most of 
the States have carried it on during the last century…against colonies which have as their 
basis a piece of land, then the seeking to draw immigrants thither, to establish there officials 
and to erect fortified places…Entirely different is the question, first, as to whether it is 
judicious, and second, as to whether it is the duty of the German Empire, as respects those 
of its citizens who have entered such undertakings in reliance on the protection (schutz) of 
the Empire, so that those structures that have grown out of the superabundance of the 
whole German body, in foreign lands, may be granted our trusteeship and protection…’123  
Bismarck’s 1884 framing of the protectorate concept, with its echoes of Locke’s labour-based 
justification of property rights,124 gestures toward the competing influences on the 
development of the German concept of the protectorate as Schutzgebiet: on the one hand were 
economic considerations regarding whom should be expected to bear the cost of imperial 
expansion occasioned by private enterprise, and on the other, political considerations of how 
to respond to the problem of mass German emigration following the prolonged economic 
depression. On the matter of finance, the new federal government was constitutionally 
unable levy direct taxes.125 It was thus inherently limited in the funds it could commit to 
colonial enterprise without the approval of the Reichstag, which was not politically inclined 
to support the Chancellor.126 The limitation of governmental responsibility for cost was thus 
central to the German adoption of the protectorate model, as Bismarck sought to emphasise:     
‘(o)ur intention is not first to create provinces to be administered, but so take under our 
protection colonial enterprises and to aid them during their development…In so doing, 
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where such creations are unsuccessful, the Empire will not lose much and the expense will 
not have been considerable’.127  
According to Bismarck, the only aid to be provided to protectorates so created was official 
recognition by the Reich of the relevant company’s trading rights within the region in 
question, and the threat of enforcement via German warship should such declarations be 
ignored by other Europeans.128 Companies were expected to fund and perform any necessary 
administrative functions over the claimed area themselves, including the protection of 
already acquired private rights of German and other European citizens, and to fund the costs 
of stationing a governmental official for the resolution of disputes.129    
On the matter of German population growth and emigration, management of the growing 
population of rural unemployed had quickly become an urgent political issue for the newly 
confederated Reich.130 The discourse of emigrationist colonialism had taken shape 
throughout the 1870s. Proponents of emigrationist colonialism advocated the reservation of 
areas of Africa and the Pacific for the German working classes to practice the ‘traditional’ 
German rural lifestyle that had been decimated by the industrialisation of agriculture in 
Europe.131 Fabri’s 1879 pamphlet Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien? (‘Does Germany Need 
Colonies?’) sought to appeal to German nationalist sentiment, declaring that ‘only a mother 
country which is able to produce a continuous supply of superfluous labour is qualified to 
found agrarian colonies; and that therefore it is today only for the Germanic race to engage 
in this more modern form of colonial creation…’.132 Despite its political significance as a 
multivalent policy response to economic recession and the perceived threat of socialism, the 
rhetoric of emigrationist colonialism translated only weakly into practice. German emigration 
to the protectorates was scant.133 Despite its failure in practice, the popular discourse of 
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emigrationist colonialism contributed significantly to the Reichstag’s approval of the 
extension of protectorate status to existing trade networks.134   
The German government’s abrupt turnaround on colonial policy in 1884 had a direct effect 
on the formalisation of empire in the Western Pacific. After the Reichstag voted down 
banker Hansemann’s proposal to save Godeffroy & Sohn’s Pacific interests with state funds in 
1880, head of the Foreign Office Count von Limburg-Stirum advised Hansemann that the 
Reich would not consider anything more than consular assistance for German commercial 
enterprise in the Pacific, or more specifically, ‘protection, naval and consular, to property in 
land acquired by private adventurers’.135 Like Lüderitz in Angra Pequeña, and Carl Peters in 
East Africa, Hansemann persisted in his requests for protection of his Pacific interests, and 
his more modest entreaties to the German Foreign Office in relation to his investments in 
New Guinea resulted in a quite different outcome. By August 1884, the official position on 
the Western Pacific had been reversed, as illustrated in a memo sent by Secretary of State 
Count Hatzfeld to German Ambassador to London, Count Münster: ‘(o)ur experience in 
other respects makes it desirable that all territories in which German commerce 
preponderates, or which have become the goal of costly expeditions, the legitimacy of which 
no one can question, should be placed under the direct protection of the Empire’.136 
10. Concern in Australian colonies over German imperial expansion  
The expansion of the Hamburg firms in the Western Pacific was a matter of great 
consternation in the Australian colonies. By the 1880s, New South Wales, Victoria, South 
Australia, Queensland and Tasmania had been granted self-governing status and had together 
developed a policy on external affairs self-consciously distinct to that of the British Imperial 
government. The colonies regarded Hanseatic commercial activity in the Western Pacific, 
and particularly in New Guinea, as a subterfuge for German imperial aspirations in the 
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region, and thus as a direct threat to Australian ascendancy.137 The colony of Queensland 
had in 1882 entreated the British Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby, to allow the colony to 
annex to its territory the entire eastern part of the island of New Guinea, Holland having 
long claimed the western part.138 Lord Derby refused on the basis that the added expense 
was unnecessary, given Germany’s express lack of interest in acquiring territory in the region; 
in Lord Derby’s opinion there was ‘no reason for supposing that the German Government 
contemplates any scheme of colonisation’.139  
In response to the Imperial Government’s refusal to acquiesce to Queensland’s request, the 
colonies planned the ‘Australasian Convention on the Annexation of Adjacent Islands and 
the Federation of Australasia’, which was held in Sydney in November and December 
1883.140 The other colonies expressly supported Queensland’s position, and expressed unrest 
at the Imperial Government’s lack of interest in protecting Australian regional interests.141 
The Premier of Queensland Thomas McIlwraith’s memorandum of July 1883 to the other 
colonies on the matter draws unambiguous connection between the perceived German threat 
and the need to federate:  
‘there can be no doubt that the [British] refusal to annex New Guinea, together with the 
possible acquisition by foreign Powers of some of the Pacific Islands contiguous to Australia, 
does raise very serious questions intimately connected with the future interests of the 
Australasian Colonies...The circumstances of the present seem to point to a necessity for 
combination among the Australian Colonies – a combination for both legislative and 
executive purposes. Australian interests are involved in securing the peaceful and progressive 
supremacy of Australian influences in the adjoining seas. In order to effect this, it is necessary 
that there should not only be sentiments held in common, but that a form of government 
should be provided capable of giving expression to these sentiments. The federation of the 
Australian colonies may thus be forwarded’.142       
The German government was aware of Australian unrest at German commercial activity in 
the area, and of the tension between the colonies and the Imperial Government. As late as 
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January 1884, Moritz Busch of the German Foreign Office expressed frustration to German 
Ambassador Count Münster over coverage of German activity in Australian newspapers, 
explicitly disavowing any imperial aspirations: ‘on the one hand, the existence of German 
commercial interests is wilfully denied, and on the other non-existent projects of German 
annexation are asserted to exist, in order to further the desires of Australia to annex the 
independent islands of the South Sea’.143 
 
Busch’s disavowal of official annexation plans took place as Hansemann campaigned for 
protection of his interests in New Guinea. Following negotiations with the British Foreign 
Office, it was decided in August 1884 – four months after the declaration of the protectorate 
of German South West Africa - that Germany would extend protection over the northeast 
of New Guinea, leaving the southeast to the British. Bismarck notified Hansemann of the 
decision in a telegram: ‘(t)he acquisitions made by you will be placed under the protection of 
the Empire, on the same conditions as in south-western Africa, subject to the condition that 
they are not made in territories to which other nations have legitimate claims’.144 The areas 
claimed were subsequently named ‘Kaiser Wilhelmsland’ and the ‘Bismarck Archipelago’.145 
The response in the Australian colonies was to decry the Imperial Government’s suspected 
duplicitousness over its complicity in German expansion.146 The British response, in turn, 
was the hasty declaration of a protectorate over the southwestern part of New Guinea in 
October 1884 - a month before the Berlin Conference.147 While the substance of the Berlin 
Conference dealt with the regulation of European imperial expansion in Africa, the 
diplomatic context that prompted Bismarck to call the Conference seems to have clearly 
included the regulation of German and British commercial expansion in the Pacific.    
11. German and British consular jurisdiction in the Western Pacific  
Prior to the consolidation of the protectorate regime, a patchy network of German consular 
jurisdiction extended over parts of the Western Pacific. In 1879, the Reich had passed the 
Gesetz über die Konsulargerichtsbarkeit or ‘Law on Consular Jurisdiction’, which established 
                                                          
143 Parliament of Victoria, German Interests in the South Sea, above n 135, 33. 
144 Ibid, 42. 
145 Firth, New Guinea under the Germans, above n 5, 21–22.  
146 J L Whitaker et al (eds), Documents and Readings in New Guinea History: Prehistory to 1899 (Jacaranda Press, 1975), 
474–476. 
147 See Charles Lyne, New Guinea: An Account of the Establishment of the British Protectorate over the Southern Shores of 
New Guinea (Sampson Low, 1885); Johnston, above n 81, 141. 
70 
 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over ‘subjects of the Reich’ and ‘other protected persons’, where 
exercisable by ‘tradition or treaty’.148 By 1884, both the DHPG and another Hanseatic firm, 
Hernsheim & Company, had headquartered their regional operations on the island of Jaluit 
in the Ralick chain of islands, around halfway between New Guinea and Hawai’i. Together 
with the Radack chain, the Ralicks had become known in English as the ‘Marshall Islands’ a 
century earlier, after the visit of the British barque Scarborough under Captain Thomas 
Marshall in 1788.149 Marshall and the Scarborough were on their way to Canton, having carried 
English convicts to Botany Bay as part of the First Fleet under Captain James Cook earlier 
that year.150 One hundred years later, the Marshall Islands had become a major source of 
copra, and a key trade port in the Western Pacific. Together, the two Hamburg firms 
controlled around two thirds of the copra trade moving through Jaluit.151 Hernsheim & 
Company had been established in the Marshalls from the mid-1870s, and like Hansemann 
on behalf of the DHPG, had lobbied for official protection of their commercial interests in 
the region from the late 1870s.152 Echoing the Reich’s response to Hansemann at the same 
time, the Hernsheims were successful only in prompting the creation of the new imperial 
consulate of Jaluit in 1880. As reward for lobbying for official resources for the protection 
of trade, the Franz Hernsheim was himself appointed consular agent of an expansive region 
that from 1880 to 1885 took in the better part of the Western Pacific, including Hansemann’s 
interests in New Guinea.153 During this period, the boundaries of the consular jurisdiction 
of Jaluit were indeterminate, following Hanseatic commercial enterprise from New Guinea 
in the west, to the Caroline Islands in the north, and to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands in the 
east.154  
Britain’s consular jurisdiction of the Western Pacific was more clearly defined, building as it 
did on the legislative basis of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843.155 The specificities of the 
Pacific context, including the geographical limits of the jurisdiction and the procedures for 
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enforcement, were detailed in the Western Pacific Orders in Council, issued in 1877.156 The 
extent of British consular jurisdiction in the region was typical: ‘the jurisdiction of the High 
Commissioner extends over all British subjects, but over British subjects exclusively’157. In 
the absence of a treaty with another sovereign Power, the British empire was understood by 
its jurists to have no basis on which to assert jurisdiction over foreign subjects, according to 
the principle of extra territorium ius dicenti haud pareteur long established in the European law of 
nations.158 In contrast to the Reich, Britain’s principal concern in administering its consular 
jurisdiction in the Western Pacific seems not to have been the protection of trade, but rather 
the punishment of its subjects caught perpetrating the trade in indentured labour that had 
developed in the region.159 The inability of the High Commissioner of the Western Pacific 
to punish either non-British subjects for their perpetration of ‘blackbirding’ in the region, or 
Pacific Islanders who retaliated with violence against all Europeans for the actions of some, 
again drew the ire of the Australian colonies, where it was widely held that prosecution of 
British subjects only was unfair.160  
As such, it was not only Britain’s French and German competitors in Africa and the Pacific 
but British imperialists themselves who were irritated by Britain’s reliance on the frugality of 
consular jurisdiction to manage its informal empire. In light of repeated refusals to expand 
the basis of British jurisdiction in the Western Pacific, the Australian colonies found 
additional reason to meet to debate a basis on which they themselves could officially annex 
the region.161 Despite the comparative conceptual clarity of British consular jurisdiction in 
this period, then, the practical and political difficulty of maintaining this position in the 
context of European imperial competition created pressure to devise a basis of jurisdiction 
over foreign subjects.162 The matter of whether Pacific Islanders and Africans possessed 
sovereignty pursuant to which a treaty could be established therefore became an openly 
considered issue in the English jurisprudence on extraterritorial jurisdiction.163  
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In contrast, the jurisprudential basis of jurisdiction over foreign subjects was a matter yet to 
be ventilated in the context of German imperial expansion, if indeed it ever seriously was. 
With the shift in official policy in 1884 and the declaration of the protectorates of South 
West Africa, the Cameroons, Togoland and New Guinea, Bismarck’s initial intention in 
relation to administration was to emulate the British model of the chartered company. 
Whereas the area of the Protectorate of South West Africa was delimited on the basis of 
Lüderitz’ treaties with local rulers, as was the developing practice in Africa, in the case of 
New Guinea it is not clear that cession of indigenous sovereignty as such was ever 
contemplated. Indeed it is not entirely clear what concept of sovereignty operated in the 
Schutzbrief or ‘Letter of Protection’ granted to Hansemann in respect of his New Guinea 
interests, other than that it was of a divisible and delegable nature, as the instrument itself 
makes plain: 
‘Having in August 1884 promised our protection to a society of German subjects and citizens 
who have since then adopted the name of ‘New Guinea Company’ in a colonial scheme 
initiated by them and directed to island groups in the Western Pacific not yet under the 
protection of another power…we therefore grant to the New Guinea Company this Letter 
of Protection, and confirm herewith that we have assumed the sovereignty over the 
territories in question…We likewise grant to said Company (subject to the obligation of its 
introducing and maintain the political institutions agreed to, as well as of defraying the 
expenses of a sufficient administration of justice) rights of sovereignty corresponding 
thereto…Our Government also reserves to itself the regulation of the administration of 
justice, as well as the management of the relations between the protected territories and 
foreign governments’.164  
In the absence of any consideration of indigenous sovereignty, Hansemann’s Neuguinea-
Kompagnie thus appears to have been cast in the position of the weaker party in the classic 
protectorate model. In the Schutzbrief, the Reich purports to assume the external sovereignty 
of the territory, leaving the internal sovereignty to the Neuguinea-Kompagnie. There appears to 
have been no reckoning with the legal impediment of local sovereignty which had so 
preoccupied the British law officers in their insistence on consular jurisdiction in the Western 
Pacific. Hansemann himself was appointed judicial officer of the new protectorate, in 
addition to his role of ‘Commercial Councillor’. 165 A colleague subsequently remarked that 
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Hansemann ‘governed New Guinea in the morning hours before he came into the bank’.166 
After New Guinea followed East Africa: on 27 February 1885, the Protectorate of German 
East Africa was declared, and the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft or ‘German East Africa 
Company’ was formed by Carl Peters to take on its administration.167  
12. The establishment of the Marshall Islands Protectorate 
The Marshall Islands were to follow in August 1885. The established presence of more than 
one German firm in the area seems to have affected the mode of creation of the protectorate. 
Neither Hernsheim & Company nor the DHPG predominated in such a way that they could 
simply be ordained with the official administrative responsibilities of an imperial charter as 
had been the case in South West Africa, New Guinea, and East Africa. An unusual process 
of establishing a protectorate took place. In contrast to New Guinea but in keeping with the 
African model, the mechanism of the treaty was employed, ostensibly as a means of 
establishing jurisdiction. However, the protectorate was declared in August 1885, months 
before any treaties had been entered into; and when treaties were completed, they were 
entered into not by the DHPG or Hernsheim, but by the Reich itself. In October 1885, the 
captain of a German corvette, the Nautilus, was given the mission by the Foreign Office of 
visiting the Marshall Islands with drawn-up treaty documents in order to obtain the 
signatures of local Marshallese rulers on behalf of the Reich.168 Marshall Islands Consul Franz 
Hernsheim accompanied Nautilus Captain Rötger on this mission, which began in Jaluit on 
15 October 1885, and proceeded on a tour of the islands in the chains on which European 
settlements had been established. Ultimately the signatures or marks of eighteen iroij or 
Marshallese ‘chiefs’ were gathered on the original text.169  
Typical of island regions, political authority in the Ralik and Radack chains prior to European 
intervention was neither unitary nor centralised. Many iroij or chiefs were spread across the 
atoll chains that Europeans had together labelled the Marshalls after an English captain of 
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the First Fleet.170 The iroij approached to sign these documents were simply those known to 
Hernsheim as having some amenity either in the English language or in the copra trade, the 
most prominent being Kabua of Jaluit, the iroij with whom European traders preferred to 
deal.171 The treaty-signing tour undertaken by Rötger and Hernsheim seems to have appeared 
a sham undertaking even at the time; as a member of the Nautilus crew was reported to have 
written, 
‘(t)he treaty was written both in German and in the Marshall Islands language, which for this 
purpose had to be Romanised, as the islanders have no written language of their own. The 
document was signed by King Kabua and four other principal chiefs, all of whom, with the 
exception of one, managed to affix their names to the paper in English letters, though their 
handwritings were but sorry specimens of calligraphy… This having been done, preparations 
were made to hoist the German flag on the islands…’.172  
The manner in which the iroij understood the treaty document presented to them by Rötger 
and Hernsheim is, at least in the context of this discussion, effectively unknowable.  
Ultimately dated 1 November 1885 after the Nautilus returned to Jaluit, the Treaty between the 
Marshallese Chiefs and the Reich invokes the concept of protection in multiple and contradictory 
ways.173 It is not clear that a cohesive legal rationale informed its drafting. The agreement is 
framed as being prompted by the chiefs’ request for the protection of Kaiser Wilhelm I, a 
request which in turn is framed as motivated by the chiefs’ desire both to maintain 
independence from colonisation by other European powers, and to protect German trade.174 
The Kaiser offers his protection to the chiefs, and the chiefs undertake to protect ‘all German 
subjects and protected persons’ in their lands.175 In consonance with the classical protectorate 
model, the chiefs undertake to not provide land or enter into agreements with other foreign 
powers without the permission of the Kaiser; and in protection of German trade, the chiefs 
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also undertake to not ‘pass any legislation’ that would affect German companies without 
permission.176  
13. The legal establishment of the German protectorate regime 
Over the subsequent year of 1886, the legal framework of the German protectorate regime 
was rapidly defined. Whereas only two years previous, Bismarck had refused to extend 
anything beyond consular assistance to German commercial interests outside of Europe, the 
Reich now had the protectorates of South West Africa, Togo, Cameroon, New Guinea, 
German East Africa and the Marshall Islands to manage according to a largely undefined and 
untested model of extraterritorial administration. The Imperial Constitution of 1871 did not 
contemplate colonial expansion and was silent on the structure of extraterritorial 
administration.177 In the absence of a constitutional or private law basis for establishing the 
legitimacy of the protectorate regime, in April 1886 the Reichstag passed the Gesetz, betreffend 
die Rechtsverhältnisse der deutschen Schutzgebiete or ‘Law Governing the Legal Status of the 
German Protectorates’ (‘Protectorate Law’).178 The Protectorate Law became the domestic 
legal foundation of the German protectorate regime. In Section 1, the Law provided that the 
power to make laws for the protectorates was exercised by the Kaiser on behalf of the Reich, 
which circumvented the need for legislative governance of the regime by the Reichstag.179 In 
a seeming attempt to mirror the operation of British Orders in Council as the primary means 
by which extraterritorial governance was to be effected, the Protectorate Law then delegated 
the power to the Kaiser or his representative to issue regulations or ordinances (Verordnungen) 
for each protectorate.180 In this respect, however, the Protectorate Law departed from the 
British model in that it effectively suspended the principles of constitutional rule in the 
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protectorates. Executive and legislative power were centralised within a single office and 
there was no provision for legislative review.181      
In Section 2 of the Protectorate Law, the provisions of the Law on Consular Jurisdiction 
were stipulated to apply in protectorates in respect of all matters of private law, criminal law 
and procedural law, enforceable not by the consular agent but by the official placed in charge 
of the protectorate by the Chancellor.182 In this way, consular law – and not German 
domestic law - became the basic content of law in the German protectorates. As Nuzzo 
points out, this shift was paradigmatic; it purported to convert the consular jurisdiction from 
a personal into a territorial one.183 Whereas the Law on Consular Jurisdiction described a 
personal jurisdiction for subjects of the Reich and other Europeans, limited in its territorial 
application to those countries in which German consular jurisdiction was exercisable by 
‘tradition or treaty’, the protectorate jurisdiction was territorial, and could be imposed simply 
via declaration by the Kaiser of a given region as a protectorate.184   
In the crucial matter of the extension of protectorate jurisdiction over non-Europeans, the 
Protectorate Law was effectively silent. The imperial power to issue decrees included the 
power to subject additional categories of persons to the protectorate jurisdiction than were 
already subject by virtue of the application of the Law on Consular Jurisdiction to ‘subjects 
of the Reich’ and ‘other protected persons’.185 Other than this general and unlimited 
provision, the Protectorate Law leaves unspoken the matter of the governance of indigenous 
populations. In fact, the Protectorate Law does not expressly refer at all to indigenous 
populations (Eingeborene or ‘Natives’), other than to stipulate that the waiver of the right to 
legal representation does not apply to Natives named as defendants or accused in cases 
before the court of the protectorate.186  As Hanschmann notes, this silence effectively created 
a dual legal order in the protectorates: on the one hand was the regime of existing consular 
law applicable to Europeans and subject to such legislative and judicial review as provided 
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for in the Constitution, and on the other, a tabula rasa regime of protectorate law by imperial 
decree applicable to indigenous populations, exempt from review entirely.187      
This silence was only barely addressed in the founding imperial Ordinance (Verordnung) on 
the Marshall Islands Protectorate, issued in September 1886.188 The Ordinance decreed that 
consular law applied in the Marshall Islands to all resident in the jurisdiction, including 
natives but only to the degree expressly provided by the Chancellor.189 Most importantly, the 
Ordinance then delegated to the Chancellor the power to determine firstly, who was a native 
(Eingeborene) for the purposes of the Ordinance, and secondly, whether the legal relationships 
of natives thus defined were to be governed under consular law or under the regulations of 
the Marshall Islands Protectorate.190  
14. The Agreement between the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Reich 
The Marshall Islands Protectorate thus established by treaty and by imperial decree, the 
DHPG and Hernsheim & Company agreed to amalgamate their interests in the Marshalls 
region into one company that could take on the administration of the protectorate. In 
December 1887, the Jaluit Gesellschaft was incorporated in Hamburg, marking the 
amalgamation of the erstwhile Hanseatic networks of Goddefroy and Hernsheim in the 
Pacific. In January 1888, the new company entered into an Agreement with the Reich with 
respect to administration of the Marshall Islands Protectorate.191 The Agreement provided 
inter alia as follows: 
‘Whereas the Marshall Islands…have been placed under the protection of His Majesty the 
Kaiser; and whereas, on 21 December 1887, the Jaluit-Gesellschaft was incorporated in 
Hamburg on the basis of the Articles of Association appended under A, and this Company has 
undertaken to meet the cost of the administration of the Protectorate, subject to His Majesty’s 
assent the following agreement has been concluded between the Foreign Office and the Jaluit-
Gesellschaft; 
 
1. The Jaluit-Gesellschaft is granted the following exclusive rights and privileges within the 
domain of the aforesaid Protectorate:  
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a. the right to take possession of ownerless land, 
b. the right to engage in fishing for pearlshell, insofar as this is not carried on by the 
natives in accordance with tradition, 
c. the right to mine guano deposits, without prejudice to the duly acquired rights of 
third parties. 
 
2. The administration of the Protectorate will be conducted by an Imperial Commissioner 
assisted by a Secretary, to be appointed. 
 
3. The Imperial Commissioner will appoint the requisite officials for the local administration 
of the Protectorate as proposed by the agents of the Company in Jaluit, subject to the assent 
of the German Chancellor. 
 
4. A budget for the administration of the Protectorate will be drawn up annually, to be agreed 
upon between the Foreign Office and the Jaluit-Gesellschaft. … 
 
5. The Jaluit-Gesellschaft undertakes to meet the costs arising from the administration.  … 
 
6. Licence fees and head-taxes as specified in the budget are to be collected annually in the 
Protectorate. … 
 
7. Laws and Ordinances affecting the administration of the Protectorate are to be introduced 
only after a hearing before the Jaluit-Gesellschaft.  
 
8. In the promulgation of local administrative regulations, the Imperial Commissioner will, as 
far as possible, act in agreement with the agents of the Jaluit-Gesellschaft.  
… 
10. Voluntary liquidation of the Company may take place only after previous notice of 
severance of this agreement.  … 
 
12. Pleasant (Navoda) Island will be subject to the terms of this agreement as soon as the same 
is placed under the protection of the Reich.  
… 
Berlin, on the twenty-first day of January, eighteen hundred and eighty eight. 
The Jaluit Gesellschaft 
for the Board of Directors: 
           A. Weber Hernsheim 
 
The Secretary of State 
The German Foreign Office 
Count von Bismarck’ 
The property and guano clauses of the Agreement warrant some consideration. As discussed, 
a central concern of European commercial interests in the consolidation of the protectorate 
regime was that land acquired in areas outside European sovereign territory be recognised as 
attracting the protections of real property within the meaning of European private law. 
Requests for some guarantee from the imperial powers that land acquired prior to the 
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extension of formal protection would be treated as property were made by Lüderitz in Angra 
Pequeña, by Hansemann in Papua New Guinea, and by Goddefroy in the Marshall Islands.192 
Indeed it is possible to read requests by private individuals and companies for official 
protection of commercial interests outside of Europe during this period as precisely a request 
that such ‘interests’ be recognised as proprietary in European law, a contention supported 
by Bismarck’s comment to the Reichstag that the protectorate regime was prompted by 
Hanseatic enterprise ‘beginning with land purchases and leading to requests for imperial 
protection’.193  
The debate at the international level over legitimate means of territorial acquisition dealt 
squarely with the status of European property claims in Africa and the Pacific. The 
jurisprudential solution of territorium nullius proposed by Martitz and Twiss as the 
rationalisation of the protectorate regime was grounded in the logic of property: indigenous 
peoples were capable of owning land in the Lockean sense of possession gained via 
occupation and cultivation, but not of evincing sovereignty over it comparable to the 
sovereignty of civilized European nations.194 The rationale of territorium nullius, however, left 
unanswered the question of who owned ‘ownerless land’ within a protectorate. Absent 
sovereignty over territory, indigenous peoples could not own more land than they directly 
occupied; and the purpose of claiming a protectorate as opposed to a colony was precisely 
to avoid the legal obligations that would attend territorial acquisition of lands. As discussed, 
the German Protectorate Law provided that consular law would apply in respect of private 
law matters; thus it was already settled that pre-existing claims to private property would be 
upheld within the Marshall Islands Protectorate. However, the question of which between 
the Reich and the Gesellschaft had a better claim to those areas of the Protectorate not already 
subject to private possession was not clear. The reference to ‘ownerless land’ contemplated 
in the Jaluit Agreement thus seems to have settled the question in favour of the company. 
The Marshall Islands Protectorate was not, at least on its establishment, understood as 
German territory; it was something like private territory of the company.      
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The guano clause appears to add a crucial caveat to this arrangement. The Jaluit Gesellschaft is 
granted the right to mine guano deposits, but not property in the deposits themselves. On a 
practical level, the clause was seemingly moot. Neither the DHPG nor Hernsheim had been 
involved in mining in the Pacific prior to amalgamation, in keeping with the Hanseatic 
tradition of commodity circulation. Given the ability to manipulate commercial regulation 
afforded the Gesellschaft in its agreement with the Reich, the firm had little incentive to alter 
its business practices, and made no moves toward either direct involvement in plantation 
agriculture or mining operations, as had British companies.195 Nor had any ‘guano’ or 
phosphate deposits been discovered on the Ralick and Radack chains at that time. The 
reference to mining in the agreement therefore appears prospective, and with good cause. 
Commercial interest in ‘guano islands’ had been strong since at least the mid-nineteenth 
century.196 By the mid-nineteenth century, phosphate was a boom industry, particularly in 
the Pacific.197 In 1856, the United States passed the Guano Islands Act, which purported to 
claim all islands not already occupied upon which guano was discovered by a US citizen as 
‘appertaining to’ the United States.198 The United States proceeded to claim sixty-six islands 
across the Caribbean and the Pacific under the Guano Islands Act.199 This included the Line 
Islands, the Phoenix Islands, Baker Island and Jarvis Island, all to the southeast of the 
Marshall Islands.200 The United States Guano Company had commenced mining on the 
Pheonix Islands with the use of indigenous Hawai’ian labour in 1858, an industry underway 
at the time of the Jaluit Gesellschaft’s Agreement with the Reich regarding the Marshall Islands.  
The guano provision in the Jaluit Agreement thus seems likely to have been the means by 
which the company and the Reich determined how prospective profits from the exploitation 
by third parties of any phosphate deposits found within the Marshall Islands Protectorate 
would be allocated. When read with the property clause, the guano clause seems to provide 
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the Gesellschaft only with a transferable license to mine phosphate within the Protectorate, 
implying that the mReich claimed property in mineral deposits and therefore any royalty 
rights. This is in keeping with German mineral law operative at the time, and the 
arrangements made in the other German protectorates of South West Africa and German 
East Africa.201 Read together, then, the property and guano clauses are contradictory: the 
Reich did not make a sovereign claim to acquire the protectorate as German territory, yet it 
purported to claim sovereign rights in all mineral resources within the protectorate.   
15. The incorporation of Nauru into the Marshall Islands Protectorate 
The Jaluit Agreement singled out only one island for special mention: ‘Pleasant (Navoda) 
Island’.  Following the declaration of the Marshall Islands Protectorate, the Jaluit consulate 
formerly officiated by Franz Hernsheim was abolished in January 1887, a full year before the 
amalgamation of the DHPG and Hernsheim & Company and the Agreement between the 
resulting Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Reich. This left the consulate in Apia, Samoa as the primary 
means of legal redress in the Pacific for German traders operating outside of the New Guinea 
and Marshall Islands Protectorates. For agents of DHPG and Hernsheim posted on the 
remote Pleasant Island, a coral atoll south of the Marshalls, this arrangement was highly 
unsatisfactory. According to the agents, the natives of Pleasant Island had for a decade been 
in a state of civil war, armed with the guns and ammunition used as trade for copra.202 The 
consul in Apia, the DHPG traders complained, was too far away to be of timely assistance 
in case of emergency.203 In correspondence with the Reich, the DHPG requested that 
Pleasant Island be included within the Marshall Islands Protectorate. Not only did the firm 
profess to ‘regard the incorporation of Pleasant Island in the Protectorate of the Marshall 
Islands as highly desirable’, but took the ‘liberty of stressing that peace and order would be 
established on Pleasant Island with much greater ease and despatch if the flag-raising 
ceremony could be accompanied by a major show of force’.204   
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Pleasant Island, so named in 1798 by the British captain John Fearn of the merchant ship 
Hunter, had been known as a source of food and water since at least the 1830s by whalers 
working the Line Islands in the central Pacific.205 A small, single coral island lacking a harbour 
which could be easily approached, and over 300 kilometres from its nearest neighbour, 
Ocean Island in the Gilberts, European reports of the local population and landscape of 
Pleasant Island remained scant well into the 1870s.206 Written records consisted of a 
scattering of reports of approach in ships’ logs, and details in the Australian and New Zealand 
press filtered through dramatized accounts of runaway whalers and escaped convicts.207 The 
island had become a minor source of copra for Goddefroy & Sohn in the mid-1870s. The old 
firm’s agent was joined over the next decade by agents of Hernsheim and of two New 
Zealand trading companies, Tiernan Venture and Henderson & McFarlane. By 1887, as the 
German consul in Apia reported, there were ‘ten white residents’ on the island, being 
employees of the trading companies or independent traders, and consisting of two Germans, 
four British, two Norwegians, one American and one Dutchman.208    
In correspondence with the German consul in Apia in 1884, Cesar Goddefroy VI - working 
now for the DHPG which had taken over his family firm’s Pacific interests - reported that 
‘native’ Eingeborene numbered between 1,000 and 3,000, and had been warring since 1878.209 
The situation had become dangerous for traders; a trader’s house had been ransacked; one 
had been shot. On Godeffroy’s reckoning, it would not be sufficient to have a German 
warship visit the island, or to pass an Ordinance preventing Germans and other Europeans 
within the consular jurisdiction from perpetuating the trade in arms and alcohol; the native 
population would need to be disarmed.210 Goddefroy and the Hernsheim brothers assured 
the consul in Apia that the DHPG and Hernsheim & Company were willing to include 
Pleasant Island in their negotiations with the Reich as the new Jaluit Gesellschaft took shape. 
One resident official would be sufficient, Godeffroy wrote, and the firm would fund all costs 
of administration. All that was needed was the assent of the Reich.211 A brief note in the files 
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of the Foreign Office indicates that Bismarck agreed to the request on 21 October 1887.212 
Imperial assent to the incorporation of Pleasant Island within the Marshall Islands 
Protectorate was given by Kaiser Wilhelm on 24 October 1887.213 An Imperial Proclamation 
followed on 16 April 1888. The Kaiser himself had died a month earlier; his grandson, 
Wilhelm II, was not crowned until June 1888.  
In contrast to the treaty-signing tour of the Marshall Islands, the practical preoccupation of 
the German traders and administrators after the new Protectorate was declared to include 
Pleasant Island was not the securing of signatures of local chiefs, but their prompt 
disarmament. On the day of the Imperial Proclamation in April 1888, an Ordinance was 
issued under the Protectorate Law preventing the ‘importation of firearms, ammunition and 
explosives’ into Pleasant Island.214 The records available in English translation reveal no 
contemplation of treaty arrangements, but rather strategising on how best to disarm the local 
population, given the absence of a harbour or anchorage for a warship, and the abundance 
of firearms on the island.215 The German gunboat SMS Eber was ordered to attend the island, 
disarm the population and hoist the flag; more detailed instructions, it appears, were not 
given.216 The plan adopted by the newly appointed Imperial Commissioner to the Marshall 
Islands, Franz Sonnenschein, and the Commander of the Eber, Sub-Lieutenant Emsmann, 
to obtain the compliance of the indigenous population was more in the nature of conquest 
by ambush than agreement. The Eber landing party would ‘march around and across the 
island’; the native chiefs would be ‘persuaded amicably to join in’ and return to a German 
trading station close to the gunboat’s mooring. The chiefs would then be ‘kept in custody as 
hostages and the natives are to be informed that they have to hand in all firearms and 
ammunition within the next 24 hours, failing which the chiefs will then be taken away into 
captivity’.217  
On 1 October 1888, the Eber moored off the southwest of Pleasant Island, and a party of 
thirty-six soldiers proceeded to enact this plan. In his subsequent report to Bismarck, 
Sonnenschein hailed the raid as a success. On his account, the chiefs were taken prisoner 
                                                          
212 Ibid 188.  
213 Imperial Assent, 24 October 1887, reproduced in Fabricius, above n 129, 188–189.  
214 Verordnung betreffend das Verbot der Einfuhr von Feuerwaffen, Schießbedarf und Sprengstoffen in Pleasant Island, 16 April 
1888, reproduced in Fabricius, above n 129, 197. 
215 See Fabricius, above n 129, 190–195. 
216 Ibid 208. 
217 Resolution of the Imperial Commissioner and the Acting Commander of the Gunboat SMS Eber, 1 October 
1888, reproduced in Fabricius, above n 129, 214–215.  
84 
 
overnight in a German copra house. By the following morning, the island’s population had 
gathered there ‘in a great crowd’. The German flag was hoisted and the Imperial 
Proclamation read out; and the local population was ordered to hand in their firearms and 
ammunition in exchange for the release of the chiefs.218 By the time of the departure of the 
Eber on 3 October, Sonnenschein reported, 765 firearms had been handed in, including ‘1 
revolver, 109 pistols and 655 rifles’.219 The chiefs were released and the Eber departed on the 
same afternoon. Sonnenschein wrote a detailed report to the Foreign Office advising of the 
success of the mission. In his report, he substituted the English name of Pleasant Island for 
‘Nauru’, a Germanic spelling of Naoero or Nawodo, the phonetic indigenous name for the 
island.220  
16. Nauru’s incorporation into the German protectorate as a matter of law 
As discussed, the concept of the protectorate existed in the law of nations as a species of 
treaty arrangement between sovereign states, however the protectorate of the late nineteenth 
century was far removed from the simple reasoning of pacta sunt servanda. From the 
perspective of German imperial expansion in the Pacific, however, justifications for the 
protectorate concept offered within the framework of the law of nations – and more 
specifically, by the new Institut de droit international – seem if not incidental then at least ex post 
facto attempts to attribute the coherence of legal reason to a series of ad hoc administrative 
decisions prompted by private demands for commercial certainty. As a matter of law, then, 
the basis of Nauru’s incorporation into the German protectorate of the Marshall Islands 
bears restatement. As a legal construction, the German protectorate regime was grounded in 
German public law as configured in the Imperial Constitution of 1871, and was not formally 
expressed as deriving from any international rule.221 Whilst it is possible that the Berlin 
Conference was understood in Germany to have either confirmed or established a general 
principle permitting the establishment of protectorates in the absence of treaty, it is not clear 
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from the records considered that a foundation in the law of nations for imperial expansion 
was understood by the German Reich over the years 1884 to 1888 to be necessary at all. The 
central preoccupation was not whether the law of nations sanctioned Germany’s declarations 
in the Western Pacific, but whether other European powers in the region would tolerate 
those declarations.  
In formal terms, the legal basis of the imposition of protectorate status on Nauru was as 
follows. Section 1 of the Protectorate Law purported to vest the power of the Reich to make 
laws for protectorates (the ‘Schutzgewalt’) in the Kaiser. According to section 3, the power so 
vested was exercisable via imperial decree; and in September 1886, the imperial Ordinance 
establishing the Marshall Islands Protectorate was issued by Kaiser Wilhelm. Pursuant to the 
same section, Nauru was decreed a German protectorate on 16 April 1888 and incorporated 
into the administration of the Marshall Islands Protectorate by Sonnenschein, the 
Commissioner of the Marshall Islands, as the Kaiser’s delegate.222 This is the extent of legal 
foundation for the creation of Nauru as a German protectorate: a piece of legislation passed 
by the Reichstag, an ordinance issued by the Kaiser, and a proclamation issued by the Kaiser’s 
delegate in the Marshall Islands.          
In terms of the law of nations, the legal foundation of protectorates over non-European 
areas in the absence of treaty was not settled in 1888, and indeed never clearly was.223 
Recognised modes of territorial acquisition – namely conquest, cession, or occupation in case 
of res nullius, the civil law concept analogised into the law of nations as terra nullius – could 
not be directly invoked as justification for the creation of protectorates as legal entities; as 
argued, the precise purpose of the protectorate model was to avoid territorial acquisition of 
the area in question so as to limit administrative obligations. Articles 34 and 35 of the Treaty 
of the Berlin Conference had settled that any declared territorial acquisition obliged the 
administration of annexed territory sufficient to protect private rights and trade therein 
(although it should be noted that the Institut regarded this obligation, subsequently restated 
as the principle of effective occupation, as already settled in practice prior to the Conference, 
and indeed potentially limited by the Berlin treaty’s confinement to the African coasts).224 
The Treaty however left unclear the legal obligations that attended protectorate status.  
                                                          
222 Imperial Proclamation extending the German Protectorate to include Pleasant Island, 16 April 1888, 
reproduced in Fabricius, above n 129, 196. 
223 Thanks to Matthew Craven for his time and generosity across a number of discussions on this topic.   
224 Koskeniemmi, above n 82, 149.  
86 
 
Subsequent to the Berlin Conference, the Institut commissioned German public lawyer 
Ferdinand de Martitz in September 1885 to chair a committee into the law of occupation, 
which prompted a consideration of whether and which non-European lands were subject to 
new occupation by European states.225 Martitz proposed that lands considered territorium 
nullius were subject to such occupation, where territorium nullius denoted ‘any region not 
actually under the sovereignty or protectorate of a member of the community of the law of 
nations, whether inhabited or not’.226 Martitz’ attribution of legal equivalence to uninhabited 
and inhabited lands was justified by his assessment of ‘savage and ‘semi-barbarian’ peoples 
as incapable of possessing sovereignty recognisable in the law of nations.227 Lands considered 
territorium nullius were open to occupation by European states, and effective occupation 
would ground a claim either of sovereignty or of protectorate over the area.228 In case of 
protectorate over land considered territorium nullius, however, Martitz analogised from the 
classical formulation: there must be an agreement with the indigenous authority, who would 
retain political and administrative authority over local affairs, with the European state 
assuming authority vis-a-vis other European states.229 With respect to protectorates declared 
over inhabited lands in the absence of treaty, however, Martitz’ formulation with indigenous 
peoples was either equivocal, or relied implicitly on a division of indigenous peoples into 
those possessing recognisable local authority and those who did not.230  
Martitz’ formulation of territorium nullius was directly challenged by the French diplomat 
Edouard Engelhardt.231 Engelhardt took exception on two grounds to the uncertainty in 
Martitz’ use of the ‘community of the law of nations’ as the means of defining which political 
entities possessed sovereignty to an extent sufficient to render the land they inhabited as 
other than territorium nullius. Firstly, he cited the cases of Morocco, Abyssinia and Zanzibar 
as examples of the difficulty of determining which political entities fell within the ‘community 
of nations’; and secondly, he noted that it was possible to hold that even in the case of land 
inhabited by ‘savages’ outside the community of nations, it would be ‘exorbitant’ to consider 
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such land territorium nullius for the purposes of occupation.232 In any event, Martitz’ proposed 
consolidation of the law of occupation was not adopted by the Institut. Although it was left 
open that inhabited lands could potentially be subject to occupation without treaty, ultimately 
no agreement was reached within the Institut as to how to define as a matter of law those 
indigenous peoples whose lands were legitimately subject to occupation by European 
states.233  
The relevance of contemporaneous understandings of the law of nations, and in particular 
the debate within the Institut over territorium nullius, to the incorporation of Nauru into the 
Marshall Islands protectorate is therefore questionable.234 Quite apart from the lack of 
agreement on both the positive and natural law of occupation within the Institut, its treatment 
of the question of protectorates does not seem to have figured in German administrative 
policy at all. Even for German jurists such as Robert Adam, Paul Heilborn and Paul Laband 
seeking to explain the protectorate regime after its establishment, the primary concern was 
with the coherence of German public law, and whether the protectorates fell within the scope 
of domestic law or outside law altogether. Adam insisted that treaties with indigenous 
authorities had no legal character; they were ‘sham’ agreements, functional in politics but not 
in law.235 If the law of nations was considered, the emphasis was on the rules of engagement 
between imperial powers, not between imperial powers and the regions they occupied.236 
Heilborn in his treatment of the German protectorate regime seems to have considered that 
the law of nations was not applicable to relations between European states and indigenous 
peoples.237 For Laband, the relation with indigenous peoples was a matter of morality, and 
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not a matter for either domestic or international law; likewise for Bornhard, imperialism was 
principally a matter of economic policy, and not for law at all.238     
In the absence of treaty agreement and in the use of force outside the scope of law, the 
manner in which Nauru was incorporated into the protectorate of the Marshall Islands is 
best characterised as an act - however small - of war. Given its success, that act could have 
been recognisable in the European law of nations as conquest sufficient to ground the 
acquisition of Nauru as German territory. However, the purpose of the invasion was not to 
assume sovereignty in the sense that would generate the administrative obligations of 
effective occupation, but to assert the exclusive authority to protect European commercial 
interests on the island as private rights to property and trade.239  
In this assertion of the existence of property in the absence of sovereignty, the concept of 
the protectorate as practised in Nauru can be viewed as a flawed mirror. On one side, 
Europeans were to have their commercial interests recognised as private rights without any 
perceived need for an assertion of sovereignty to ground those rights. On the other, 
Nauruans were assumed to be without sovereignty but were recognised to hold rights in real 
property. In Sonnenschein’s report back to Bismarck on the success of the Eber’s mission to 
Nauru, he included the following note under the heading ‘Land Ownership’: ‘‘(t)he white 
residents own little land as the natives, who need the land for their own livelihood, are 
reluctant to part with it’.240 This statement suggests that indigenous property interests were 
understood to survive the invasion and thus, it is possible to infer, either to derive from an 
indigenous legal authority capable of creating recognisable private proprietary rights but 
incapable of qualification as sovereignty, or from a principle of occupation in the law of 
nations. The former view – that via the fact of occupation, indigenous peoples possessed 
property recognisable in private law, but not sovereignty recognisable in international law – 
was subsequently expressed by Adam and by Westlake.241 The latter view – that indigenous 
occupation created property rights in international law via the principle of occupation derived 
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from Roman civil law – was open to take. Both alternatives work within the sketchy logic of 
territorium nullius proposed by Martitz.   
17. International status and imperial administrative form: the view from Nauru  
However, to attempt to perfect the jurisprudential reasoning behind the incorporation of 
Nauru into the German protectorate of the Marshall Islands is to miss the point of this 
chapter. It is possible to describe the actions taken by the German Reich with respect to 
Nauru in 1888 as founded on an understanding of Nauruan land as territorium nullius, in order 
to fit the creation of the Nauruan protectorate into a taxonomy sensible to international law. 
As a matter of legal history, however, it is more accurate to describe those actions as ad hoc 
administrative responses to a series of commercial demands that had become significant to 
European diplomacy and to German domestic politics. In the reading offered here, the 
impetus to assume authority over the island of Nauru in 1888 ultimately had little if anything 
to do with legal arguments of territorium nullius offered by the Institut in the same year. If the 
actions taken by the German administration were characterised at the time within a 
jurisprudential framework at all, they were characterised within the public law of the German 
Imperial Constitution and the private law of property. The efforts of the Institut to define 
those actions as indicative of a coherent logic of sovereignty and territory followed the event.   
The analytical implications of this observation bear some consideration. If it is accurate to 
posit that imperial expansion in the late nineteenth century was framed as a jurisprudential 
problem for the law of nations – an assessment that may be appropriate in other contexts, 
most probably the case of British imperialism - it is just as accurate to observe that it was 
also framed as a material problem of how to provide commercial ventures with a level of 
official administrative support that both satisfied their demands and minimised state 
expenditure. On this view, the lack of coherence in the protectorate as a legal concept 
resulted from the relatively quick failure of the protectorate model as a viable solution to that 
material problem, which obviated the need for jurisprudential coherence. As discussed in the 
following chapter, the protectorate waned not for want of jurisprudential justification, but 
for its unsustainability as an administrative form.   
When viewed from Nauru, then, if the law of nations played a role in the appearance of 
Nauru on the plane of imperial administration, it was hardly as a coherent European project, 
but as ex post facto rationalisation of a series of administrative decisions reactive to private 
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commerce. Koskeniemmi has stated of the Institut that ‘(i)t was their failure to spell out the 
meaning of sovereignty in social and political terms, as applied in non-European territory, 
that in retrospect made international lawyers seems such hopeless apologists of empire’.242 
However this assessment implies that there was ‘a’ meaning of sovereignty to be spelled out. 
When viewed from the Western Pacific, what was attempted in the protectorate model was 
an administrative reconciliation of European claims to private property outside of the 
domain of European sovereignty - an endeavour that in practice, as Leroy-Beaulieau insisted, 
was doomed to fail. The view from Nauru therein offers a cautionary addendum to the 
impetus to tell the story of European imperial expansion as contemporaneously justified in 
the idiom of international law offered by the Institut. To marginalise certain experiences of 
imperial administration as peripheral to that story – and here the German protectorate of the 
Marshall Islands serves as but one instance - makes it easier to miss the respects in which 
sovereignty and territory as core concepts of international law developed subsequent to 
administrative practices of imperial expansion that, if contemporaneously informed by the 
logic of law at all, were informed by the private law of property on the one hand, and 
constitutionalism on the other.   
18. Conclusion  
The narrative of the Hanseatic inheritance of Goddefroy, Hansemann and Hernsheim thus 
serves as a crucial counterweight to narratives of international legal history that have 
developed subsequent to the period in question. The classical concept of the protectorate 
does not clearly explain the nature of authority asserted by the German Reich over Nauru in 
1888, not least of all because the concepts of sovereignty and territory were not settled as 
matters of positive international law. The authority asserted over Nauru was more a 
reflection of practical concern with the balance of administrative authority and corporate 
financial responsibility to be struck between the Reich and the Jaluit Gesellschaft. The balance 
of company and state rule struck between the Reich and the Jaluit Gesellschaft in the 
Agreement of 1888 responded more directly to the pragmatic contingencies of German 
imperial expansion in the Pacific than to concepts of the law of nations. These contingencies 
included the political and commercial legacy of Hanseatic firms; the industrialisation of 
agriculture, and its effect on commodity prices and labour politics; the competing interests 
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involved the German nationalist project, only just taking shape; the personalities and political 
priorities of the German imperial government; and the international commercial and 
diplomatic environment in which the firms and the Reich found themselves in the Pacific of 
the late nineteenth century. Only peripherally could the assertion of authority over Nauru be 
understood as informed by the intellectual project that was coming to know itself in Europe 
as international law.    
Attention to this distinction between international status and administrative form generates 
its own historiographical momentum. As argued in the following chapters, the form of 
company administration established in Nauru in 1888 developed accretively as the 
international status of Nauru shifted from protectorate to colony to mandate over the 
following decades. The 1888 Agreement between the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Reich was the 
legal condition on which the British-owned Pacific Phosphate Company came to be granted 
an exclusive license to mine phosphate on the island. In turn, the consolidation of the Pacific 
Phosphate Company’s mining operation on Nauru was a key condition of possibility of the 
occupation of the island by Australian troops on behalf of the British empire in 1914. 
Australia’s occupation of Nauru, and insistence on ownership of Nauruan phosphate, in turn 
prefaced not only the designation of Nauru as a C Class Mandate by the new League of 
Nations, but as will be argued in the followed chapter, the creation of the C Class Mandate 
itself. Focus on imperial administrative form as a phenomenon related but distinct from 
international status therefore establishes an alternative perspective from which to consider 
the attempt to establish a new international order following the war of 1914-1918.  
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Chapter 3  
From Protectorate to Colony to Mandate, 1920 
 
1. Introduction  
This chapter redescribes the shifts in the international status of Nauru from German 
protectorate to German colony to British mandate, and the accretions of administrative form 
that accompanied each shift. It argues that as the status of Nauru shifted from German 
protectorate to British mandate at the international level, the structure of private and public 
relations instantiated by the Agreement between the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Reich in 1888 
was not dismantled, but persisted in the tripartite arrangement struck between Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand for joint administration of the island as a Mandate of the new 
League of Nations. The status of Nauru was determined by the Mandate conferred by the 
League of Nations on the British Empire in 1920; yet the administrative structure in which 
that mandate would be exercised was determined by the Nauru Island Agreement, settled in 
1919 prior to the conferral of the Mandate.  Under the sub-imperial Nauru Island Agreement, 
public authority previously exercised by the Nauru District Office was assumed by an 
Australian Administrator; and corporate authority previously exercised by the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft was transferred to a new tripartite Board of Commissioners, subsequently known 
as the British Phosphate Commission. The new status of C Class Mandate reflected tensions 
at the Paris Peace Conference over how to dispose of the occupied German and Ottoman 
territories after the war, striking an uneasy compromise between territorial annexation and 
international administration; and the assumption of administrative control by a tripartite 
body reflected tension within the British empire between the Imperial government and the 
Dominions over Dominion independence in external affairs. Yet the administrative form of 
Nauru established in 1888, with its particular configuration of public and private authority, 
remained intact.  
The chapter begins with an account of the ad hoc development from 1888 of the jurisdiction 
of Nauru as a District Office of the German protectorate of the Marshall Islands under the 
administration of the Jaluit Gesellschaft. The arrangement proved less than successful for the 
Gesellschaft, as did similar arrangements of company rule across the German protectorates. In 
the early 1900s, the Reich assumed direct colonial administration of German New Guinea; 
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and the Marshall Islands protectorate was incorporated into German New Guinea on request 
of the ailing Gesellschaft. The chapter moves to redescribe the sale of the Gesellschaft’s 
phosphate exploitation rights to the British owned firm, the Pacific Islands Company, in 
context of the commodification of phosphate, the industrialisation of agricultural 
production, and the legal articulations of imperial expansion into the Pacific region. The 
development of the Pacific Islands Company’s mining operation under German 
administration is described in context of growing anti-German sentiment in newly federated 
Australia, exacerbated by the tension between the new federal government’s ‘sub-imperial’ 
posturing toward the Pacific region and the limitations on its external affairs power as a 
British Dominion. The chapter then moves to consider the relation between the occupation 
of the German territories in the Pacific and South West Africa by Australia and South Africa 
on the outbreak of war in 1914, the debates at the international level between 
internationalisation and territorial annexation of the occupied German and Ottoman 
territories, and the compromise arrangement of classed mandates reached in the Versailles 
negotiations and codified in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The 
chapter concludes that while the creation of C mandate status as ascribed to Nauru marked 
a significant shift, the administrative structure adopted by Britain, Australia, New Zealand to 
administer Nauru as a phosphate operation marked an accretion of the administrative form 
established under German rule.    
2. Administration of Nauru under the Marshall Islands protectorate  
As covered in Chapter 2, the imposition of protectorate status on Nauru occurred via a series 
of instruments of German law.1 The Protectorate Law purported to vest the power of the 
Reich to make laws for protectorates in the Kaiser. The power so vested was exercisable via 
imperial decree; and in September 1886, the imperial Ordinance establishing the Marshall 
Islands Protectorate was issued by Kaiser Wilhelm I. Pursuant to the same section, Nauru 
was decreed a German protectorate on 16 April 1888 and incorporated into the 
administration of the Marshall Islands Protectorate by the Commissioner of the Marshall 
Islands, as the Kaiser’s delegate.2 Beyond this basic jurisdictional scaffolding, the content of 
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the law that applied in Nauru remained to be determined. The Protectorate Law of 1886 
provided that German consular law applied in the protectorates with respect to private law, 
criminal law and related procedure, and any other matters covered by consular law.3 The 
Reich’s Consular Law itself provided for personal jurisdiction over German and other 
European subjects in regions to which it applied, and defaulted to German municipal law 
unless specifically provided.4  
In effect, then, the default position within the territory of the German protectorates was that 
German municipal law applied to relations between Europeans; but jurisdiction over 
indigenous peoples was not expressly contemplated.5 The attempt to territorialise the 
personal jurisdiction created in consular law effectively created a juridical vacuum with 
respect to the legal status of the indigenous populations of regions over which German 
protectorates were declared. However, the Protectorate Law provided that the general power 
to make laws in the protectorates was exercised by the Kaiser on behalf of the Reich, free 
from the legislative oversight of the Reichstag; and in practice, this power was delegated to 
the Imperial Commissioners on the creation of each protectorate. 6 Once this delegation 
occurred, the Imperial Commissioners were regarded under German law to have unlimited 
executive power in the protectorates where the Protectorate Law and the Consular Law were 
silent; and with respect to indigenous peoples, the Laws were almost entirely so.7 Outside 
the scope of private and criminal law and procedure as applied to European subjects, the 
Commissioners governed by executive decree.8 With respect to Bismarck’s attempt to limit 
the scope of the Reich’s administrative responsibilities in the protectorates, the irony of this 
structure is clear. As a legal form, the German protectorate was originally intended to 
minimise formal administrative intervention outside the bounds of territorial sovereignty; 
but in the absence of consideration of the legal status of indigenous peoples, the 
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protectorates effectively subjected indigenous people – the majority in every case - to 
absolute executive rule.       
For the Marshall Islands Protectorate, the Kaiser’s power to make laws was delegated to the 
new office of Imperial Commissioner in September 1886.9 Following the Agreement 
between the Reich and the Jaluit Gesellschaft, in which the Gesellschaft agreed to cover all costs 
of extending the protectorate to cover Nauru,10 the island became a District Office by 
proclamation of the Imperial Commissioner of the Marshall Islands Protectorate in April 
1888.11 From that date – six months prior to the gunboat occupation of Nauru in October 
1888 - ordinances issued by the Imperial Commissioner for the Marshall Islands protectorate 
were understood to apply in Nauru, ineffective only practically for want of enforcement, 
rather than legally for want of legitimate foundation. The preoccupation with establishing 
effective control as opposed to legitimacy of rule is evident in the fact that the first ordinances 
specific to Nauru were the ‘Ordinance relating to the Prohibition of the Importation of 
Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives into Pleasant Island’, issued the same day as the 
Proclamation declaring the incorporation of Nauru into the Marshall Islands Protectorate, 
and the ‘Ordinance relating to the Declaration of Jaluit as the Port of Entry for Pleasant 
Island’, issued the following day.12  
From April 1888, then, the German understanding of the law applicable in Nauru was as 
follows: German consular law applied to the European traders in matters of private and 
criminal law and procedure, and in all else, ordinances specific to the Marshall Islands or 
Nauru issued under the Protectorate Law applied. The ad hoc development of legal content 
specific to the protectorates is evident from the order of ordinances issued for the Marshall 
Islands protectorate and for Nauru.13 The Jaluit Gesellschaft’s original concern to monopolise 
                                                          
9 Verordnung, betreffend die Rechtsverhältnisse in dem Schutzgebiete der Marschall-, Brown- und Providence-Inseln [Law 
Governing Legal Relations in the Marshall, Brown and Providence Islands Protectorates], (Germany) 17 
September 1886, RGBI, 1886, 291 (‘Verordnung’). 
10 ‘Agreement between the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Reich’, 21 January 1888, reproduced in Fabricius, above 
n 2, 202–204. 
11 Bekanntmachung [Proclamation], Jaluit 16 April 1888, reproduced in Fabricius, above n 2, 196. 
12 Verordnung betreffend das Verbot der Einfuhr von Feuerwaffen, Schiessbedarf und Sprengstoffen in Pleasant Island 
[Prohibition of the Importation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives into Pleasant Island] (Germany), 16 
April 1888, reproduced in Fabricius, above n 2, 197; and Verordnung betreffend die Eklärung des Hafens von Jaluit 
zum Eingangshafen für Pleasant Island [Ordinance relating to the Declaration of Jaluit as the Port of Entry for 
Pleasant Island] (Germany) 17 April 1888, reproduced in Fabricius, above n 2, 198–199.  
13 Dirk H R Spennemann, ‘A Hand List of Imperial German Legislation regarding the Marshall Islands (1886–
1914)’ (2007) 3 Studies in German Colonial Heritage 1. On the ad hoc development of law in the German 
protectorates, see Snow, above n 5, 97; and Hanschmann, above n 8, 249.  
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trade in the islands and pacify the local population is reflected in the initial ordinances, which 
required non-German vessels to report first to the Imperial Commissioner in Jaluit, and 
prevented the sale of arms, ammunition and alcohol to indigenous peoples.14 These were 
followed by ordinances establishing local judicial authorities and delineating a hierarchy for 
appeals;15 and ordinances regulating the raising of personal and business taxes.16 As the 
Gesellschaft and other copra traders on Nauru had already established trading relationship with 
locals prior to the articulation of this administrative regime, basic questions of contract and 
property soon presented themselves with respect to relations between Europeans and 
indigenous peoples. The content of ordinances thus moved on quickly to deal with credit 
arrangements and property dealings between European traders and locals.17  
Criminal jurisdiction over indigenous peoples took a few years to be positively established. 
In July 1889, Imperial Commissioner Biermann, Sonnenschein’s successor in the Marshall 
Islands, reported that although German law was effectively in operation, the situation 
required clarification; and that in the interim, some gesture toward the customary authority 
of Nauruan chiefs had been deemed symbolically necessary:  
‘(i)n Nauru, as also here in the Marshall Islands, the people believe that the German government 
official automatically has the right in given circumstances to punish anyone, whether native or 
foreigner, chief or commoner, and that he has in fact to settle all disputes. As however the 
Commissioner has not thus far been formally vested with criminal jurisdiction over natives, 
hitherto such cases have always been tried and sentenced passed by calling in chiefs as judges. 
                                                          
14 For example, Verordnung, betreffend die Verpflichtung nichtdeutscher Schiffe zur Meldung bei dem Vertreter der kaiserlichen 
Regierung in Jaluit [Ordinance regarding the Obligation of Non-German vessels to Notify the Representative of 
the Imperial Government at Jaluit] (Germany), 2 June 1886; and Verordnung, betreffend den Verkauf von Waffen, 
Munition, Sprengstoffen und berauschenden Getränken and Eingeborene der Marshall Inseln oder andere auf denselben sich 
aufhaltende Farbige [Ordinance regarding the Sale of Weapons, Munitions, Explosives and Intoxicating Beverages 
to the Indigenous Peoples of the Marshall Islands or Other Coloured Persons Present Thereon] (Germany), 3 
June 1886, cited in Spennemann, above n 13, 4. 
15 Examples include Dienstanweisung, betreffend die Ausübung der Gerichtsbarkeit in dem Schutzgebiet der Marshall-, Brown- 
und Providence-Inseln [Directive regarding the Execution of Judicial Duties in the Protectorate of the Marshall, 
Brown and Providence Islands], 2 December 1886, cited in Spennemann, above n 13, 4. 
16 Verordnung, betreffend die Erhebung von persönlichen Steuern [Regulation, regarding the Levy of Personal Taxes] and 
Verordnung, betreffend die Erhebung von persönlichen Steuern [Regulation, regarding the Levy of Business Taxes in 
Jaluit], both passed on 28 June 1888, cited in Spennemann, above n 13, 4–5. 
17 Verordnung, betreffend das Kreditgeben an Eingeborene und die Anmeldung alter Schulden derselben in den Marshall Inseln 
[Ordinance regarding the Giving of Credit to the Indigenous Population and the Registration of Old Debts in 
the Marshall Islands], 25 January 1887; and Verordnung, betreffend Verträge mit Eingeborenen über unbewegliche Sachen 
[Regulation regarding Contracts with Indigenous Peoples regarding Immovable Properties], 28 June 1888, cited 
in Spennemann, above n 13, 4–5. 
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On these occasions the chiefs are in fact only puppets, who concur automatically in every 
proposal put forward by the white official.’18   
Clarification at the legislative level was not forthcoming from the Reichstag, an omission that 
aligned with broader German unconcern at the problem of legitimacy of jurisdiction over 
indigenous peoples. On 26 February 1890, Biermann filled the vacuum by simply issuing an 
executive ordinance declaring general jurisdiction over the indigenous peoples in the 
protectorate of the Marshall Islands.19  
As discussed in Chapter 2, indigenous peoples in the Marshall Islands and in Nauru were 
understood by the Germans as possessing real and personal property rights under Nauruan 
customary law that were recognisable in German law.20 Records indicate that the new 
imperial administration considered itself obligated not only to respect but to also enforce 
those proprietary rights where disputes arose. The Agreement between the Gesellschaft and 
the Reich purported to grant the Gesellschaft the right to ‘take possession of all ownerless 
land’, understood to exclude land owned by both traders and indigenous locals.21 Following 
the establishment of the District Office of Nauru, in September 1889 the Imperial 
Commissioner entered into a contract with a local chief for the sale and purchase of land and 
buildings to house the new Office.22 This contract between the Imperial Government and 
‘Chief Jim of Nauru’ purported to pass ownership in an area of land and buildings, ‘together 
with all the coconut palms growing thereon’.23 The express reference to palms was included 
in recognition of local Nauruan property practices, which the German administration 
understood to separate absolute ownership of land from absolute ownership of trees growing 
on that land. According to a report written by Nauru District Officer Fritz Jung in 1897, 
ownership in land and trees could pass separately, and owners of trees could grant 
usufructuary rights to third parties, which land owners would be required to recognise.24 
                                                          
18 Letter from Imperial Commissioner Biermann to His Highness Prince Bismarck dated 29 July 1889, 
reproduced in Fabricius, above n 2, 240, 241. 
19 Verordnung, betreffend die Gerichtsbarkeit über die Eingeborenen im Schutzgebiete der Marshall-Inseln, [Ordinance 
regarding the Jurisdiction over the Indigenous Peoples in the Protectorate of the Marshall Islands] issued 26 
February 1890, cited in Spennemann, above n 13, 6.  
20 See also Christopher Weeramantry, Nauru: Environmental Damage under International Trusteeship (Oxford 
University Press), 186–187. 
21 Vereinbarung zwischen dem Auswärtigen Amt und der Jaluit-Gesellschaft [Agreement between the Jaluit Gesellschaft 
and the Reich] cl 1(a), reproduced in Fabricius, above n 2, 202. 
22 Vereinbarung zwischen der Kaiserliche Regierung und dem Häuptling Jim von Nauru [Contract between the Imperial 
German Government and Chief Jim of Nauru], 29 September 1889, reproduced in Fabricius, above n 2, 250. 
23 Ibid. 
24 ‘Property in land is of primary importance. Almost every native on Nauru owns land or palms, with the 
exception of the slaves. Every patch of ground and every palm, the reef surrounding the island and even the 
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Acting Secretary to the Imperial Commissioner Senftt reported on his inspection of the 
Nauru District Office in September 1895 – which he found to be in ‘exemplary order’, with 
District Officer Jung enjoying the ‘due respect’ of the Nauruans - that land disputes 
constituted the bulk of the Office’s work, and were resolved by Jung according to Nauruan 
customary law.25 In the vacuum created by the Protectorate Law with respect to the 
government of indigenous peoples, an ad hoc body of German law thus developed for Nauru, 
which combined executive ordinances with interpretations of Nauruan customary law.         
3. The collapse of the German protectorates and the assertion of direct rule  
As the Nauru District Office of the Marshall Islands protectorate developed its own law and 
procedure to govern the Nauruan population, the Jaluit Gesellschaft was required under the 
terms of the 1888 Agreement to meet the costs of administration.26 As detailed in Chapter 
2, in 1886 the Gesellschaft had requested the incorporation of Nauru into the Marshall Islands 
protectorate as a means of gaining official protection of its copra trade on the island, which 
the company complained was at risk due to civil violence, exacerbated by the European 
practice of trading arms and alcohol for local copra. In 1896 - barely eight years after the 
capturing of the chiefs and the raising of the German flag on Nauru at its behest in 1888 - 
the Gesellschaft attempted to abolish the administrative regime on financial grounds. Its 
primary complaint was that the trading tax payable to the Reich was fixed at an excessively 
high annual rate, and did not reflect changes in copra yield.27 In addition to the trading tax, 
a head tax had been imposed on the Nauruans in the form of an annual copra quota. One 
third of the price obtained from taxed copra was returned to chiefs as incentive to facilitate 
its collection.28 Where this combined tax revenue failed to meet the costs of administration 
– the highest of which were salary costs for the District Officer and secretary, including 
                                                          
sea washing the coastline has its owner…Land is seldom sold, but different portions of land are frequently 
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by two different proprietors.’ Fritz Jung, ‘Aufzeichnungen uber die Rechtsanschauungen der Eingeborenen 
von Nauru’ [Notes on the Legal Concepts of the Natives of Nauru] (1897) 10 Mittheilungen aus den deutschen 
Schutgebieten 64; cf Peter H McSporran, ‘Land Ownership and Control in Nauru’ (1995) 2 Murdoch University 
Electronic Journal of Law 1, 2. 
25 Briefe von Sekretair a.i. der Kaiserlichen Landeshauptsmannschaft an den Kasierlichen Landeshauptmann Herrn Dr. Irmer 
[Letter from Temporary Secretary to the Administrator Arno Senftt to Imperial Administrator Georg Irmer] 
27 September 1895, reproduced in Fabricius, above n 2, 258–260. 
26 ‘Agreement between the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Reich’, 21 January 1888, reproduced in Fabricius, above 
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pension contributions – the company accountants in Hamburg recorded a loss against its 
Agreement with the Reich.29  
In January 1896, the Gesellschaft sent a letter directly from Hamburg to the Foreign Office in 
Berlin seeking to exercise its right under the Agreement to terminate the Nauru arrangement, 
bypassing both the Nauru District Officer and the Imperial Commissioner of the Marshall 
Islands.30 In justifying its request, the Gesellschaft asserted the continuity between 
administrative and commercial rationales for the establishment of the Nauru Office:  
‘(w)hen Nauru was incorporated in the Protectorate of the Marshall Islands, the main concern 
was to put an end to the totally lawless situation on this island, to disarm the natives, who were 
at the time in possession of a large number of firearms…The desired reforms have now been 
implemented for a number of years; the situation on Nauru as regards personal safety and 
security of property no longer falls short of that on the other islands…The returns from Nauru 
are relatively low…In these circumstances we take the liberty of proposing that, on expiry of the 
present contract with Herr Jung, the District Office on Nauru be abolished…’31 
From the perspective of the Jaluit Gesellschaft, then, by 1896 the commercial potential on 
which it had lobbied the Reich to declare protectorate status over Nauru had failed to 
materialise, and it was no longer willing to cover administrative costs. The Foreign Office in 
Berlin consulted with the Imperial Commissioner of the Marshall Islands Protectorate, who 
roundly rejected the Gesellschaft’s claims.32 According to the Commissioner, peace on Nauru 
was maintained only by the presence of the District Officer; and the Gesellschaft was either 
underreporting its returns on the copra trade, or directly responsible for its decline. 33 In his 
correspondence with the Chancellor regarding the matter, Commissioner Irmer contended 
that ‘the only concrete argument in favour of abolishing the position in Nauru is the bad 
trading position of the Jaluit-Gesellschaft’.34 
The Gesellschaft’s rapid disenchantment with its protectorate responsibilities once in practice 
reflected comparable developments across the German empire. Due to the Protectorate 
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Law’s device of delegating executive rule directly from the Kaiser to the Imperial 
Commissioners, many of whom then delegated that power by ordinance on to District 
Officers, the administrative structures of the protectorates were heterogeneous.35 Yet on the 
whole, the German protectorates proved ineffective both at shoring up the commercial 
interests at whose behest they were created to protect, and at circumscribing the 
administrative and financial involvement of the Reich, as Bismarck had assured the Reichstag 
in 1884 that they would.36 German East Africa was the first venture in the fledgling 
commercial empire to falter. By 1889, the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft had effectively 
failed in its attempt to administer the region west of Zanzibar over which Carl Peters had so 
brazenly sought to claim control.37 Only four years before in 1885, following Peters’ securing 
of protection agreements with local rulers, his Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation had been 
granted the patronage of Kaiser Wilhelm I in an agreement that came the closest to an 
imperial charter of all the commercial interests supported by the Reich in the late nineteenth 
century.38 Yet the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft’s attempt to execute its charter under the 
direction of Peters failed. The company proved unable to finance the administration of the 
territory it sought to rule, and its aggressive conduct in pursuit of a trading monopoly from 
the mountains to the coast of Zanzibar prompted vigorous resistance from local peoples.39  
Bismarck’s response to Peters’ request for military support to shore up the Company’s 
position was characteristically ambivalent toward increased colonial commitment. As late as 
September 1888, he had stated that he ‘would rather give up the whole East African 
endeavour than agree to imperial military undertakings in the interior’.40 Nevertheless, in 
                                                          
35 Sebastian Conrad, German Colonialism: A Short History (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 72. 
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January 1889 Bismarck issued orders for military intervention with the Reichstag’s support, 
and the protectorate of German East Africa was placed under the direct administration of 
the Reich.41 In German South West Africa too, the Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft für Südwest-
Afrika created by Lüderitz to administer the protectorate was failing financially by mid-1889, 
unable to compete with Cecil Rhodes’ consolidation of his corporate empire in Southern 
Africa.42     
Bismarck himself was forced to resign from his double post as Chancellor and Prussian 
Foreign Minister in March 1890 by the new Kaiser Wilhelm II. Wilhelm II’s rise to the throne 
is commonly treated as marking an epochal shift in modern German history.43 Bismarck’s 
retirement followed protracted parliamentary discord over the Chancellor’s anti-socialist 
agenda, and his related failure to maintain a stable coalition of parties in the Reichstag.44 On 
Bismarck’s ousting from office, the young Wilhelm II appointed former Commanding 
General of the Army Corps, Leo von Caprivi, as Chancellor, and began to implement what 
has subsequently become known as the ‘New Course’ in German statecraft.45 The new 
regime appointed under Wilhelm II departed at his behest from the essentially reactionary 
realpolitik that been practised under Wilhelm I and Chancellor Bismarck, and accommodated 
the Kaiser’s increasingly autocratic, unpredictable and expansionary approach to foreign 
policy, subsequently narrativised as Weltpolitik.46 The nature and significance of the 
Wilhelmian period of the German Reich remains a highly contested question in 
historiographical debates regarding the War of 1914-1918 and the origins of the National 
Socialist movement in Germany in the 1930s.47  
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Kaiser Wilhelm II’s ‘New Course’ in German governance was reflected in the centralisation 
of colonial policy. In October 1890, Caprivi created the Kolonialabteilung, or ‘Colonial 
Department’, which sat within the Foreign Office. The Colonial Department took over the 
appointment of officials in the protectorates.48 The shift toward direct colonial 
administration undertaken by the Wilhelmian Reich seems to have been motivated at least in 
part by an attempt to quell political discord within Germany via a unifying nationalist 
discourse of imperial strength.49 In March 1891, the Reich passed a law providing military 
support to Peters’ failing administration in German East Africa, and the new Imperial 
Commissioner Hermann Wissmann was authorised to recruit local mercenaries to quash 
local resistance under the command of German officers.50 In March 1893, Caprivi declared 
South West Africa to be a German colony, and increased military support to Lüderitz’ South 
West Africa Company.51 Within Germany, the Social Democratic Party opposed the 
centralisation of colonial policy and the militarisation of colonial intervention in Africa as 
furthering the interests of the ruling elite at the expense of the German majority.52 In 1896, 
the Reichstag passed a law aggregating the administration of the colonial armed forces or 
Schutztruppen of German East Africa, South West Africa and Cameroon, and formalising the 
conscription of indigenous Africans into the forces.53 In 1907, the Colonial Department was 
separated from the Foreign Office and became its own Office, the Reichskolonialamt.54 Over 
the course of twenty years, Bismarck’s reluctant extension of official protection to disparate 
German commercial interests in Africa and the Pacific had developed into a ministry of 
government with its own armed force.  
Yet even with the official protection they had sought in the 1880s, German commercial 
interests in the Pacific failed to thrive, as had their counterparts in Africa. In 1898, 
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Hansemann’s Neuguinea Komagnie was rescued from bankruptcy by an agreement with the 
Reich, in which the Reich paid out the ailing company and assumed direct administration of 
the region.55 In the same year, the ad hoc regime of tripartite rule of Samoa by German, British 
and United States empires came to an end. The ‘condominium’ arrangement had been 
brokered by Bismarck in the Berlin Samoan Conference of 1889 on the basis of equality of 
their respective commercial interests in the Samoan islands.56 Shared administration of 
Samoa had come to irritate the Wilhelmian Reich, at least in part due to the island’s 
prominence in domestic political discourse as the idyllic exemplar of German empire: 
Herbert von Bismarck’s replacement as Foreign Secretary in the new regime, Adolf 
Marschall, wrote of the ‘Samoan question’ that ‘the reputation of the New Course depends 
upon it”.57 In the Samoan Tripartite Convention of 1899, negotiated in the context of civil 
war in the Samoan islands, the three powers agreed that Germany would exercise exclusive 
control of the western islands; the United States, the eastern islands; and Britain, exclusive 
control of the Solomon Islands to the west as compensation.58 In this way, the Reich came 
to exercise colonial rule over the islands where Hanseatic firm Godeffroy & Sohn had 
established their first Pacific trading post in 1857.59   
The Jaluit Gesellschaft’s request that the Nauru District Office be abolished came as the 
German experiment in company protectorates began to unravel. The Foreign Office’s refusal 
of the Gesellschaft’s request was given as the Wilhelmian Reich consolidated its ‘New Course’ 
in foreign and in colonial policy, shifting toward the militarisation of the Reich’s intervention 
in Africa, and the assumption of direct administrative control in the protectorates. Whilst the 
term Schutzgebiet continued to be used to refer to German imperial ventures in Africa and the 
Pacific, the substance of the arrangements to which the term referred altered greatly over the 
1890s and 1900s, from a mode of protecting German commercial interests without assuming 
direct administrative control, to direct administrative control supported by military force. 
Ten years after the Gesellschaft’s failed attempt to exit its arrangement with the Reich, the 
                                                          
55 Stewart Firth, ‘German Firms in the Western Pacific Islands, 1857–1918’ (1973) 8 Journal of Pacific History, 10, 
21; also Conrad, above n 35, 54.  
56 See generally Paul M Kennedy, ‘Germany and the Samoan Tridominium, 1889–1898: A Study in Frustrated 
Imperialism’ in John A Moses and Paul M Kennedy (eds), Germany in the Pacific and the Far East, 1870–1914 
(University of Queensland Press, 1977), 89–114. Also Great Britain Foreign and Commonwealth Office, British 
and Foreign State Papers (1898–1899), vol 91, 1272–1273.  
57 Kennedy, above n 56, 101.  
58 Ibid 109–110; also W M Roger Louis, Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies 1914–1919 (Clarendon Press, 
1967), 27. 
59 See section 5 ‘Hanseatic firms in the Pacific’ in Chapter 2, ‘From Trading Post to Protectorate’.  
104 
 
Marshall Islands Protectorate was incorporated into German New Guinea in April 1906.60 
Executive authority over the Nauru District Office shifted from the Imperial Commissioner 
at Jaluit to the Governor of New Guinea, Albert Hahl, who by 1907 answered directly to the 
head of the Colonial Office, Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs Bernhard Dernburg.61  
By 1907, then, the status of Nauru had shifted from protectorate to colony. The 1888 
Agreement between the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Reich came to an end with respect to all 
terms except one: the Gesellschaft’s exclusive right to exploit phosphate deposits was renewed 
as a separate mining Concession, with a term of 94 years, and rights of assignment.62 The 
Nauru District Office now answered to the Governor of New Guinea rather than the 
Imperial Commissioner of the Marshall Islands, and powers of appointment passed to the 
Reich’s Colonial Office. Yet as the German Schutzgebiete became colonies in all but name, the 
legal framework set up by the Protectorate Law did not change. Colonial officers still wielded 
an executive authority unfettered by legislative and judicial review.63 The administrative 
powers of the Nauru District Office did not change, and all laws established in the 
protectorate period continued on foot. In the shift from protectorate to colony, the power 
to appoint officials shifted from the Jaluit Gesellschaft to the new Colonial Office, but the 
administrative form over which those officials presided remained unchanged.  
4. The federation of Australia and taxonomies of British imperial form  
The Wilhelmian Reich’s adoption of the ‘New Course’ and the transition from the 
protectorate to the colonial form was keenly followed in the Australian colonies. The British 
government’s diplomatic acquiescence to the activities of the Hanseatic firms in the Pacific 
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in the 1870s and 1880s had been publicised as a primary reason for the federalist conventions 
that commenced in the early 1880s.64 The unpopularity in the Australian colonies of the 1886 
Demarcation Agreement between Britain and Germany, which divided the western Pacific 
including the eastern half of New Guinea into British and German ‘spheres of influence’, 
stemmed in part from the failure of Britain to consult with the colonial governments on 
matters which they considered to directly affect their regional interests, both in terms of 
commerce and security.65 As the German empire shifted in form toward direct colonial 
administration, the legal structure of the British empire and the comparative status of its 
constituent parts came under increasing scrutiny from within. In 1887, the first Colonial 
Conference met in London, commencing a series of meetings between colonial governments 
that continued for over twenty years without resolving the basic question which had 
prompted it: namely, the international status of the colonies.66         
Within the British empire of the late nineteenth century, administrative arrangements in place 
were so diverse as to be unified only by the identity of the imperial power under which they 
were contrived. Over two centuries, the British empire had through corporate, military, 
diplomatic and administrative means evolved into a legal entity of extraordinary internal 
diversity.67 Following the Berlin Conference, the classical protectorate form of divided 
internal and external sovereignty was increasingly deployed by the British government for 
reasons similar to those given by Bismarck in 1884: it offered a means of protecting British 
commercial interests in a given region by keeping out other imperial powers, without creating 
the rights and obligations of territorial sovereignty.68 However, the German and British 
iterations of the protectorate were to diverge over the 1890s and 1900s, in both theory and 
practice. As the German government moved away from the form toward direct colonial 
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administration in substance if not in name, German jurists concerned themselves with the 
status of the Schutzgebiet in German constitutional law, with only minor attention paid to the 
legitimacy of the protectorate form in the law of nations. In contrast, as the protectorate was 
increasingly deployed across the British empire, British jurists engaged in earnest with 
theoretical coherence of the practice across domestic law and the law of nations.69  
A jurisprudential debate over the protectorate form ensued in Britain around the provisions 
of the Berlin Conference.70 Of key concern in the British debate was whether a protectorate 
could be established via unilateral domestic action, legislative or otherwise, or whether it 
required an act of territorial acquisition effective in the law of nations. Parliamentary counsel 
Henry Jenkyns, who prepared the Foreign Jurisdiction Bill of 1888, advocated an 
understanding of the protectorate as a division of the sovereignty of the weaker entity.71 
Where the weaker entity was not recognised as sovereign, the protecting state could 
effectively assume the external sovereignty of the region via domestic legislation asserting 
the assumption of jurisdiction, much as the German government assumed.72 Junior counsel 
to the Treasury, Robert Wright, countered Jenkyns’ formulation on the basis of Austin’s 
principle of the indivisibility of sovereignty.73 Holding sovereignty to be territorial, Wright 
argued that assumption of sovereign powers over a foreign region could not occur via 
domestic legislation, and required an act of territorial acquisition effective in the law of 
nations. In weighing up the debate, Lord Chancellor Halsbury concluded that the 
protectorate form was an established legal convention which simply did not require 
explication in terms of sovereignty, as to do so would limit the flexibility of the form in 
practice:  
‘(p)rotectorate furnishes a convenient middle state between annexation and mere alliance so long 
as it is allowed to remain mere convention, but if you assert a principle which practically 
annihilates any distinction between the rights and obligations of a protecting power and those 
of complete sovereignty, then the function of protectorate is at an end’.74  
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The consolidation of the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts in 1890 adopted Halsbury’s approach, 
remaining silent on the conception of sovereignty at play in assertions of protectorate 
status.75 For the Imperial government, then, the utility of the protectorate was not in 
providing a conceptual justification for empire, but in providing status to existing 
administrative forms.   
In contrast to the German context, however, the British protectorate was but one of a 
multiplicity of designations given to imperial administrative arrangements that from the 
sixteenth century had evolved across place and time, in the Americas, in Eurasia, in the 
Caribbean, Africa and the Pacific. These included ‘Crown colony’, ‘self-governing colony’, 
‘dependency’, ‘dominion’, and ‘condominium’.76 As with the protectorate, these designations 
lacked consistent legal definition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This 
mutability of terminology reflected the iterative nature of British imperialism in the 
nineteenth century. As Welsh lawyer and historian Charles Prestwood Lucas wrote in 1891, 
‘(t)he British empire has grown of itself; it has owed little or nothing to the foresight of 
soldiers or statesmen; it is the result of circumstances, or private adventure, and of national 
character; it is not the result of any constructive power on the part of the government’.77  
Retrospective attempts to rationalise as a matter of legal principle the diversity of 
administrative arrangements established in place were underway by the late nineteenth 
century. The Interpretation Act of 1889 offered a basic taxonomy in a section titled 
‘Geographical and Colonial Definitions in Future Acts’, which defined all ‘British 
possessions’ as ‘dominions’, of which the ‘colony’ was a subset including all except British 
India, which the Act held as irreducible.78 British jurists extrapolated on the theme. For Lucas, 
the operative label for the form of British imperial rule was not the geographically inflected 
‘dominion’ given in the Interpretation Act, but the governmentally inflected ‘dependency’, 
where a ‘dependency’ was defined as ‘part of an independent political community which is 
immediately subject to a subordinate government’.79 In his account, the key distinction was 
between dependencies governed by Europeans, and dependencies both governed and 
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populated by Europeans, which he regarded ‘colonies in the true sense of the word’.80 In 
Lucas’ schema, colonies were proper objects of self-government in all matters except ‘the 
regulation of foreign relations’ and the ‘disposal of the public lands’.81 For William Anson, 
the key categorical differences were between the ‘Crown colonies’, in which English people 
had settled,  India, which the English ruled, and the ‘miscellaneous possessions, 
dependencies and protectorates’ that comprised the remainder of the empire.82 For Charles 
James Tarring, the categorical distinction was between colonies formed by settlement of 
‘unoccupied or barbarous country’, and colonies formed by conquest or cession.83 In 
Tarring’s schema, the common law established that in occupied colonies, English law and 
sovereignty was carried with English subjects, ‘and therefore such countries are to be 
governed by the laws of England’.84 In the case of conquered or ceded countries, on the 
other hand, existing law remained ‘until altered by the conqueror’, except in the case of laws 
‘contrary to the fundamental principles of the British constitution’, which ceased at the 
moment of conquest.85  
Attempts to attribute some legal coherence to the diversity of forms of imperial 
administration intensified as demands for increased levels of self-rule emerged from the 
subjects of empire. With respect to the Australasian, Southern African and Canadian 
colonies, those demands developed not so much as demands for independence from empire, 
so much as for greater autonomy within it; yet debates over the extent of autonomy that 
should be devolved to Lucas’ ‘colonies in the true sense of the word’ proved to require 
definition of the juridical nature of empire itself. Self-government over internal affairs had 
been devolved progressively by subject matter to the Australasian, Southern African and 
Canadian colonies from the mid-nineteenth century. By the 1890s, jurisdiction over 
immigration and emigration, internal commerce and trade, and taxation and expenditure 
were all recognised as properly residing with colonial government.86 Yet the matter of power 
over external affairs of the colonies remained contentious. The Imperial government 
regarded the retention of power over foreign policy as basic to imperial authority - including 
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the power to enter into agreements concerning external commerce and trade, and to enter 
into agreements regarding war. In 1899, the Imperial government conceded the self-
governing Colonies should have autonomy with respect to regional commercial treaties; yet 
power to enter into defence treaties remained with Britain.87 Thus while the Imperial 
government passed statutes recognising the confederation of the Canadian colonies as the 
Dominion of Canada in 1867, of the Australasian colonies as the Commonwealth of Australia 
in 1901, and of the Southern African colonies as the Union of South Africa in 1910, treaties 
entered into by the Imperial government continued to bind each with respect to the conduct 
of foreign policy.88  
As a result, the newly federated Australian Commonwealth continued to be bound by the 
1886 Demarcation Agreement between Britain and the Reich, which had contributed directly 
to the federation movement.89 The shift in German foreign policy under Wilhelm II was 
keenly followed in Australian public discourse, and the German assumption of colonial rule 
in New Guinea exacerbated disquiet in Australia at perceived British acquiescence to German 
imperialism in the Pacific.90 The Reich had taken over the administration of German New 
Guinea from Hansemann’s New Guinea Company in 1898; and in 1902, the Commonwealth 
government took over the administration of British New Guinea from the colony of 
Queensland, later renamed the Australian Territory of Papua.91 From 1902, then, the Reich 
and the Commonwealth of Australia shared a land border between Papua and New Guinea, 
yet the Imperial government was not legally required to consult with Australia on matters of 
imperial defence. At the Colonial Conference of 1907, Australia and the other self-governing 
Colonies sought direct representation on the Committee of Imperial Defence established 
after the Boer War in 1902.92 The Imperial government agreed that the Committee would 
consult with the self-governing Colonies on matters of local defence; however the 
Committee if Imperial Defence was ‘purely a consultative body, having no executive powers 
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or administrative functions’.93 In the opinion of jurist Lassa Oppenheim, maintained up until 
the War, the position was clear: the inability of the ‘Colonial States’ of the British empire to 
conduct their own affairs with respect to defence meant that from the perspective of 
international law, they had ‘no international position whatever’.94 
5. Agriculture, labour and phosphate in the Pacific  
As the expansionist German empire militarised and the British empire negotiated its internal 
tensions, imperial commerce in the Pacific required more and more labour. In the new 
Australian federation, the issue of imperial competition was intimately related to issues of 
labour, agricultural production and race. The Commonwealth Parliament is well known to 
have passed the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 early in its first term, openly referred to then 
as now as the ‘White Australia’ policy.95 Its preceding action was to pass the Pacific Island 
Labourers Act 1901.96 The Pacific Island Labourers Act purported to end the use of Pacific 
islanders as labour on agricultural plantations in Australia, not because of the widespread use 
of forced indenture, but because of the perceived threat to white Australian labourers.97  The 
Labourers Act of 1901 not only prohibited the importation of Pacific labourers without a 
licence, but provided for the forced removal of those already in Australia.98 The practice of 
subjecting islanders to forced labour had become widespread in the second half of the 
nineteenth century among French and British trading firms in the Pacific.99 As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the Hanseatic firms in the Pacific bought copra and other commodities from local 
growers, choosing not to invest in land for plantations or primary infrastructure.100 In 
contrast to their German counterparts, British and French firms in the Pacific engaged 
directly in plantation agriculture. Not only did this require investment in land, roads, water 
and industrial plant. It required human labour.101  
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From the 1850s, European companies began to force Pacific islanders into labour using 
violent practices that became known euphemistically as ‘blackbirding’.102 It was estimated at 
the time of Australian federation that around 10,000 Western Pacific islanders from New 
Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu were present in Queensland under varying 
degrees of forced labour; more recently, Banivanua Mar has put this figure at 60,000.103 
Although the British Imperial government sought to distinguish itself from other imperial 
powers in its distaste for slavery, its response to blackbirding in the Pacific was ironic: as an 
alternative to the blackbirding system, the Governor of Fiji, Sir Arthur Gordon, requested 
to be provided with labourers from India.104 Prior to his Fiji appointment, Gordon - a family 
friend of British Prime Minister Gladstone - had been Governor of Trinidad and Mauritius, 
where plantations were reliant on Indian indentured labour.105 Although the Pacific Island 
Labourers Act purported to end the practice, blackbirding persisted into the twentieth century 
on cane sugar plantations in Queensland.106 The exploitation of Pacific Islanders contributed 
directly to the development of Australian agriculture. Whereas in the early nineteenth 
century, the Australian colonies depended economically on the pastoral industry, and from 
the 1840s, on gold and coal mining, at the time of federation in 1901 the sugar, wheat and 
dairy industries were emerging as the stalwarts of the colonial economy.107 
This shift in Australian primary industry correlated not only with racialized labour 
exploitation, but with the rapid expansion of the use of phosphate as an agricultural fertiliser 
in the late nineteenth century. The top-dressing of soil with phosphate improves the root 
growth of young plants and therefore their ability to absorb nutrients from the soil, which 
increases their overall health and drought resistance.108 The recycling of organic waste 
including manure, bones, and ash back to the soil was a technique common to pre-industrial 
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agricultural traditions, used to replace phosphoric acid in soil depleted through continual 
cropping, or to treat soil otherwise lacking mineral composition suitable for agriculture. In 
the mid-nineteenth century, organic phosphate had become known as ‘guano’, a conquista-
era Spanish adaptation of the Quechua word, huanu. Fossilised huanu was found in high 
concentrations on the Peruvian coastal islands, and local trade among the Quechua people 
of the region of contemporary Peru and Bolivia had existed for centuries, as observed by 
Alexander von Humboldt in 1803.109 In 1840, the Peruvian Republic had passed a resolution 
granting the President of the Peruvian Chamber of Commerce, Don Francisco Quiros, 
exclusive rights to export Peruvian guano, with property in guano remaining with the 
Republic.110 Quiros’ main customers were British trading firms that were initially sceptical of 
the worth of the trade, as the primary sources of phosphate fertiliser in Britain, crushed bone 
and animal manure, were of low market value.111  
Yet as Peruvian guano entered the British market, chemists soon reported that it contained 
higher concentrations of phosphate and nitrogen than any other form of organic fertiliser in 
use.112 By the 1860s, Peruvian guano was the most significant South American import into 
Britain.113 The term ‘guano’ thus became synonymous with the commodification of 
phosphate in the mid-nineteenth century. Yet Peruvian supply was limited and already 
waning by the early 1860s.114 Increasing demand for Peruvian guano in Britain and the United 
States of America had prompted trading firms to seek new sources in other locations.  
In the United States, members of Congress were repeatedly petitioned by American 
companies to introduce administrative measures to break the Peruvian monopoly.115 In 1856, 
the Congress passed the Guano Islands Act. In heavily negotiated text, the Act purported to 
protect any guano claim made by a US citizen over any otherwise unclaimed island; yet it 
purported to do so without extending territorial sovereignty:   
‘Whenever any citizen of the United States discovers a deposit of guano on any island, rock, or 
key, not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other government, and not occupied by the citizens 
of any other government, and takes peaceable possession thereof, and occupies the same, such 
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island, rock, or key may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the 
United States.’116 
The US State Department itself acknowledged that the language of ‘appurtenance’ was 
intentionally ambiguous, leaving unclear the status in the law of nations of any islands so 
claimed: the purpose of the novel terminology was to ‘lend itself readily to circumstances 
and the wishes of those using it’.117 The Act provided that ‘after the guano shall have been 
removed’, the United States was not bound to retain possession of any island claimed under 
it.118 Within a decade, fifty-nine islands, rocks and keys in the Pacific and the Caribbean had 
been claimed by US entrepreneurs and companies under the Guano Islands Act.119  
The association of guano with small islands in the Act reflected the initial commodification 
of Peruvian deposits, more than scientific understanding of the origins of the substance itself. 
In the emerging field of agricultural chemistry, theories of the origin of guano developed as 
testing of potential sources was funded by firms seeking to meet growing demand, and then 
by states seeking to regulate the composition of guano on the market.120 The popular belief 
that high concentration phosphate derives from bird manure was fixed early in the phosphate 
industry’s development. But unmet commercial demand drove prospectors to identify larger 
and deeper deposits in continental and marine as well as insular sites, and before long 
agricultural chemists replaced the colloquial term ‘guano’, with its misleading avian 
connotations, for the geological term ‘alluvial phosphate’.121 In the later twentieth century, 
the concept of the phosphorus cycle developed. The geological accumulation of tricalcium 
phosphate in geologic matter is currently understood as a phase in a biogeochemical cycle 
that includes atmospheric precipitation, concentration in micro- and macro-organisms, 
accumulation in the ocean floor, and hydrothermal volcanic activity.122  
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In the mid-nineteenth century, however, scientific interest in phosphate rock was largely 
directed by its commercial value. Agricultural chemists were hired by companies, including 
Gibbs & Sons in Britain and the American Guano Company in United States, to locate and 
test deposits, and maximise the value of phosphate rock as an agricultural fertiliser.123 In the 
1840s, Irish chemist James Murray patented the creation of ‘superphosphate’, mixing ground 
phosphate rock with sulphuric acid to produce high concentration phosphoric acid.124 The 
commodification of superphosphate enabled the scaling up of agricultural production to 
industrial levels, making existing farmland more productive and converting areas naturally 
unsuitable for agriculture into arable land. Large inland deposits were identified in Algeria 
and Tunisia in the 1870s, and in Florida and South Carolina in the 1880s. Under the Guano 
Islands Act, more than seventy islands in the Pacific and Caribbean had been recognised as 
‘appertaining to the United States’ by the turn of the century - even though the legal 
significance of ‘appurtenance’ still remained unclear, forty years after the passage of the 
Act.125 World phosphate production increased from an estimated 505,000 tons in 1875 to 
3,150,000 tons in 1900, and then to 8,800,000 tons in 1925.126  
The commodification of phosphate rock from the mid-nineteenth century was thus a crucial 
yet often overlooked aspect of the industrial revolution. In ecological terms, Cushman has 
argued that ‘(h)uman intervention in the cycling of nitrogen and phosphorous represents one 
of the central manifestations of human domination of the earth’s ecosystems’.127 In terms of 
political economy, ready access to superphosphate brought a certainty to agricultural 
production that favoured market speculation and economic growth. In effect, the 
commodification of phosphate was central to the industrialisation of agricultural production, 
which in turn provided a response to Malthusian arguments of an arithmetical relationship 
between population and agricultural yield.128 The economic effects of phosphate was 
particularly significant in the Australian colonies, as soil on the Australasian continent is low 
in naturally occurring phosphatic content. The increasing availability of commercial 
phosphate from the mid-nineteenth century not only increased yield of existing crops, but 
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enabled land otherwise unsuitable for agriculture to be farmed, and increased yield of grasses 
used as fodder for cattle on pastoral land.129 The development of the sugar, wheat, cattle and 
sheep industries in Australia – in which Pacific Islanders were indentured to work - was to a 
determinative degree made possible by ready access to commercial phosphate.130  
6. The Pacific Islands Company and its Agreement with the Jaluit Gesellschaft 
Over the 1860s and 1870s, competition between British and American empires over 
phosphate claims in the Pacific intensified. In 1874, English trading entrepreneur John T. 
Arundel, associated with the London Missionary Society and former employee of London 
shipping company Houlder Brothers, established John T. Arundel and Company, with the 
intention of trading in Pacific phosphate.131 With Houlder Brothers, Arundel had visited the 
Peruvian Chincha Islands in 1860, and investigated opportunities for Houlder to add guano 
lines to its shipping operations between Britain and the Pacific, which included emigrant 
transport from England to Australia and New Zealand.132 The initial operations of John T. 
Arundel and Company were parasitic on the rush of American entrepreneurial activity 
incentivised by the Guano Islands Act. Arundel would seek leases from US entrepreneurs to 
dig phosphate on islands claimed by them under the US Act but left unexploited, and 
therefore at risk of forfeit.133 Arundel supplemented his company’s fledgling operations by 
planting copra plantations near phosphate diggings, leveraging early profits to buy exclusive 
rights to islands claimed by US companies under the Guano Islands Act and left unexploited 
in the rush.134 In 1897, Arundel negotiated the merger of his company with Auckland firm 
Henderson & McFarlane - one of Goddefroy & Sohn’s early competitors in commodity 
circulation in the Pacific - under the name of the Pacific Islands Company.135 Henderson & 
McFarlane had operated trading posts in the British protectorate of the Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands, and in the German protectorate of the Marshall Islands.136 Sir Arthur Gordon – 
responsible for the import of Indian indentured labourers to Fiji, and later named as Baron 
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Stanmore by his friend Gladstone - was appointed by Arundel as Chair of the Company.137 
With the merger of the two companies, Arundel’s Pacific Islands Company became the 
largest British-held commercial interest in the Pacific islands.138  
One of the interests acquired by Arundel in the 1897 merger was Henderson & McFarlane’s 
trading post on Nauru. As the Jaluit Gesellschaft’s interest in maintaining their company 
administration of Nauru waned, fewer Gesellschaft ships visited the island and the company’s 
supplies dwindled.139 The Nauruan known as ‘Chief Jim’ by the Gesellschaft was reported to 
be acting insubordinately to District Officer Jung, and land disputes formerly presided over 
by the District Officer were left to be resolved by the Imperial Administrator’s Office in 
Jaluit.140 As the Jaluit Gesellschaft increasingly left its administrative duties derelict, Nauruans 
began to take any copra left surplus to the German head tax to Henderson & McFarlane 
agents to trade for their superior supplies.141 At the time of the formation of Arundel’s Pacific 
Islands Company in 1897, Henderson & McFarlane’s copra exports from Nauru were more 
than double those of the Jaluit Gesellschaft.142 The intended advantage of incorporating Nauru 
into the German empire – namely the securing of the German copra trade on the island - 
had within a decade either failed to materialise, as the Gesellschaft complained, or had been 
squandered, as the German Imperial Commissioner retorted.143 In its desire to extricate itself 
from its Agreement with the Reich, the Gesellschaft appeared uninterested either in the new 
Pacific Islands Company’s takeover of the greatest share of the Nauruan copra trade, or in 
the Company’s regional interest in phosphate.     
The story of the identification of Nauruan phosphate in the Sydney office of the Pacific 
Islands Company by Australian employee Albert Ellis has become a platitude in popular 
accounts of the island’s history.144 Albert’s father George Ellis, an agricultural chemist, had 
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been appointed by Arundel as a director of the Pacific Islands Company, and had his three 
sons employed by the company.145 As told by Albert himself, in July 1899 he noted 
similarities between the ‘office doorstop’, a lump of geologic matter which had been picked 
up on Nauru in 1896 by a former agent of Henderson and McFarlane, and ‘rock guano’ dug 
on nearby Baker Island by Arundel and Company.146 Ellis tested a sample of the Nauruan 
rock; according to his memoirs, ‘it was phosphate rock of the highest quality, and from the 
structure of the material one could tell that it was a very old and probably extensive 
deposit’.147 The Sydney office manager wrote to Arundel in London with a dramatic sense of 
the commercial-in-confidence that went so far as to refer to Nauru as ‘Frezzant Island’, lest 
the letter be intercepted by competitors in the Pacific phosphate trade:        
‘The whole island I firmly believe to be one huge mass of Rock Guano. How this is to be worked, 
I cannot suggest, as you are aware the island is under German jurisdiction and under German 
laws, the Gescell Scharft have sole right to work the deposits’.148   
The letter prompted the Company’s Board to seek exclusive rights to phosphate on all islands 
under the jurisdiction of the Gesellschaft, so as to not alert either the Gesellschaft or the German 
Foreign Office of the Nauruan find.149  
The agreement struck in 1900 between the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Pacific Islands Company 
reflected the different commercial orientations of the German and British imperial firms.150 
In a contract approved by the German Colonial Office, the Gesellschaft’s right to exploit guano 
deposits in the Marshall Islands Protectorate was licensed to the Pacific Islands Company, 
in exchange for all trading interests and copra plantations held by the Company within the 
Protectorate, and an immediate payment of 500,000 marks.151 A new company was to be 
created to hold the mining right, in which the Gesellschaft would be gifted 10% share capital; 
and the Gesellschaft would receive an annual royalty of half a mark on each ton of phosphate 
mined above 50,000 tons.152 The new Pacific Phosphate Company was formed in 1902 from 
the capital of the wound up Pacific Islands Company, and additional capital from Prussian 
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fertiliser company Die Union Fabrik Chemische Produkte. 153 Together, the Gesellschaft and Die 
Union Fabrik held about one third of the share capital in the new British-registered Pacific 
Phosphate Company.154  
Via the Pacific Islands Company, Arundel had also negotiated with the British Colonial 
Office for concession to mine phosphate on nearby Ocean Island, 300 km to the east of 
Nauru. A former Henderson & McFarlane employee had visited Ocean Island and noted the 
similarity of its single raised atoll formation to Nauru.155 Although near to the British 
protectorate of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Ocean Island - or Banaba, its indigenous name 
– had not been claimed by Britain, the United States or the Reich.156 With the support of the 
Commissioner of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Telfer Campbell, the British Colonial Office 
agreed to annex Ocean Island into the protectorate before knowledge of the unclaimed 
island’s value reached commercial competitors.157 A concession to mine Ocean Island 
phosphate was given by the British Colonial Office to the new Pacific Phosphate Company, 
subject to the Company’s securing of an agreement with the local population, recognised as 
possessing proprietary rights.158 In early 1900, Albert Ellis was sent on a Company ship, the 
Archer, to Banaba to secure this agreement.159 On 3 May 1900, Ellis secured the ‘signature’ 
of a Banaban chief, Temate - referred to as the ‘King of Ocean Island’ – on a mining 
agreement. The agreement purported to pass for a period of 999 years the ‘sole right to raise 
and ship all the alluvial and rock phosphate on Ocean Island’, in exchange for a yearly 
payment to ‘the said natives’ of fifty pounds, and the maintenance of a company store on the 
island at which this income could be spent.160 In September 1901, Ocean Island was 
incorporated in the Protectorate of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands.161 
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7. The right passed from the Gesellschaft to the Pacific Phosphate Company 
When formed in 1902, the Pacific Phosphate Company thus came to hold phosphate mining 
rights for two neighbouring Pacific islands: Nauru within the German protectorate of the 
Marshall Islands, and Ocean Island, within the British protectorate of the Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands. For Nauru, the Company acquired the mining right in an agreement with the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft, purportedly passing on a concessionary right originating with the Reich. For 
Banaba, the derivation of the mining right was an agreement between the British company 
and the local chief Temate, understood to hold indigenous proprietary rights recognisable in 
English law. Both Nauruan and Banaban populations were understood by the German and 
British empires respectively to hold proprietary rights in land, and both mining rights 
originated in a concessionary system that purported to respect existing proprietary rights. 
The difference in the chain of title of mining rights in respect of Nauru and Banaba was 
largely due to differing treatment of phosphate under German and British mining law in 
1900. Under British mining law, phosphate was a designated mineral, and therefore 
phosphate mining in the protectorates was regulated by the logic of the concession, in that 
the state held the power to assign mining rights.  
Under German mining law in 1900, however, phosphate was not a designated mineral. After 
the agreement between the Gesellschaft and the Pacific Phosphate Company, a proliferation 
of lawmaking purported to regularise the chain of title of Nauruan phosphate in German 
law. Less than ten years after the Gesellschaft had tried and failed to wind up its 1888 
Agreement with the Reich with respect to Nauru, the guano concession created by that 
Agreement had become one of its greatest assets, and the most profitable German private 
interest in the Western Pacific.162 In 1905, the Gesellschaft secured the renewal of its guano 
concession for Nauru from the Reich for a period of 94 years from 1 April 1906, the date on 
which administration of Nauru and the Marshall Islands protectorate would pass from the 
Gesellschaft to German New Guinea.163 In February 1906, phosphate was designated under 
German mining law as a ‘free’ mineral, in which ownership vested in the state; and a Mining 
Regulation was issued with respect to the ‘African and South Sea Protectorates’, explicitly 
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importing German mining law into the protectorates and thereby claiming state title in 
phosphate.164 In 1907, a supplement to the Gesellschaft’s 1905 concession retrospectively 
applied the Mining Regulation to the concession agreement, regularising the 1888 passage of 
title from Reich to company.165 By 1907, then, the legal interests in Nauruan phosphate were 
as follows: the German and British financed, British-registered Pacific Phosphate Company 
held an exclusive right in German law to mine phosphate on Nauru, under license from a 
German company, within the colony of German New Guinea. Property in Nauruan 
phosphate purportedly vested in the Reich, whilst property in the land from which phosphate 
was to be mined was recognised as remaining with the Nauruans.       
8. The commencement of phosphate operations on Nauru 
Between 1902 and 1906, the Pacific Phosphate Company developed the commercial, 
administrative and industrial infrastructure required for exporting phosphate from Nauru. 
Staff houses, labourers’ dormitories, and jetties were built on the coast at Yangor, near the 
contemporary Nauruan district of Aiwo.166 Roads and cableways were built from the central 
elevation of the island down to Yangor.167 Phosphate exports commenced in 1907. From the 
commencement of mining operations, the Company leased land from Nauruan landowners 
for nominal rent.168 From 1907, in accordance with German mining law as applied to the 
concession, the Company also paid a royalty to Nauruan landowners.169 The royalty was 
calculated at five pfennig a ton of phosphate removed from an owner’s land, and was paid 
by the Pacific Phosphate Company directly to the German colonial administration, to be 
distributed to Nauruan landowners via the chiefs.170 Paul Hambruch, a German 
anthropologist from the Ethnological Museum in Hamburg, estimated in his 1909 study of 
Nauru that five pfennig held a value of around half a box of matches.171 At the same time, 
the German administration converted the Nauruan head tax formerly charged in copra into 
                                                          
164 Weeramantry, above n 20, 184. 
165 Nachtrag zur Guano-Konzession der Jaluit Gesellschaft für die Marshall Inseln erteilt vom Reichskanzler am 21 November 
1905 [Supplement to the Guano Concession of the Jaluit Gesellschaft for the Marshall Islands granted by the 
Imperial Chancellor on 21 November 1905] cited in Spennemann, above n 13. Weeramantry, above n 20, 188. 
166 Ellis, above n 111, 128. 
167 Ibid; also see the map included in the inside back cover of Ellis, ibid. 
168 Weeramantry, above n 20, 192. 
169 Ibid 391. 
170 C E W Bean (ed), ‘The Military Occupation of Nauru’, in Official History of Australia in the War 1914–1918, 
(Australian War Memorial, 1941 ed, vol x), ch 9, 141. Nancy Viviani, Nauru: Phosphate and Political Progress 
(Australian National University Press, 1970), 35. 
171 Paul Hambruch, Nauru: Ergebnisse der Su ̈dsee-Expedition, 1908–1910 [‘Nauru: Results of the South Sea 
Expedition, 1908–1910’] (L Friedaricksen, 1914), translated in Weeramantry, above n 20, 391.  
121 
 
a tax in German marks; in the words of Governor of German New Guinea Hahl, the 
payment of rent and royalties meant that ‘the natives were now able to earn a good income 
in connection with the phosphate works’, and were therefore able to pay their tax in 
money.172 
Extraction of Nauruan phosphate required intensive manual labour due to the particular 
geologic structure of the island. Phosphorus had to be dug out from around hard limestone 
pillars that comprised the island’s central elevation. The coral reef surrounding the coast 
prevented safe landing, and phosphate had to be unloaded from the cable bins onto 
surfboats, then rowed out to cargo ships waiting off the reef.173 The Company found that 
the Nauruans were not amenable to providing labour for phosphate operations.174 In 1906, 
the German Colonial Office approved the import of Chinese labourers from the German 
protectorate of Kiaochow in the region of contemporary Jiaozhou in mainland China, a bay 
leased by the Reich from the Chinese Imperial administration.175 Around five hundred 
labourers were recruited from China, and another five hundred from the Marshall and 
Caroline Islands.176 The process of labour recruitment was outsourced by the Company to 
sub-contractors in China and the Pacific, and labourers were induced into individual 
contracts for a fixed period of three years’ labour, on the basis of pay and conditions 
represented in a second document.177 On arrival, the labourers in Nauru were told by the 
Company that the second document was not legally binding.178 Strikes and uprisings by 
labourers were met with the joint force of the Company and the German colonial 
administration.179 By 1910, around 250 Chinese labourers had died on Nauru from dysentery 
or from protein deficiency due to punitive rations provided by the Company in response to 
strikes.180 Labourers from the Truk Islands in the Marshalls and the Caroline Islands also 
died in numbers, and introduced dysentery spread to the local population.181 Amidst the 
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violence of indentured labour, between 1906 and the outbreak of European war, the total 
amount of phosphate shipped from Nauru by the Pacific Phosphate Company was 781,000 
tons.182 The phosphate was exported for agricultural use primarily to Germany, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Japan.183  
9. Nauru, the European war and Australian ‘sub-empire’ in the Pacific 
As the Pacific Phosphate Company’s operations on Nauru thrived under German 
administration and paid large dividends to its British and German investors, diplomatic 
relations between the German and British empires soured.184 Following the 1907 entente, 
growing hostility between the triple alliance of Reich, Austro-Hungarian empire and Italy on 
one hand, and British, French and Russian empires on the other, was only distantly felt by 
the German colonial administration in New Guinea. Across the Pacific, the European 
empires largely maintained their existing commercial relations right up until August 1914.185 
Unlike in the African protectorates, where the shift toward colonial rule and the militarisation 
of the Reich under Kaiser Wilhelm II was accompanied with the creation of the Schutztruppe, 
there were no colonial troops in the German Pacific, and only minimal police forces 
maintained in New Guinea and Samoa. Despite the Reich’s expanding naval force, no 
German warships were permanently stationed in the Pacific. By August 1914, no official 
instructions had been received in the German colonial administration in the Pacific as to 
conduct in the event of war.186 In contrast, Australia and New Zealand had by 1911 adopted 
formal plans for military occupation of the German Pacific colonies should war be declared 
between Britain and Germany.187 As the European empires clashed over territorial claims 
and spheres of influence in northern Africa and eastern Europe, the notion of sub-empire 
developed in Australian political discourse. Explicitly borrowing from the notion of a 
‘Monroe Doctrine for the Pacific’, which had circulated in the colonies since the 1870s, after 
federation the Commonwealth government increasingly styled itself as the ‘sub-imperial’ 
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power in the Pacific.188 The discourse of sub-empire drew on both anti-German and anti-
Japanese sentiment, which grew as Meiji Japan was increasingly recognised by Europe and 
the United States as a Great Power in the first decades of the twentieth century.189  
Yet Australia’s self-positioning as the ascendant power in the Pacific was undermined by its 
inability to enter autonomously into treaties on the use of force. Australia was not consulted 
on the Franco-British Entente of 1904 or the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1907, despite 
French and increasing Japanese activity in the Western Pacific.190 At the Imperial Conference 
in 1907, the Dominions accepted that on British declaration of war, they would be 
automatically regarded in international law as belligerents; yet Canadian Prime Minister Sir 
Wilfred Laurier openly questioned the extent of their legal obligations to give military 
assistance.191 At the Imperial Conference of 1911 in London, the tension between the 
administrative independence of the Dominions and their legal obligations with respect to 
British foreign policy was debated at length.192 Australian Prime Minister Andrew Fisher, a 
proponent of the ‘Monroe Doctrine for the Pacific’, openly demanded prior consultation on 
entry into treaties understood by the parties to bind the British empire, describing the 
limitations on the Dominions’ external sovereignty with respect to non-commercial treaty 
obligations as ‘a weak link in the chain of our common interests’.193  
The tension between Australia’s posturing as a sub-imperial power in the Pacific and its legal 
obligations with respect to British foreign policy is reflected in official communications and 
statements made on the escalation of war in Europe in July 1914. On 6 August 1914, two 
days after Britain’s declaration of war on Germany, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
the Viscount Lewis Harcourt, sent a carefully worded telegram to the Governor-General of 
Australia, Ronald Ferguson:    
‘If your Ministers desire and feel themselves able to seize German wireless stations at Yap in the 
Marshall Islands, Nauru or Pleasant Island, and New Guinea, we should feel that this was a great 
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and urgent Imperial service. You will, however, realise that any territory now occupied must be 
at the disposal of the Imperial Government for purposes of an ultimate settlement at conclusion 
of the war. Other Dominions are acting in a similar way on the same understanding’.194 
The British declaration of war and subsequent request for Australian occupation of German 
interests in the Pacific occurred during a federal election campaign in Australia. The 1914 
election was a contest between the Commonwealth Liberal party under incumbent Prime 
Minister Joseph Cook, and the Labor party under Andrew Fisher, well known as a Pacific 
imperialist.195 In the context of the election campaign, The Age newspaper in Melbourne on 
12 August editorialised on the significance of the British request to Australia’s imperial 
ambitions:  
‘We have long since realised that we have a Pacific Ocean destiny, and for some years past we 
have been striving to attain Imperial recognition for our right to enforce a definite Pacific Ocean 
policy. By virtue of the European war an unexpected path has been opened to the furtherance 
of our ambition…The whole business should not take more than a month. We should then have 
laid the foundations of a solid Australian sub-empire in the Pacific Ocean, and we should own 
five groups of islands…’196 
Against such clamouring, a further telegram from Harcourt reiterated that the requested 
Australian occupation of German interests in the Pacific should not be understood as a 
pretext for Australian territorial acquisition:   
‘In connection with the expedition against German possessions in the Pacific, British flag should 
be hoisted in all territories occupied successfully by His Majesty’s Forces and suitable 
arrangements made for temporary administration: but no proclamation formally annexing any 
such territory should however be made without previous communication with His Majesty’s 
government’.197 
Without any official instructions from the Reich on how to proceed, the German 
administration of Nauru responded to the British declaration of war by deporting the forty 
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British employees of the Pacific Phosphate Company to Ocean Island.198 On 9 September 
1914, four days after the federal election that returned Andrew Fisher to the Prime 
Ministership, the Australian naval cruiser HMAS Melbourne visited Nauru and reported via 
telegram that it had ‘put the wireless station out of action’ as requested, albeit without leaving 
troops to occupy the island.199 On 14 September the Acting Governor of German New 
Guinea, also without instructions or standing troops, surrendered Herbertshöhe and Rabaul 
to the Australian officers of the HMAS Sydney.200 With no wireless station to receive the news 
of official surrender of German New Guinea, the District Office on Nauru was left in limbo 
for a month. In mid-October, a plan for Nauru was agreed between the Governor-General 
of Australia, the British High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, and the Pacific 
Phosphate Company. The Company would continue phosphate operations under an 
Australian military administration and provision the island for the duration of the 
occupation.201 On 6 November 1914, 66 Australian troops arrived on the Company steamer 
to occupy Nauru, hoisting the British flag.202 In his telegram advising the British Secretary of 
State of the Colonies of the Nauruan occupation, Governor-General Ferguson signed off 
with a pointed question: ‘May Nauru now be considered open to trade?’203  
Tension between the Pacific Phosphate Company and the Australian government over 
substantive control of the administration of Nauru was evident from the outset of the 
occupation. Immediately after the occupation, the Company declared and delivered up its 
German-owned shares to the Public Trustee in London, for auction to British buyers.204 Now 
comprised predominantly of British capital, the Pacific Phosphate Company regarded 
Australian military administration of a Nauru as a temporary measure, to be replaced at the 
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end of the war with the control of the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific.205 Yet 
Australian aspirations to the territorial annexation of Nauru and German New Guinea 
intensified after October 1915, when William Morris Hughes replaced Andrew Fisher as 
Prime Minister of Australia. Open criticism of the prospect of British control of Nauru after 
the war appeared in the Australian media, where the Pacific Phosphate Company was 
described as ‘a few big European capitalists’ who had ‘allowed themselves to be puppets in 
the hands of German plotters against the interests of Australia’.206  
From mid-1917, the idea that Australia should be granted possession of Nauru in 
recompense of for war losses was strongly advocated in the media. The likely worth of 
Nauruan phosphate became a matter of common speculation.207 Hobart’s Daily Post put the 
point bluntly:    
‘Australia’s share of the cost of the war will be at least £200,000,000 sterling. The question is 
how to recoup ourselves for this enormous expenditure, equal to the indemnity paid by the 
French to the Germans in 1870. Nauru Island was mainly German property…German 
properties, interests and territories captured in the Pacific Islands by the valor of Australians and 
New Zealanders could be used as a national investment for the purpose of paying back the cost 
of the war to Australia and New Zealand.’208 
The Sunday Times in Sydney described the benefit to Australia not as one of the value of 
phosphate as an export commodity, but of increased agricultural production: ‘the value to 
the Commonwealth is not to be estimated in figures of phosphate. It must be calculated in 
figures of wheat’.209  
The question of territorial annexation of the German colonies by the Dominions was 
discussed at the Imperial Conference of 1917 in London, ever more closely bound up with 
growing demands for control over external affairs. The 1917 Conference headed by the new 
British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, proceeded without Australian representation, as 
Hughes remained in Australia to campaign in a notorious federal election fought on the issue 
of conscription.210 In the absence of an Australian delegation, the Conference adopted a 
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Resolution on the ‘Constitution of the Empire’, which provided that ‘the readjustment of 
the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire is too important and 
intricate a subject to be dealt with during the War’. 211  
On the urging of Lieutenant-General Smuts, the South African Minister for Defence, and 
William Massey, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, the Resolution further provided that 
any such ‘readjustment’ ‘should be based on a full recognition of the Dominions as 
autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth’, and should ‘recognise the right of the 
Dominions and of India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and foreign relations’.212 In 
the Imperial War Cabinet appended to the Conference, Smuts and Massey pushed for 
territorial annexation of the German colonies by the Dominions after the war - South West 
Africa to South Africa, and the Pacific colonies to New Zealand and Australia.213 Whereas 
Massey’s justifications for annexation of the Pacific colonies rested on regional security, 
Smuts argued for annexation on bases both of security and of the barbarism of the German 
colonial administration in South West Africa.214 On Smuts’ account, the German colonies in 
South West Africa and the Pacific could not be handed back to Germany after the war, as 
German imperialism had proved barbaric; and the only alternative was that they be annexed 
by the Dominions.  
10. Internationalisation, the mandatory principle and the Peace Treaty  
The Dominions’ annexationist aspirations conflicted directly with emerging proposals for 
internationalisation of the occupied German and Ottoman imperial territories. 
Internationalisation had been advocated within Britain as an alternative to annexation from 
as early as 1915, primarily by the Labour Party, prominent public intellectuals associated with 
the Fabian Society including H.G. Wells and Leonard Woolf, and socialist associations 
including the Inter-Allied Conference of Labour and Socialist Organisations.215 Advocates 
of an internationalist basis for peace converged in asserting that European imperial 
competition had precipitated the conflagration, and as such territorial annexation would be 
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unstable grounds for peace.216 On its entry into the war in April 1917 after three years of 
avowed neutrality, the United States government under President Woodrow Wilson aligned 
with the internationalist movement in describing its intention to ‘vindicate the principles of 
peace and justice in the world as against selfish and autocratic power’.217  
Yet competing concepts of internationalisation circulated. Some versions focused on 
economic principles of ‘open door’ trade, and imagined the occupied territories as 
internationally administered areas of free commerce, with the resolutions of the Berlin 
Conference on free trade in the African interior providing a structural blueprint.218 British 
Conservative politicians including Lord Robert Cecil also advocated internationalisation, 
arguing that an international structure to guarantee economic liberalisation was the only 
means by which to achieve political stability.219 Other advocates of internationalisation 
focused on political concepts of national self-determination, and imagined an allocation 
amongst the Allied Powers of responsibility for the administration of the occupied territories 
- this time with the consent of the local population.220 On 5 January 1918, in a speech to the 
British Trades Union Congress later labelled his ‘War Aims’ speech, Lloyd George broadly 
advocated the adoption of a principle of self-determination in any peace settlement, defining 
‘self-determination’ as ‘government by the consent of the governed’.221 Without ruling out 
annexation, George declared that ‘government with the consent of the governed must be the 
basis of any territorial settlement in this war’.222 Three days later in his ‘Fourteen Points’ 
address to a joint session of Congress on 8 January 1918, US President Wilson did not go so 
far as to adopt a principle of self-determination, instead advocating a reconciliation of 
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imperial claims with ‘the interests of the populations concerned’.223 Wilson’s fifth point called 
for:  
‘A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a 
strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the 
interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the 
government whose title is to be determined’.224 
In his influential 1918 manifesto on the subject, Lieutenant-General Smuts approved of 
internationalisation in principle, putting forth a proposal for the formation of a League of 
Nations which would function as ‘the successor to the Empires’.225 With respect to the 
occupied territories, Smuts acknowledged both principles of national self-determination and 
open door trade, yet differed from Lloyd George and Wilson in addressing as a matter of 
pragmatism the question of how such territories might best be administered after the war. In 
Smuts’ view, a new League of Nations would not have the necessary experience to take on 
direct administrative control.226 Whilst territorial annexation was not desirable, only existing 
states had the capacity to administer the occupied territories:          
‘(t)he only successful administration of undeveloped or subject peoples has been carried on by 
States with long experience for the purpose and staffs whose training and singleness of mind fit 
them for so difficult and special a task. If serious mistakes are to be prevented and the League is 
to avoid discrediting itself before public opinion, it will have to begin its novel administrative 
task by making use of the administrative organisation of individual States for the purpose’.227 
Smuts is often credited as the originator of the mandatory principle.228 From the outset, 
Smuts advocating mandatory administration for all occupied territories except German 
South West Africa and the German Pacific. In response to t Lloyd George on self-
determination as ‘government by the consent of the governed’, Smuts reframed the 
justification for territorial annexation of these exceptions not on regional security, as argued 
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by Hughes and Massey, but on the basis of the incapacity of the indigenous peoples to 
comprehend their own interests:    
‘the German colonies in the Pacific and Africa are inhabited by barbarians, who not only cannot 
possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas of political 
self-determination in the European sense…The disposal of these Colonies should be decided 
on the principles which President Wilson has laid down in the fifth of his celebrated Fourteen 
Points’.229 
Wilson’s fifth point left open the possibility of territorial annexation; all that was required 
was an ‘impartial adjustment of colonial claims’ that balanced the interests of the local 
population against the ‘equitable title’ of the occupying government. On Smuts’ account, 
obtaining the consent of the governed in the German colonies of Africa and the Pacific was 
simply ‘impracticable’.230  
In contrast, Australian Prime Minister Hughes did not bother himself with the niceties of 
principle in the debate over the occupied territories, instead applying the blunt force of 
realpolitik. Against the discourse of self-determination as consent or welfare broadly adopted 
by the British and the United States in early 1918, Australian Prime Minister Hughes 
maintained that the Dominions and the Imperial War Cabinet had ‘decided definitely’ in July 
1918 that German New Guinea, Samoa and South West Africa ‘must be ceded to the 
Dominions’; and that should a mandatory principle be adopted in which Powers would 
administer occupied colonies under some form of international oversight, it should not be 
applicable to the Pacific territories for reasons of Australian regional security.231  
Despite the growing prominence of Smuts and Hughes in the debate over the fate of the 
German colonies, the Dominion governments were not consulted by the Imperial 
Government on the terms of the armistice agreed between the Allies and the Reich on 11 
November 1918, the Reich on the basis of Wilson’s Fourteen Points.232 In the Imperial War 
Cabinet convened immediately after the armistice, Hughes demanded that the Dominion 
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governments be directly represented at the planned Peace Conference.233 Over the six 
months of the Paris Peace Conference from 18 January 1919 to the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles on 28 June 1919, the terms of the peace agreements, the future of the occupied 
territories and the formation of a League of Nations were negotiated between the delegations 
of thirty-two nations.234 European histories of the Conference have tended to focus on the 
significance of the informal negotiations between Lloyd George, Wilson, and French Prime 
Minister Georges Clemenceau, and to a lesser extent Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando, 
as determinative of Conference outcomes.235 Yet the international significance of the 
frustrated attempts of non-European politicians and jurists to engage in the process is more 
recently a subject of increased consideration.236 A prominent example is the presence of Emir 
Faisal of the Kingdom of Greater Syria, later King of Iraq, who unsuccessfully sought the 
renunciation by Britain and France of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement.237  
The inclusion of the Dominion delegations in official Conference proceedings, however, was 
understood at the time as marking a fundamental shift in Dominion status both within the 
British empire and within international law. 238 However the nature of that shift was not yet 
clear. As the mandatory principle gathered strength as the principle on which 
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internationalisation of the occupied territories would take place, Smuts, Hughes and Massey 
continued to maintain that the while the principle properly applied to occupied territories in 
the Middle East and North Africa, it could not apply to the German colonies of South West 
Africa, New Guinea or Samoa; and in open conflict with Wilson, Hughes reiterated the 
unacceptability to Australia of German New Guinea passing to any Power save Australia.239   
Part I of the Treaty of Versailles comprised the draft Covenant of the League of Nations, 
and Article 22 articulated the position reached by the Conference on the future of the 
occupied colonies. In heavily negotiated language, Article 22 sought to reconcile the 
mandatory principle, the principle of self-determination and the exception of the German 
colonies of South West Africa and the Pacific from the operation of either.240 The Article 
adopted a mandatory principle in providing that the ‘well-being and development’ of peoples 
formerly under German or Ottoman rule and ‘unable to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world’ formed ‘a sacred trust of civilisation’; and that 
the ‘best method of giving practical effect to this principle’ was ‘that the tutelage of such 
peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations’ and ‘exercised by them as Mandatories on 
behalf of the League’.241 Yet the success of Hughes’ and Smuts’ campaign with respect to 
South West Africa and German New Guinea is evident in the section half of the article. After 
broadly stating the mandatory principle by which the German and Ottoman territories were 
to be administered under international oversight, Article 22 goes on to provide for 
differential application of the principle, stating that ‘the character of the mandate must differ 
according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the 
territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances’.242 Distinguishing first 
‘certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire’ as having ‘reached a stage 
of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally 
recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory’, 
then ‘other peoples, especially those of central Africa’ as being ‘at such a stage that the 
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Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory’, Article 22 codifies 
the position of Smuts and Hughes:        
‘…There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, 
which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from 
the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and 
other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral 
portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the 
indigenous population’.243 
The precise form in which South West Africa and ‘certain of the South Pacific Islands’ were 
to be ‘administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, 
subject to the safeguards above mentioned’ was left to the new League to be determined. 
The three categories of mandate distinguished in Article 22 subsequently became known as 
the A, B and C Class Mandates. The C Class would include only the former German colonies 
of South West Africa, German New Guinea, and German Samoa. Under the terms of Article 
22, an ‘open door’ to other members of the League with respect to trade and commerce 
would not be required in the C Mandates.244 Belgian statesman Paul Hymans was 
commissioned by the League to advise on the legal obligations falling to the League and to 
Mandatories under Article 22.245 Hymans reasoned that with respect to the B and C Class 
Mandates, the Mandatory Power appointed by the Allied Powers and granted a mandate by 
the League would ‘enjoy’ ‘a full exercise of sovereignty, in so far as such exercise is consistent 
with the carrying out of the obligations’ imposed by Article 22; and that with respect to the 
C Class, ‘the scope of those obligations is narrower’, ‘thus allowing the Mandatory Power 
more nearly to assimilate the Mandated territory to its own’. The difference between a C 
Class Mandate and territorial annexation was real; but it was slight, and ambiguous.   
11. The Nauru Island Agreement of 1919  
With Nauru under Australian military occupation and Hughes’ annexationist intentions 
evident from his ascent to the Prime Ministership in October 1915, the Board of the now 
British-controlled Pacific Phosphate Company sought to use its influence with the British 
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ruling elite, including Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour and chair Earl Stanmore, to campaign 
for Nauru to be placed under British administration on the conclusion of the European 
war.246 In 1918, Balfour had written on behalf of the Company to Lord Milner, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, to submit that its shareholders were entitled to ‘some voice in 
determining the future jurisdiction’ of Company property on Nauru, and to propose that 
Nauru be included in the British Protectorate of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands with Ocean 
Island, to bring Nauru under the ‘direct administrative control of the Imperial Government’ 
via the Commissioner for the Western Pacific.247 Milner appears to have personally 
supported this proposal, later writing confidentially to Lloyd George that ‘British agriculture 
is vitally interested in Nauru’.248  
In February 1919, with the Peace Conference underway, Lord Milner proposed in a separate 
meeting with the Dominion delegates that the occupied German colonies south of the 
equator be allocated with German Samoa to New Zealand, German New Guinea to 
Australia, and Nauru to Britain under the Commission for the Western Pacific; and that all 
those north of the equator – including the Marshall Islands and the Caroline Islands – be 
offered to Japan.249 Hughes agreed to the arrangement with Japan, having long agreed to 
mark the equator as the delineation of the Australian sphere of Pacific influence.250 Yet, 
distrustful of the Pacific Phosphate Company’s close connection with the Imperial 
government, Hughes pushed back against Milner’s proposal for Nauru, insisting that Nauru 
be included in the Australian allocation. In March, he reiterated his position in writing to the 
British and Dominion delegates that territorial annexation of occupied Nauru was Australia’s 
due for losses sustained during the war.251 New Zealand Prime Minister Massey disputed 
Hughes’ claim to exclusive title, arguing that New Zealand had both similar need for 
phosphate and a comparable claim to control of the German Pacific on the basis of regional 
security and Dominion status.252 Milner’s diaries record over twenty meetings about Nauru 
during the Conference: nine with Hughes, six with Massey, and eight with Sir Alwyn 
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Dickinson, the Director of the Pacific Phosphate Company, with Balfour present at three in 
his capacity as Chairman.253        
The compromise agreement reached between Britain, Australia and New Zealand for Nauru 
severed the island from the erstwhile administrative unit of German New Guinea, and 
purported to deal both with administrative control of the island on the one hand, and 
phosphate rights on the other.254 As detailed above, the legal situation with respect to 
Nauruan phosphate prior to military occupation was understood as follows: under its 
agreement with the Gesellschaft, the Company held the exclusive right to exploit Nauruan 
phosphate; proprietary rights in phosphate were held by the Reich; and proprietary rights in 
land resided with Nauruan landowners under Nauruan law, leased to the Company. The 
question of whether Nauru itself was sovereign territory of the Reich had not been explicitly 
considered prior to the war. It is clear that it was not regarded as such whilst part of the 
protectorate of the Marshall Islands, yet from its incorporation into German New Guinea in 
1906, the island was likely understood to be under German sovereignty to the extent that 
this was so for German New Guinea.  
The Nauru Island Agreement was signed by George, Hughes and Massey in Paris on 2 July 
1919, less than a week after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. The Agreement purported 
to derive its authority to deal with Nauru not from the new League of Nations but from the 
Treaty of Versailles, describing its source of authority as ‘a Mandate…conferred by the Allied 
and Associated Powers upon the British Empire’ to operate from the coming into force of 
the ‘Peace Treaty with Germany’.255 Whilst the Agreement was novel in its tripartite 
compromise that reflected the changing status of the Dominions within the empire, the 
administrative form it contemplated essentially continuous with that established during the 
protectorate era. Whereas in 1888, the Reich had vested administrative powers directly in the 
Jaluit Gesellschaft, which exercised both private rights and public powers through to 1906 when 
administrative control passed back to the Reich, the Nauru Island Agreement created two 
new public bodies, and vested administrative powers in one, and private rights in the other.  
The same structure of public and private power, however, remained in place. Administrative 
powers previously exercised by the District Officer vested in the new Administrator; and 
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corporate rights previously held by the Gesellschaft then the Pacific Phosphate Company 
vested in the new Board of Commissioners. Article 1 created the office of Administrator, 
with power to ‘make ordinances for the peace, order, and good government of the Island, 
subject to the terms of this Agreement’ and to ‘provide for the education of children on the 
Island, to establish and maintain the necessary police force, and to establish and appoint 
courts and magistrates with civil and criminal jurisdiction’.256 The Administrator was initially 
to be appointed by the Australian government for the first five years, and 
‘thereafter…appointed in such manner as the three Governments decide’. Article 3 created 
a ‘Board of Commissioners’, comprising three members, one appointed by each 
Government; and Article 6 provided that ‘title to the phosphate deposits on the Island of 
Nauru and to all land, buildings, plant, and equipment on the island used in connexion with 
the working of the deposits, shall be vested in the Commissioners’.257 The Board of 
Commissioners was to become known as the British Phosphate Commission. Article 9 
provided that ‘(t)he deposits shall be worked and sold under the direction, management, and 
control of the Commissioners’, and that is was the ‘duty of the Commissioners to dispose of 
the phosphates for the purpose of the agricultural requirements of the United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand’.258  
Importantly, Article 2 replicated the revenue structure set up by the 1888 Agreement. It 
provided that ‘(a)ll the expenses of the administration (including the remuneration of the 
Administrator and of the Commissioners), so far as they are not met by other revenue, shall 
be defrayed out of the proceeds of the sales of the phosphates’, thereby making the 
Administrator and the administration of the island financially dependent on Commission 
profits.259 At the same time, Article 14 excluded the Commission’s phosphate operations 
from administrative oversight, providing that there was to be ‘no interference by any of the 
three Governments with the direction, management, or control of the business of working, 
shipping, or selling the phosphates’.260 Article 15 provided that the phosphate was to be 
divided at cost between the three Governments in proportion of 42% to the United 
Kingdom, 42% to Australia, and 16% to New Zealand’, and Article 17 provided that ‘such 
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allotment shall be for home consumption for agricultural purposes in the country of 
allotment, and not for export’. 261  
12. Reception of the Nauru Island Agreement and its relationship to Article 22 
It is not clear from the Nauru Island Agreement whether the signatories understood 
themselves to be acquiring the rights of the Pacific Phosphate Company in a chain of title 
originating with the Reich, or whether they understood themselves to be claiming rights 
derived from some form of radical title to Nauru, created in the British empire either by 
conquest or by Article 22 of the Covenant.262 Parliamentary debates suggest that there was 
no consensus between the parties on this point. The Agreement was the subject of 
parliamentary debate over the following year, as Article 15 required ratification of all three 
Parliaments. The Nauru Island Agreement and the text of the Peace Treaty were tabled in 
the Australian House of Representatives on the same day of 18 September 1919, reflecting 
Hughes’ belief that the significance of the Peace Conference for Australia was in Australia’s 
international aggrandisement.263 Hughes framed the Agreement in his second reading speech 
on 24 September 1919 as a commercial one, in which the administration arrangements were 
secondary to the commercial objective of securing phosphate for agricultural use. Describing 
the mandate principle as ‘the tenure under which the sovereignty of the island is held at 
present’, Hughes stated that the purpose of the Agreement was ‘to make the phosphates 
available at cost price to the three parties to the agreement’.264 In the debate that ensued, the 
contradictions between the Agreement as a tripartite commercial monopoly and the open 
door and mandatory principles of the Covenant were not raised; rather, a series of members 
of Parliament took issue with the estimations as to the quantity and value of Nauruan 
phosphate according to which the Pacific Phosphate Company was to be compensated under 
Article 7.265   
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In January 1920, the Council of the League of Nations held its first meeting in Paris.266 The 
official conferral of the mandates did not receive direct treatment by the League; as stated 
by the first Council Chairman, French Senate President Leon Bourgeois, the first of the two 
tasks given to the League was ‘the practical execution of the Treaties of Peace’.267 The second 
Bourgeois termed the ‘task of the future’, which he described as securing ‘the definite 
foundation of international justice’ and the ‘protection of races not yet able to stand by 
themselves, whose welfare and development, in the words of Article 22, “form a sacred trust 
of civilisation”’.268 While the League dealt with other business, including plans for the 
Permanent Court of International Justice provided for in Articles 13 and 14 of the Covenant, 
the Allied Powers allocated the mandates, some ten months after the execution of the Nauru 
Island Agreement, and eight months after its ratification by the Australian Parliament.269  
It was not until after the allocation of the Nauru mandate by the Allied Powers that Lloyd 
George saw fit to introduce the Nauru Island Agreement into the House of Commons for 
ratification.270 The Bill was tabled for second reading on 16 June 1920. In the debate that 
ensued, the Coalition Government and the Opposition adopted contrasting characterisations 
of the nature of the Agreement and its compliance with the Covenant. With the Government, 
Charles Palmer argued that the Agreement contemplated the purchase of British corporate 
interests under private law and was therefore outside the purview of the new League of 
Nations. 271 The Opposition argued that the Agreement was an international administrative 
agreement that fell squarely within the purview of Article 22 of the Covenant. William 
Ormsby-Gore, a prominent internationalist appointed as British representative to the 
Permanent Mandates Commission of the League, vigorously opposed passage of the Bill on 
four grounds.272 Firstly, he disputed that authority to dispose of the island derived from the 
Treaty of Versailles, arguing that authority did not reside with the Empire until formally 
delegated by the League. Ormsby-Gore argued that what was agreed in Article 22 of the 
Covenant was that the League would create Mandates which would confer powers on 
Mandatories, and that until this was done, the ‘British Empire’ had no authority to dispose 
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of Nauru.273 Secondly, if the ‘British Empire’ did indeed derive mandatory authority from 
the Peace Treaty as opposed to the League, he took issue with the assumption made in the 
Agreement that the ‘British Empire’ could be read down to include only Britain, Australia 
and New Zealand; in his terms, ‘(i)f the mandate is conferred upon the whole British Empire 
you cannot without gross violation of our whole Imperial arrangement confine the mandate 
to two self-governing Dominions and the Mother Country, and shut out the others’.274  
Thirdly, Ormsby-Gore argued that the Agreement contravened the two major principles 
agreed to at the Peace Conference. In effectively creating a ‘Government monopoly’ over 
Nauruan phosphate, the Agreement directly contradicted both the principle of ‘open door’ 
trade in the occupied territories, and the mandatory principle of trusteeship on behalf of the 
League.275 Ormsby-Gore was supported by Lord Robert Cecil, who argued that the Nauru 
Island Agreement directly contravened the spirit of Article 22, and that there was no 
authority to dispose of Nauru until the League granted a formal mandate.276 Despite the 
lengthy arguments of Ormsby-Gore and Cecil, the Bill was passed without amendment by 
the House of Commons the same day, 218 votes to 57.277 In New Zealand, the Agreement 
was ratified unconditionally by parliamentary resolution.278  
13. The Transfer Agreement with the Pacific Phosphate Company  
Following parliamentary ratification of the Nauru Island Agreement, it remained to formally 
acquire the rights of the Pacific Phosphate Company. The Company, unhappy with the 
compromise arrangement, argued via Lord Balfour that its Ocean Island concern could not 
compete with the proposed tripartite monopoly over Nauruan phosphate, and that the new 
Commission should buy out both concerns.279 On 25 June 1920, an Agreement of purchase 
and sale of both the Nauruan and Ocean Island rights of the Company to the new ‘Board of 
Commissioners’ was executed.280 In the Transfer Agreement, description of the rights 
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transferred from Company to Commission slips from mining concession toward property in 
phosphate.281 The concession rights conferred upon the Jaluit Gesellschaft are described as ‘the 
exclusive right of exploiting the Guano (phosphate) deposits existing in the Marshall Islands’, 
which accurately reflected the 1905 German instrument, annexed in translation to the 
Agreement.282 The rights transferred from the Gesellschaft to the Pacific Phosphate Company 
are described as ‘the right to the exclusive exploitation and utilisation of the rights conferred 
upon the said Jaluit Gesellschaft’, with the 1906 renewal of the private agreement annexed 
as the second schedule.283 The rights transferred from Company to Commission, however, 
are described as ‘all the right title and interests of the Company in the guano phosphate 
deposits in and upon the said Islands and in the lands buildings plant and equipment on the 
said Islands’, for consideration of £3,500,000.284 It is hard to imagine in such a laboriously 
drafted commercial contract that this slippage from concession to property was 
unintentional.  Certainly the transaction appears to have been understood in Australia as the 
purchase not of a mining concession but of property, and property not only in Nauruan 
phosphate but in Nauru itself. When the Appropriations Bill for Australia’s proportion of 
the purchase price was tabled by Hughes in the House of Representatives, the Transfer 
Agreement was discussed not as the purchase of the Pacific Phosphate Company but as ‘the 
purchase of Nauru Island’.285  
14. The Mandate for Nauru and the tension between international and sub-imperial status  
With the execution of the Nauru Island Agreement and the Transfer Agreement, both 
administrative control of the island and the phosphate operation passed to the three 
governments, and vested in the new offices of Administrator and British Phosphate 
Commission. On their face, both Agreements constituted British sub-imperial rather than 
international arrangements; yet the international status of the British Dominions was rapidly 
shifting. On 29 November 1920, the Council of the League passed the Constitution of the 
Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC), which provided that the majority of the PMC was 
to comprise nationals of non-Mandatory powers, and one representative of the International 
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Labour Organisation.286 The PMC was not delegated the power to issue formal mandates, 
which remained with the Council of the League; rather, it was delegated the power to ‘receive 
and examine’ the reports required to be rendered to the Council each year by the 
Mandatories, and to ‘advise’ the Council on ‘all matters relating to the Mandates’.287 On 17 
December 1920, the Council settled the allocation of the C Class Mandates. As expected, the 
‘Mandate for German South-West Africa’ was conferred upon ‘His Britannic Majesty to be 
exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa’. The ‘Mandate for 
German Samoa’ was conferred upon ‘His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by 
the Government of the Dominion of New Zealand’.288 Most of the German administrative 
unit of New Guinea was dealt with in the ‘Mandate for German Possessions in the Pacific 
Ocean Situated South of the Equator, Other than German Samoa and Nauru’, conferred 
upon ‘His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf of the Government of the 
Commonwealth of Australia’.289 The Marshall Islands, which with Nauru as the Marshall 
Islands Protectorate had been brought within German New Guinea in 1906, were once again 
administratively separated from New Guinea and Nauru, and allocated to Japan along with 
the Caroline Islands and the Mariana Islands in the ‘Mandate for the Former German 
Possessions in the Pacific Ocean Lying North of the Equator’, conferred upon ‘His Majesty 
the Emperor of Japan’.290  
As pre-empted in the Nauru Island Agreement, Nauru was dealt with by the Council of the 
League separately from the Marshall Islands and New Guinea. In contrast to the other C 
Mandates conferred on the British empire, which included the recognition of Dominion 
status fought for so doggedly by Hughes and Smuts, the ‘Mandate for Nauru’ was conferred 
upon ‘His Britannic Majesty’ alone.291 Seven articles long, the Mandate provided that, subject 
only to its terms, the Mandatory would have ‘full power of administration and legislation 
over the territory…as an integral portion of his territory’; and would ‘promote to the utmost 
the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the 
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territory’.292 The Mandatory was required to make an annual report to the Council of the 
League, containing ‘full information with regard to the territory’, and indicating ‘measures 
taken to carry out the obligations assumed’.293 There was no mention of the Nauru Island 
Agreement in the Mandate.     
As such, the tripartite arrangement agreed upon by Britain, Australia and New Zealand 
seventeen months earlier to administer the pre-empted mandate was not codified at the 
international level. While Hughes had succeeded in gaining administrative control of the 
northeast of New Guinea in addition to the southeast already under Australian 
administration, his attempt to annex Nauru to Australian territory had, at least on paper, 
failed.294 Whether the provisional allocation of the mandate by the Allied Powers or the 
Mandate for Nauru was the instrument of public international law by which administrative 
control of Nauru passed from the Reich, it passed to the British empire; and the Nauru Island 
Agreement, negotiated alongside the Peace Treaties, could not clearly be said to be an 
international as opposed to a sub-imperial instrument. Yet while the Dominions were still 
not independent, given the continued curtailment of Dominion power with respect to 
external affairs, their inclusion in the Paris Peace Conference negotiations signalled a shift 
toward international status.295 While the Australian and South African governments had 
failed to achieve their goal of territorial annexation of the occupied German colonies, 
through the process of trying to assert themselves as sub-imperial powers in their own 
regions they had achieved two significant outcomes: the recognition of the Dominions as 
subjects of international law, and the creation of the C Class Mandate.     
15. Conclusion  
This chapter has redescribed the shift in status of Nauru from protectorate to colony to 
mandate at the intersection of three processes of international legal formation: the 
imbrication of company and administrative rule that had been fixed under the German 
regime prior to the ‘discovery’ of phosphate, and continued when control of the Nauru 
passed to the British empire; the internal tension in the British empire between the Imperial 
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government and the Dominions over Dominion independence in external affairs; and the 
tension between territorial annexation and internationalisation of occupied territory at the 
Paris Peace Conference, codified in Article 22 of the Covenant. Whereas at the 
commencement of the protectorate era, German concern was largely with keeping out 
commercial interests of other European imperial powers, over the following twenty years a 
legal regime developed particular to Nauru. As with the other German protectorates, Nauru 
was administered under what was effectively unfettered executive rule, severed from the 
development of constitutional jurisprudence in the German Reich. As the model of company 
rule proved unworkable in its assertion of property rights in the absence of a framework of 
territorial sovereignty, and the Wilhelmian Reich embarked upon its New Course of 
expansionism, the mode of administration shifted toward direct colonial rule. In other parts 
of the German empire, this shift was accompanied by military force.  
Within a period of twenty years, the status of Nauru in international law shifted from 
protectorate via colony to C Class Mandate. Both the protectorate and the mandate form 
struck an ambiguous balance between administrative control and territorial annexation that 
responded directly to commercial and domestic political pressures.296 Yet whereas the 
Bismarckian Reich had in the 1880s considered the protectorate form attractive precisely 
because it did not purport territorial annexation of Nauru to the Reich whilst at the same 
time purporting to provide legal protection to Hanseatic trading interests, Australia – along 
with fellow Dominions of South Africa with respect to South West Africa, and New Zealand 
with respect to Western Samoa - considered the C Class Mandate form attractive because it 
was the closest to territorial annexation of the occupied territories that could be negotiated 
in the rooms of Versailles.   
What occurred at the administrative level for Nauru was at first glance more elaborate; yet 
the basic continuities in administrative form were marked. The shift from company 
administration as provided for in the 1888 Agreement between the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the 
Reich to mandatory administration occurred via two principal instruments. The Nauru Island 
Agreement of 1919 passed public power from District Office to Administrator, excluding 
the new Commission’s phosphate profits from administrative oversight whilst rendering the 
Administration financially dependent upon them. As had been the case in 1888, the power 
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of the Administrator to issue new laws and ordinances was restricted by a requirement that 
the company be consulted, and commercial operations not affected. The Transfer 
Agreement of 1920 transferred private rights from the Pacific Phosphate Company to the 
new British Phosphate Commission, augmenting those rights from concession to property 
in the process; and the new Commission employed all the Pacific Phosphate Company’s 
junior staff.  
In the protectorate period, the Nauruan people remained as ghosts to international law.297 
Under German rule, they appear via their capacity to hold real property rights, but not rights 
in minerals; and in the ad hoc imposition of total jurisdiction over them. Beyond this, they are 
known primarily through their refusal to succumb to the forced labour that was violently 
imposed in the commercial empires of the late nineteenth century Pacific. In this chapter, 
we hear of Islanders moved around the Pacific and Australia, of Indian peoples moved to 
Mauritius, Trinidad, and Fiji, and of Chinese peoples moved to Nauru, yet the scale of this 
movement and the extent of its violence remains to be carefully understood. The imposition 
of mandatory administration, however, was to have a significant effect on the representation 
of Nauruan people at the international level. Chapter 4 traces the development of the 
administrative regime from the mandate period, with creation of a weak but coalescing 
jurisdiction of international oversight of mandatory administration of Nauru. 
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Chapter 4  
From Mandate to Trust Territory, 1947 
 
1. Introduction  
From 1921, Nauru was administered by Australia as a C Class Mandate of the British empire. 
This chapter commences with an account of the accretion of Nauruan administrative practice 
in the mandate period, in accordance with the provisions of the Mandate and the Nauru 
Island Agreement. In the interwar period, the ambiguous status of the C Mandates in 
international law posed a problem for jurists, for the League, and for Australia and South 
Africa as mandatory powers advocating an interpretation of Article 22 as authorising 
territorial annexation. The chapter then traces the development of the Nauruan phosphate 
industry under the tripartite monopoly of the British Phosphate Commission, and the 
benefits that accrued to United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in the world phosphate 
market. The impact of Nauruan phosphate on the development of Australian agriculture is 
traced in context of international debates on population growth and food security prompted 
by the global depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s. In Australia, these debates were 
framed racially as risks to the white Australia policy that required a proactive response to 
prevent Asian immigration, a racial prejudice that fed directly into imperial tensions with 
Japan.   
The chapter moves to consider the impact of the War of 1939-1945 on Nauru at the 
intersection of this imperial competition in the Pacific, between Australia, Japan and the 
United States. Tensions between Australia and Japan over restricted trade access to the C 
Mandates in the Pacific had appeared during the Versailles negotiations, worsening as the 
League lost political legitimacy. The war of 1939 to 1945 is redescribed with focus on the 
Japanese offensive in the Pacific, which included the occupation of the Australian C 
Mandates of Nauru and New Guinea. As Nauru was occupied by the Japanese, the 
reconstitution of the League as the United Nations was already being negotiated. The 
negotiation of the new United Nations is redescribed with a focus on the expansion of Article 
22 of the Covenant into three full Chapters of the Charter of the United Nations. The 
Charter, adopted at the San Francisco Conference of 1945, removed the distinctions between 
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the A, B and C Mandates, and juridified the obligations of administering powers with respect 
to both the new ‘trust territories’ in particular, and to ‘non-self-governing territories’ in 
general. The status of Nauru shifted from C Mandate to Trust Territory in 1947 with the 
approval of the Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru in 1947 by the new Trusteeship Council. 
The successor body to the Permanent Mandates Council, the Trusteeship Council comprised 
an expanded membership including newly independent states, and significantly increased 
powers of review. Whilst the shift into trusteeship proved significant in providing a clearer 
framework in which the relationship between Nauru and Australia could be characterised as 
a matter of international law, at the administrative level the shift in status correlated with a 
further bureaucratisation of the existing administrative form.    
2. Administration of Nauru as a C Mandate  
As detailed in Chapter 3, the Pacific Phosphate Company’s Nauru operations continued 
without interruption from Australian military occupation in 1914 right through the Versailles 
negotiations and the deal struck in 1919 between Britain, Australia and New Zealand in the 
Nauru Island Agreement. The transition from military occupation to mandatory 
administration was smooth, and in the first year of production after the war, phosphate 
exports were the highest they had ever been, and continued to grow.1 Phosphate production 
took priority over all else; under the Agreement, the Australian Administrator’s powers to 
‘issue ordinances for the peace, order, and good government of the island’ were limited only 
by the power of the British Phosphate Commission to conduct phosphate operations 
without interference.2 Under the Transfer Agreement that assigned the Pacific Phosphate 
Company’s rights to the new tripartite board of the British Phosphate Commission created 
by the Agreement to run the phosphate mine, the operation was transferred as a going 
concern. All employees of the PPC were employed by the BPC, and the three Commissioners 
themselves, now publically employed, had previously held high positions with the PPC.3 The 
first Commissioners were Albert Ellis for New Zealand, the Pacific Phosphate Company 
                                                          
1 As championed by Australian Commissioner Harold Pope, ‘(t)he Australian farmer, therefore, has no need to 
be anxious about his supplies of superphosphate. Whatever may happen in less fortunate countries, his supplies 
are assured for the next four or five generations at any rate.’ Harold B Pope, ‘Nauru and Ocean Island: Their 
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Melbourne, 1921), 22–23. 
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3 See generally Agreement between His Most Gracious Majesty King George V and Others and the Pacific Phosphate Company, 
Westminster, 25th June 1920; on employment, see clause 10.  
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employee and later Director who claimed to have discovered Nauruan phosphate from the 
office door stop; Harold Pope for Australia, formerly the Company’s accountant; and Alwyn 
Dickinson for the United Kingdom, formerly a Director.4  
As the PPC became the new BPC, the first Administrator appointed by the Australian 
Government was English-born war veteran Brigadier Thomas Griffiths, who took office in 
June 1921.5 In the first year of the mandate, Griffiths issued a series of ordinances that 
clarified the transition from German protectorate to British mandatory rule. The Laws Repeal 
and Adopting Ordinance of 1922 provided that all laws ‘of the German Empire and of the 
German State’ would cease to apply in Nauru, to be replaced with the laws of the Australian 
State of Queensland; however all rights and obligations created under German law would 
continue on foot until satisfied or discharged.6 Any lands formerly owned by the German 
state would vest in the Administrator.7 The Judiciary Ordinance of 1922 established a Central 
Court of record and a District Court of petty sessions. 8 Whilst ‘judicial power’ was vested in 
the Court, the Court was stipulated to consist of the Administrator and his appointees. Thus, 
as the administrative structure of Nauru developed additional layers of bureaucracy, the 
Administrator was vested with a similar concentration of executive, legislative and judicial 
powers as had defined the post of District Officer under German rule.  
Other ordinances passed in the early years of the mandate reflected the obligations imposed 
on mandatories by Article 22 of the Covenant, obligations that were soon reiterated by the 
Permanent Mandates Commission in its annual questionnaire to the Nauruan Administrator. 
However, the incorporation of these obligations at the local level required little more than a 
reframing of existing practice, and in many cases provided opportunity for an augmentation 
of administrative power at the expense of the Nauruan people. The Nauru Lands Ordinance of 
1921 provided that Nauruan landowners were not permitted to sell, lease or contract with 
respect to their land.9 Similar measures were adopted in many mandates, purportedly to 
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prevent exploitation of ‘natives’ by unscrupulous commercial operators. However, the Lands 
Ordinance provided that Nauruans were permitted to lease land to the BPC, subject to the 
approval of the Administrator, at regulated rates.10 The Administrator’s approval was 
purported to protect the ‘well-being and development’ of native peoples as secured in Article 
22, but in effect prevented Nauruans from freely exercising property rights that had been 
recognised under German rule. In exchange for this limitation, the Lands Ordinance regulated 
the payment of royalties to Nauruan landowners, raising the rate from the German halfpenny 
to threepence pence per ton of phosphate.11 However of the threepence owed per ton, only 
twopence was to be paid directly to the landowner, with the remaining one pence paid by 
the BPC to the Administrator, to be held on trust for the Nauruan population.12 The fund 
into which the BPC paid the quarantined portion subsequently became known as the Nauru 
Landowners Phosphate Royalty Trust.  
The mandate system and the assumption of international administrative power over the 
occupied territories by the League of Nations effectively resolved the question of jurisdiction 
over indigenous populations that had so vexed British jurists in the late nineteenth century. 
Vested by the Mandate for Nauru with the ‘full power of administration and legislation over 
the territory’, the Administrator issued the Native Status Ordinance of 1921, which defined 
‘native’ as ‘any aboriginal of any island in the Pacific Ocean, or of any of the East Indian 
Islands or of Malaysia’.13 The Native Administration Ordinance of 1922, which applied to natives 
‘including an aboriginal native of China, or of any island of the Pacific Ocean’, stipulated that 
the Administrator had the power to make ‘any regulation affecting the affairs of natives’, 
including marriage, property rights, criminal and civil offences.14     
The transition to international oversight was, however, less smooth than the transition from 
German to Australian administrative control. Neither the Nauru Island Agreement nor the 
appointment of Australia rather than the Imperial government as Administrator of the 
Mandate for Nauru was officially communicated to the League of Nations, matters on which 
the Permanent Mandates Commission commented when it first turned its attention to Nauru 
                                                          
10 Ibid.   
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in 1922.15 In its 1922 report to the Council of the League, the PMC noted that although the 
Administrator was responsible for meeting mandatory obligations in the new system, the 
BPC was in effective control. 16 The Nauru Island Agreement provided that the 
Administrator was funded entirely from the profits of the British Phosphate Commission, 
which existed purely for the purpose of exploiting Nauru’s phosphate deposits; and that the 
Administrator had no authority with respect to the phosphate operations. As the PMC 
observed, this exemption of the BPC from administrative oversight created the potential for 
conflict with mandatory obligations, not only with respect to labour conditions but with 
respect to the mandatory principle itself:  
‘[the Commission] fears on the other hand, that the disproportion between the material wealth 
of this island and the small number of inhabitants may induce the mandatory Power to 
subordinate the interests of the people to the exploitation of the wealth. It is, therefore, not 
without the deepest concern that it considers the question whether the well-being and 
development of the inhabitants of this island, which in the words of the Covenant ‘form a sacred 
trust of civilisation’, the accomplishment of which it is the Commission’s duty to safeguard, are 
not in danger of being compromised’.17 
In response to the PMC’s concerns, the Accredited Representative of the three governments, 
Australian High Commissioner Sir Joseph Cook, obliquely insisted that any concerns with 
the arrangement between the Administrator and the BPC ‘did not really arise’.18 On Cook’s 
reasoning, the arrangement simply continued the status quo established before the war, in 
that the BPC was ‘merely the substitution of a publicly owned monopoly for a privately 
owned one’, the Pacific Phosphate Company.19 Cook argued that the BPC did not escape 
administrative oversight, and its legal position was ‘strictly analogous to that of the 
directorate of a company’; in all matters except the phosphate operation, the Commissioners 
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‘were subject to the control of the Administrator’.20 With respect to the PMC’s concern about 
the subordination of the interests of the Nauruan people to phosphate operations, Cook 
replied similarly obliquely that there was no risk of conflict between the phosphate operation 
and the mandatory obligation to promote Nauruan ‘well-being and development’, as the 
Nauruans themselves made no use of the island’s central plateau from which phosphate was 
removed: ‘the population is confined to narrow coastal strips, which are more or less fertile. 
The phosphate deposits themselves, situated within these strips, occupy an area that is 
neither populated nor food-producing’.21 Reporting on Cook’s interactions with the PMC in 
the Commonwealth Parliament, Prime Minister Billy Hughes reiterated Cook’s argument that 
the interests of the Nauruan people and the BPC’s interest in mining of phosphate could not 
conflict as they were mutually exclusive: on Hughes’ account, ‘(t)he working of the phosphate 
deposits is in no way prejudicial to the interests of the natives who, on the contrary, have 
never been so well off as they are under the present Administration’.22 
Notwithstanding Cook’s awkward sidestepping of the PMC’s questions on conflict of 
interest – a move repeated by Administrators for decades to come - the compromise between 
internationalisation and annexation that had been struck at Versailles on the insistence of 
Hughes and Jan Smuts attracted significant attention. The contradiction between the Nauru 
Island Agreement, with its exclusive focus on phosphate extraction, and the mandatory 
principle articulated in Article 22 of the Covenant was evident not only to the PMC but to 
jurists writing on the new mandate system. Those who defended the Nauru arrangement - 
including A.H. Charteris, Professor of Law at the University of Sydney – took a strict 
interpretive approach, arguing that under Article 22, C Mandates placed no positive 
obligations on mandatories with respect to free trade, and neither did the Mandate for Nauru 
itself; therefore, the monopolisation of phosphate by the tripartite BPC contravened no 
mandatory obligations.23 Charteris argued that all that was required of the Administrator was 
the promotion of the ‘well-being and development’ of the Nauruan people; and that under 
the new Lands Ordinance, Nauruans received a higher royalty than had been the case under 
the German regime, indicating that their ‘well-being and development’ was indeed being 
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prioritised over profit.24 Finding no positive conflict with the mandatory principle, Charteris 
went further, positing that the C Mandates functioned as a new sort of conditioned 
annexation: in providing that C Mandates were ‘best administered under the laws of the 
Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned’, 
Article 22 allowed ‘incorporation subject to conditions’, which on a strict positivist reading 
went no further than those given in the Article itself.25 Charteris’ legal opinion was popular 
with the Australian government, but was not shared internationally. English international 
lawyer Thomas Baty argued that the C Mandate could not be considered ‘incorporation’ into 
the territory of the mandatory power, as in no case did a C Mandate involve the extension 
of rights of nationality to indigenous populations, nor the subsumption of the fiscal affairs 
of the mandated territory into the economy of the mandatory power.26 Baty further rejected 
the analogy drawn by some commentators between the C Mandate and a private law trust.27  
For Baty, the C Mandate relationship was could not be characterised as one in which powers 
of sovereignty were assumed by the mandatory as trustee on behalf of the indigenous 
population as beneficiary, as there was no positive obligation placed on the mandatory power 
to not profit from the role.28   
The conflict between the mandatory principle and resource exploitation in the Nauru case 
was thus less an anomaly than a demonstration of the defining ambivalence of the C 
Mandate. During the 1920s, scholarly analysis of the mandate system came to focus on the 
question of where the sovereignty of the mandated territory resided.29 Reviewing the ‘law 
and practice’ of the South African mandate of South West Africa and the New Zealand 
mandate of Western Samoa, American political scientist Luther Harris Evans argued, contra 
Charteris, that the C Mandates were not territorial annexations in which sovereignty vested 
in the mandatory power - not least because the ‘semi-autocratic’ concentration of 
administrative power in a single office ‘would be considered to be too undemocratic to be 
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tolerated within the confines of the territory’ of each mandatory power. 30 Instead, Evans 
argued, the C Mandates were sui generis entities in international law, in which sovereignty 
resided with neither the mandatory power nor the indigenous population, but ‘in the 
mandatory power and the Council [of the League] acting together’.31 Similarly to Evans, 
political scientist Elizabeth van Maanen-Helmer reasoned that the C Mandates were 
differentiated from territorial annexation by the existence of the League itself – or more 
specifically, by the existence of the Permanent Mandates Commission.32 It was the fact of 
PMC oversight of matters of ‘native well-being and development’ that marked the line 
between the mandate system and ‘old-fashioned’ annexation - as limited as PMC oversight 
was to issuing questions and receiving reports.33 Yet this interpretation of the C Mandate as 
providing for joint sovereignty held between the mandatory power and the Council was not 
adopted by the Council itself. When the matter was raised, the Council opted against taking 
a position on the juridical question of sovereignty over the C Mandates, instead directing the 
PMC to request submissions from the mandatory powers themselves as to their 
interpretations of their legal relationship with the mandated territories.34 Charged with 
reporting on the matter to the Council, the Netherlands representative on the PMC, Frans 
Beerlaerts von Blokland, concluded without further elaboration that the C Mandate 
relationship was ‘clearly a new one in international law’.35  
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By the 1930s, administration of the Mandate of Nauru had settled into the rhythm of the 
phosphate operation. In 1930, the BPC completed construction of an industrial cantilever 
that allowed phosphate to be from carted from the central plateau directly into the holds of 
cargo ships, along the cableways that ran down the slopes of the plateau, through Aiwo 
district, and out across the reef into the ocean.36 Northeast of the cantilever on the forested 
hills of Aiwo was the ‘European Settlement’, where staff of the Administration and the BPC 
resided in houses; by ordinance of the Administrator, no ‘natives’ were permitted to enter 
the European Settlement between sunset and sunrise.37 Adjacent to the cantilever directly on 
the coast was the BPC labourers’ accommodation. Chinese labourers on three year contracts 
numbered between 700 and 1100 at any one time; the Administrator reported to the PMC 
that the ‘Chinese coolies’ were ‘healthy and contented’, yet first hand records of their 
experience are scant.38 Every year the Administrator claimed the cost of administration 
directly from the BPC via an Appropriations Ordinance, which included provision for wages 
and other costs of maintaining the police station and prison, wireless station, post office, 
medical services and all other public works.39 The BPC deducted appropriations from its 
accounts as a liability.40 Nauruan phosphate, in other words, paid entirely not only for the 
BPC’s operation, but for the administration of the Mandate for Nauru.  
The annual ritual of reporting to the PMC required the Administration to account for the 
satisfaction of mandatory obligations to advance the ‘social, moral and material welfare of 
the natives’. In his Annual Reports, Administrator Griffiths focused on two main initiatives: 
the creation of a Nauruan ‘Council of Chiefs’, and the provision of compulsory education. 
In response to the PMC’s questionnaire, Griffiths noted in his 1924 Report that Nauru had 
‘since time immemorial’ been divided into fourteen districts, each under a ‘Chief’, from 
whose number a ‘Head Chief’ was drawn.41 Griffiths wrote that as the policy of the 
Administration was to ‘encourage the preservation of native customs and rights where it can 
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reasonably do so’, the ‘Council of Chiefs’ had been formally recognised, and ‘charged with 
the maintenance of order in their districts’, including the power to deal with ‘minor offences’ 
as stipulated by the Administrator in the Native Regulations.42 In 1924, Griffiths reported 
that Timothy Detudamo of Uaboe had been elected as Head Chief, and a monthly meeting 
would be held with the Chiefs during which they would be ‘afforded an opportunity’ to bring 
matters to the notice of the Administration.43 This institution of the ‘Council of Chiefs’ 
formalised a practice of nominal consultation first established by District Officer Jung in the 
protectorate period.44           
The other initiative pointed to by the Administration’s reports as satisfying Article 22 
obligations was native education. Via the Compulsory Education Ordinance of 1921, all children 
between 8 and 16 were required to attend one of the two mission schools, which were 
subsidised by the Administration with funds taken from the Royalty Trust.45 In extension of 
compulsory primary education, in the early 1930s Griffiths’ replacement as Administrator, 
W.A. Newman, instigated a program of selective secondary education whereby certain 
Nauruan male students, mostly between the ages of 18 and 20, were sent to Geelong, outside 
of Melbourne, for further education in ‘technical subjects’.46 All costs of the Geelong 
program were appropriated by ordinance from the Royalty Trust. In reference to the selective 
secondary education of ‘promising’ Nauruan young men, Newman concluded in his 1931 
report to the PMC that ‘(e)ncouragement and sympathetic assistance have been given with a 
view to enabling, in due course, the native inhabitants of the Territory to administer their 
own affairs’.47  
Privately, however, both the Administrator and the BPC worried about the connection 
between further education and Nauruan demands for greater self-government than the 
Council of Chiefs allowed. The second British Commissioner, Thomas Lodge, appointed to 
the BPC from the refugee section of the League of Nations in Geneva, expressed concern 
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that British interest in Nauruan phosphate could be ‘seriously affected’ if such ‘ill-considered 
policy on native questions’ were to continue. 48 On Lodge’s estimation, drawn from his 
League experience, further education of Nauruans could only result in native unrest.49 
Administrator Newman himself expressed the same doubt, worrying that even selective 
secondary education of the Nauruan people would ‘inevitably lead to unsettlement and 
difficulties such as would appear to be the case in at least one of the dominions of the 
Empire’.50 In the 1937 Report to the League, Newman’s replacement as Administrator, 
Commander Rupert Garsia, reported that the education policy for Nauru had been revised, 
and the secondary education program curtailed.51 The reason given for the revision was not 
the risk of political unrest, but the limited prospects of the Nauruan people:  
‘education must take into account the changing social and economic conditions and 
circumstances of life of the communities concerned. This implies a need for periodical revision 
of the education programme. Such a revision has been initiated in Nauru in 1937, the idea being 
to have an education system which will be genuinely related…to the developmental needs and 
changing conditions of the island as interpreted by the Administration; in other words, an 
education suitably adapted to the Nauruan environment’.52  
3. Phosphate, agriculture, population and race in the Australian interwar period 
By the late 1930s, the administrative form of Nauru had taken shape around the division of 
powers between the Administration and the BPC set out in the Nauru Island Agreement, 
itself defended by tripartite monopoly as a simple formalisation of the arrangement of official 
and corporate rule struck during the protectorate period. The benefits that flowed from the 
Nauru monopoly were inestimable. During the mandatory period, the agricultural industries 
of Australia, and to a lesser extent New Zealand, came to depend heavily on the continuous 
supply of cost price phosphate from Nauru, and from Ocean Island in the British 
protectorate of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, both operations run by the BPC.53 As 
Australian Commissioner on the BPC, Harold Pope proved an adept propagandist for the 
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benefits of the Nauru arrangement to Australia. Openly equating the ‘progress’ of Nauruan 
peoples with which the mandatory powers were charged under Article 22 with the ‘progress’ 
of the phosphate industry, Pope made explicit the connection between the monopolisation 
of Nauruan phosphate and the economic stability of Australian primary industry in an official 
pamphlet circulated in Australia: 
‘(t)he Australian farmer, therefore, has no need to be anxious about his supplies of 
superphosphate. Whatever may happen in less fortunate countries, his supplies are assured for 
the next four or five generations at any rate…Now that we have guaranteed supplies for a great 
many years to come of some of the highest grade phosphate in the world, there appears to be 
no reason why the area under wheat should not be larger and still larger, and future harvest still 
more bountiful’.54 
New Zealand Commissioner for the BPC, Albert Ellis, was similarly evangelical about the 
benefits of phosphate, not only for the agricultural development of Australia and New 
Zealand, but also for the emerging problem of population growth: 
‘there is practically no crop which does not respond to phosphoric acid, and indeed it can be 
said, without the annual top-dressing of water soluble phosphatic fertilizer, agriculture as it exists 
to-day could not be conducted…there can be no doubt as to the use of phosphate and the 
growing importance it will have in helping to provide food for the world’s increasing 
population’.55 
Access to high grade phosphate via government monopoly enabled the continuous growth 
of the Australian sugar, wheat, wool and pastoral industries, which by the 1930s had become 
emblematic of Australian national identity.56 The ecological repercussions of routine 
phosphate use on the eastern seaboard of Australia were immense. Forced raising of crops 
further depleted soils of already low mineral content, affecting the distribution of indigenous 
plant species and aggravating soil erosion. Introduced plant species raised as stock fodder, 
including rye grass and clover, quickly became endemic weeds throughout the temperate 
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regions of the continent.57 At the same time, phosphate had appreciable impact on land 
settlement patterns in Australia. As the intensive farming of sugar, wheat, cattle and sheep 
became possible in inland areas formerly used for pastoral grazing, emigration to the new 
rural communities of Australia was marketed by the Commonwealth government to returned 
soldiers and prospective British immigrants.58  
The development of Australian agriculture in the 1920s had a particular geopolitical 
resonance, as the global deflationary recession that followed the First World War sharply 
increased food prices.59 Increase in food prices contributed to the revival of Malthusian 
arguments of the relation between population growth and agricultural production, and 
prompted increasing interest in technocratic governance as means of regulating food 
production and distribution.60 In Australia, both Europe and Asia were popularly regarded 
as facing problems of ‘overpopulation’ relative to food production; and the comparative 
‘underpopulation’ of Australia was held out as a risk that required active policy response.61 
Australian treatments of the world ‘population problem’ routinely drew a connection 
between Australia’s agricultural capacity and the White Australia policy. Sydney lawyer and 
social scientist Henry Lane Wilkinson argued that in order to avert the risk of unsolicited 
immigration from Asia, the Commonwealth should actively solicit British immigration, 
whilst increasing agricultural export to Japan, China and India.62 Agricultural export to Asia 
was, Wilkinson argued, a ‘logical extension’ of the White Australia policy.63 At the same time, 
the problem of ‘depopulation’ of the Pacific Islands was widely held out as a basis for 
extending Australian control of the Pacific region to prevent ‘Asiatic’ immigration to 
Australia via the islands.64 As food prices continued to rise, Japanese mandatory 
administration of the Pacific Islands North of the Equator was regarded with increasing 
suspicion in Australia.  
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In the international debate over food production and population distribution, assured 
phosphate supply became a national imperative. By the 1920s, global phosphate production 
was booming in the southern states of the United States, the French and Spanish 
protectorates of Morocco, the French protectorate of Tunisia, and in the Pacific Islands – 
including Nauru and Ocean Island, but also Angaur in the Japanese mandated Islands, 
Makatea in the French protectorate of Etablissements des français en Océanie (now French 
Polynesia), and Howland, Baker, and the Phoenix Islands, claimed in the nineteenth century 
as ‘appurtenances’ to the United States under the Guano Islands Act.65 Terms of commercial 
access to phosphate resources in the mandates and protectorates had by the 1930s become 
a question of international interest. In 1938, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
handed down its decision in the Phosphates in Morocco Case, brought by Italy on behalf of an 
Italian company in protest at French monopolisation of the phosphate industry in the French 
protectorate of Morocco.66 Italy argued that the establishment of a French phosphate 
monopoly was inconsistent with France’s obligation in international law to maintain an ‘open 
door’ for European commerce in the protectorate.67  
Whilst the PCIJ decided on France’s preliminary objection that it had no jurisdiction to hear 
the matter, the strength of the Italian case accentuated even further the juridical peculiarity 
of the C Mandate, in its silence on mandatory monopolisation of resource exploitation. The 
ambiguity of the C Mandate was further emphasised by the fact that the ‘economic equality’ 
afforded to States Members of the League with respect to trade in the A and B mandates 
through free trade obligations was routinely held out by the League as one of its successes.68 
Van Maanen-Helmer had identified in 1929 that the absence of obligations of economic 
equality in the C Mandates was a crucial weakness in the mandate system if not in the League 
itself, as it undermined the principle of free trade in the occupied German and Ottoman 
territories that had animated the Versailles settlement; on her reckoning, ‘the reason that the 
principle of equality of treatment was not included in the C Mandates was the desire of the 
Australians for the exclusion of Asiatic immigration’.69 Maanen-Helmer’s attribution of 
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causation to Hughes’ aggressive pursuit of Nauru understated the influence of South Africa, 
and General Smuts in particular, on the compromise reached during the Versailles 
negotiations; however it accurately identified the connection between the British Dominions’ 
policies of racial supremacy in South West Africa and the Pacific and the development of the 
C Mandate.70  
The connection between mandatory monopolisation of resources in the C Mandates and the 
racial policy of Australia had been drawn by Japan during the Versailles negotiations 
themselves. Japan had been allocated the former German territories north of the equator, 
including the Marshall Islands and the Caroline Islands, and reconstituted as the C Mandate 
of the Islands North of the Equator.71 Yet during negotiations, Japanese delegate Makino 
Nobuaki had protested the absence of an obligation of economic equality for the C Mandates 
in the drafting of Article 22, noting that Hughes’ arguments against the application of the 
open door principle in the occupied German territories of the Pacific were not commercial, 
but racial: unable to secure outright territorial annexation of New Guinea and Nauru, Hughes 
had insisted on rights of commercial exclusion in the territories as security against Asian 
immigration.72 From 1920, the tension between the two mandatory powers was only to get 
worse: Japan and Australia shared maritime borders where the C Mandates of New Guinea, 
Nauru, and the Islands North of the Equator met, but across which commercial activity 
could no longer freely pass.    
4. The co-existence of mandates and protectorates: the interwar international  
Internationally, the interwar period was marked by the continuing diversity of administrative 
arrangements within and between the European empires. The mandate system applied only 
to the former German and Ottoman territories, and therefore existed alongside the imperial 
protectorates, dependencies and colonies that had existed prior to the War of 1914-1918. 
This heterogeneity of administrative form produced odd juxtapositions in which one imperial 
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power administered two adjacent territories under different administrative structures, one 
subject to League oversight, the other not.73 In the Pacific, the British protectorate of the 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands existed adjacent to the British Mandate of Nauru. The Australian 
Territory of Papua existed adjacent to the Australian Mandate of New Guinea. In Africa, 
German Togo and German Cameroon had each been divided between the British and the 
French empires. The B Mandate of British Togo existed adjacent to the British protectorate 
of the Gold Coast, and the B Mandate of French Togo existed adjacent to the French colony 
of Dahomey, in the federation of French West Africa.74 The B Mandate of British Cameroon 
existed adjacent to the British protectorate of Nigeria. German East Africa, meanwhile, had 
been divided between Belgium and Britain. The Belgian B Mandate of Ruanda-Urundi 
existed adjacent to the colony of Belgian Congo, and the British B Mandate of Tanganyika 
existed adjacent to the protectorate of British East Africa, later British Kenya.  
This administrative heterogeneity attracted many scholarly attempts to settle a coherent 
juridical taxonomy of empire that provided reasons for the inconsistencies between 
internationalised territory and imperial territory. The tension between attempts at the 
international level to articulate a coherent body of principles for the mandate system and 
attempts at the imperial level to articulate a coherent internal structure attracted significant 
attention.75 Within the British empire, the co-existence of A, B and C Mandates, Dominions, 
protectorates and colonies proved a fertile jurisprudential problem. The development of the 
international status of the British Dominions of Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and 
Australia after the First World War was accompanied by shifting interpretations of the nature 
of imperial relation, the gradual renaming of the British ‘empire’ as the British 
‘Commonwealth of Nations’, and a surge in histories of British imperialism.76 The Imperial 
Conferences that had begun in the 1880s continued to provide a platform for the Dominions 
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to assert their claims for greater autonomy with respect to foreign affairs.77 Following the 
Dominions’ involvement in the Versailles negotiations, they were broadly recognised as 
having attained international personality.78 At the Imperial Conference of 1923, the Imperial 
government agreed that the practice of consultation with Dominion governments on matters 
of defence begun in the late nineteenth century had advanced to the status of a right to be 
informed in advance of any prospective treaty negotiations with foreign states.79  It was 
further agreed that the Dominions would not be bound by any new treaties without executive 
signature and legislative ratification.80 At the Imperial Conference of 1926, this shift in the 
status of the Dominions toward full external sovereignty was confirmed by a new definition: 
the Dominions were declared to be ‘autonomous Communities within the British Empire, 
equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or 
external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated 
as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations’.81 At the same time, the declared 
principle of equal status was acknowledged as not entirely reflected in practice; the Imperial 
government still exercised a catalogue of ad hoc executive, legislative and judicial powers over 
the Dominions.82  
As the international status of the Dominions took on clearer legal definition, the status of 
the other British imperial territories remained vague. The 1926 Imperial Conference declared 
of the British empire that the ‘widely scattered parts have very different characteristics, very 
different histories, and are at very different stages of evolution; while, considered as a whole, 
it defies classification and bears no real resemblance to any other political organisation which 
now exists or has ever yet been tried’.83 The Royal Institute of International Affairs, in its 
1937 report on the ‘structure and problems’ of the British empire, described the ‘colonial 
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empire’ beyond the Dominions and India – which retained its irreducible status in British 
imperial law - as consisting of Crown colonies, protectorates and mandated territories, each 
defined by source of legal authority. 84 The Crown colonies were those claimed under the law 
of nations via conquest, cession, occupation or treaty; the protectorates were those claimed 
under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts; and the mandated territories, those allocated by the League 
of Nations.85 On this account, the heterogeneity of administrative form within the colonial 
empire was due to the differential stages of ‘constitutional development’.86 Along similar 
lines, Sir Cecil Hurst, British lawyer and judge on the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, assessed the British empire in its entirety as a political rather than a juridical entity.87  
However, Hurst’s was indicative of a subtler trend. As the relationship between the 
Dominions and the Imperial government was increasingly framed as a constitutional one, 
the relationships the ‘non-self-governing units of the Empire’ and the ‘self-governing units’ 
- here including both Britain and the Dominions – was held to exist in the realm of 
international politics, rather than in the realm of constitutional jurisprudence.  
5. The ‘colonial question’ and the failing legitimacy of the League of Nations  
By the 1930s, such disjunctures between the register of international legal principle and the 
register of political fact were coming to characterise the international arena. The 
inconsistencies that the mandate system produced in imperial administrative practice were 
but one theme in a growing list of critiques of the principles and activity of the League itself. 
In 1935, the League’s list of ‘States, Colonies, Protectorates, Overseas Territories and 
Territories under Suzerainty or Mandate’ included 69 states and at least 118 ‘territories’.88 
However the legitimacy of both the territorial settlement reached at Versailles and its 
protection via the Covenant was increasingly criticised by Japan, Italy and Germany as 
serving the material interests of the Allied Powers, under a thin veil of internationalist 
principle.89 The global economic depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s exacerbated 
the antagonism of the ‘dissatisfied Powers’ toward the material benefit that Britain, France 
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and the United States (and to a lesser extent Belgium and Portugal) extracted from their 
imperial territories, both within and outside the mandate system.90 As the political 
equilibrium struck in 1919 increasingly wavered and the legitimacy of the mandate principle 
came under scrutiny, imperialism itself came under ideological attack from a range of political 
movements, including the Marxist-Leninism championed by the post-revolutionary state in 
the Soviet Union, the civil disobedience of the Indian nationalist movement led by Mohandas 
K. Gandhi, and the pan-African nationalism of W.E.B Du Bois.91 Against the proliferation 
of anti-imperialisms, British internationalists proposed various solutions to the ‘colonial 
question’. The Royal Institute of International Affairs proposed the internationalisation of 
all imperial territories through the allowance of free trade and submission to League 
oversight.92 International historian Arnold Toynbee proposed a readjustment of the 
Versailles territorial settlement in favour of Germany and to a lesser extent Italy and Japan, 
a proposal subsequently labelled ‘colonial appeasement’.93  
The stability of the League was fatally undermined by the successive withdrawals of 
Germany, Japan and Italy from 1933. Germany had joined the League in 1926 during the 
Weimar period with the support of German liberal internationalists including Foreign 
Minister Gustav Stresemann and jurist Hans Wehberg.94 However many German jurists 
shared Carl Schmitt’s assessment that the advent of the League marked not the rise of 
internationalism, but the ascendance to global hegemony of the United States.95 Germany’s 
involvement with the League ended abruptly in October 1933. From the mid-1920s, the 
rationale on which German and Ottoman colonial territories had been relinquished under 
Article 119 of the Versailles treaty was openly questioned within Germany. German lawyer 
and statesman Dr. Heinrich Schnee, the last Governor of German East Africa, wrote at 
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length on the ‘lie of colonial guilt’, refuting the Allied Powers’ condemnations of German 
colonial administration in Africa as more barbaric than the colonial administration of the 
other European powers.96 On Schnee’s reckoning, justifications of the confiscation of 
German colonies as protecting the ‘welfare of the natives’ against the abuses of German rule 
were duplicitous; the objective of the mandate system was territorial annexation, barely 
dressed up with the weak obligation of self-reporting to a powerless PMC.97 Schnee’s strident 
critique of the imperial objectives of the mandate system found ironic support in the 
arguments put forward by proponents of the system. In her scholarly exposition on the 
regime, van Maanen-Helmer had concluded that mandates were preferable to the old system 
of ‘economic imperialism’, as ‘it would no longer be necessary for a Power to conquer a 
territory and secure political control over it in order to benefit by its material resources’.98 
The Secretariat of the League itself argued that the objective of the mandate system was to 
enable the extraction of material resources of a territory to the ‘advantage of both colony 
and home country’:    
‘formerly, a good colonial administration was deemed to be that which procured the greatest 
economic advantages for the home country without sacrificing the future. The standard of good 
colonial administration is now that, while facilitating trade between the colony and the home 
country to the advantage of both, the administration should take the greatest care of the native 
population…’.99 
In Germany, such justifications were met with the indignance of Schnee. In October 1933, 
nine months after Adolf Hitler was appointed to the office of Chancellor by President von 
Hindenburg, Germany withdrew abruptly from the League without giving the requisite two 
years’ notice.100  
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Japan’s ambivalence toward the League was largely a response to the League’s ambivalence 
toward Japan.101 Japan’s failed attempt to include a provision on racial equality in the 
Covenant in 1919 coloured much of Japanese engagement with League activity, including 
Japan’s continued protest against Article 22’s silence on economic equality in the C 
Mandates.102 This tension came to a head with Japan’s escalation of its military presence in 
mainland Manchuria with the institutionalisation of the Manchukuo regime.103 With Japan a 
member of the Council of the League, the unanimity rule that governed decision-making 
created an impasse on the ‘Manchurian question’, resolved only by Japan’s announcement in 
1933 of its intention to withdraw from the League altogether.104 The islands comprising the 
C Mandate of the Islands North of the Equator, however, remained in Japanese control, 
adjacent to the Australian controlled C Mandate of New Guinea.105 In October 1935, Italy 
invaded Abyssinia, which in 1923 had itself been admitted as a Member of the League.106 
Italy justified its breach of the prohibition of aggression between League Members by 
refusing to accept Abyssinia’s equality.107 Coming after the Manchurian crisis, the Italian 
invasion of Abyssinia placed significant pressure on the League to defend the mandate 
system as fundamentally different to the territorial annexation engaged in by Japan and 
Italy.108 This pressure was sharpened by the presence of the Italian Marquis Theodoli on the 
PMC.109 However the League prevaricated in response to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. 
Rather than enforcing Article 15 of the Covenant, which stipulated that an act of war against 
one Member would be deemed an act of war against all, the Council adopted a 
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recommendation that Abyssinia be placed under the mandatory administration of the League 
itself – a proposal roundly rejected by both Italy and Abyssinia.110 
The legitimacy of the mandate system was further undermined by open contradictions in the 
British A Mandate for Palestine, which on its face could be interpreted to support both 
Jewish and Arab nationalist claims to the former Ottoman territory.111 Although the Mandate 
for Palestine did not explicitly contemplate the creation of a Jewish state, it incorporated the 
language of the 1917 Balfour Declaration in providing that Britain was responsible for 
‘placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will 
secure the establishment of the Jewish national home’, ‘facilitat(ing) Jewish immigration’, and 
encouraging ‘close settlement of Jews on the land’.112 At the same time, the Mandate included 
an obligation to ensure ‘that the rights and position of other sections of the population are 
not prejudiced’, a provision repeatedly invoked by Arab nationalists in petitions to the PMC 
protesting dispossession of land under British rule.113 The seizure of power in Germany by 
the Nazis accelerated the immigration of European Jews to Palestine, where British policy 
supported the sale of land to Jewish people.114 Increasingly violent political protest in 
Palestine could not be resolved via recourse to League principles of internationalism and 
self-government, which could be interpreted to support both Jewish and Arab causes.115 The 
PMC adopted an essentially pro-Zionist position by interpreting the explicit obligation placed 
on Britain in the Mandate to facilitate Jewish immigration as taking precedent over the more 
amorphously expressed Article 22 objects of ‘self-government’, ‘well-being’ and 
‘development’ on which Arab nationalists relied.116 The PMC’s interpretation of Britain’s 
mandatory obligations exacerbated nationalist protests against British imperial rule in other 
majority Arab territories, including in the protectorate of Egypt, and in the A Mandates of 
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Syria and Iraq.117 By 1936, Arab Palestine was in open revolt against British rule.118 The 
British Imperial government responded with military intervention in Palestine, explicitly 
prohibited by Article 22.119 From 1936, the PMC and Britain – by the mid-1930s, the 
strongest proponent of the mandate system amongst the Allied Powers - were in open 
disagreement.120     
6. The return to war and the Japanese occupation of Nauru  
Between 1939 and 1941, the outbreaks of war that followed Germany’s invasion of Poland 
in September 1939 were confined largely to Europe. In the Pacific, the configuration of 
imperial administration remained in its pre-war status quo until Japan’s attack on Pearl 
Harbour in Hawai’i in 1941. In mid-1941, the Australian Administration of Nauru sent what 
was to prove its final Annual Report to the PMC, for the year 1940. On the BPC’s own 
estimate, approximately 1.25 million tons of phosphate had been removed from Nauru under 
mandate rule from 1920 to 1940.121 The PMC, however, was never to meet again.122  
Mining on Nauru continued unabated until December 1940, when two German raiders made 
an attempt at seizing the island.123 The German offensive succeeding in sinking three of four 
BPC vessels moored off the coast, and then in bombarding the phosphate cantilever, the 
largest piece of infrastructure on the island, and setting alight the BPC’s oil tanks, used to 
run the electricity plant.124 By early 1942, Nauru Administrator Lieutenant Chalmers had 
evacuated all Europeans from the island except a core contingent of five, and all BPC assets 
that could be dismantled were either buried on the island or shipped to Melbourne.125 
Around 390 Chinese labourers were also evacuated to Australia, leaving around 190 Chinese 
and 150 Gilbertese BPC labourers on the island without support.126 The abrupt halt in export 
of Nauruan phosphate supply caused a sharp rise in the phosphate price in Australia, as 
                                                          
117 See generally Usha Natarajan, ‘Creating and Recreating Iraq: Legacies of the Mandate System in 
Contemporary Understandings of Third World Sovereignty’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 799. 
118 Neil Caplan, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Contested Histories (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), esp Chapter 5, ‘Collapse of 
the Mandate: Rebellion, Partition, White Paper, 1929–1939’; Royal Institute of International Affairs, ‘British 
Policy in Palestine, 1937–8 (1938) 15(23) Bulletin of International News, 3–7. 
119 Pedersen, above n 74, 385–393. 
120 Ibid 373–384. 
121 Albert Ellis, Mid-Pacific Outposts (Brown and Stewart Limited, 1946), 8. 
122 Pedersen, above n 74, 395.  
123 ‘Raider Shells Nauru Island’ The Australian Worker (Sydney) 1 January 1941, 8. 
124 Ellis (1946), above n 121, 11–15. 
125 ‘Evacuation of Nauru and Ocean I’, Courier Mail (Brisbane) 10 March 1942, 3; ibid 19. 
126 Ellis, above n 121, 140; Williams and Macdonald, above n 4, 315. 
168 
 
primary producers were subjected to international market rates for the first time in twenty 
years. The question of phosphate prompted lengthy debates in federal Parliament over 
whether the government should subsidise the difference, in order to sustain the agricultural 
industry that had come to depend on the Nauru price.127  
In December 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was followed by a rapid succession 
of assaults across the Pacific, all mounted from the Japanese mandated islands.128 The US-
held island of Guam was attacked in January 1942, followed by Rabaul in the Australian 
Mandate of New Guinea.129 With the Australian withdrawal from the Mandate of New 
Guinea south into the Australian territory of Papua, New Guinea was effectively under 
Japanese control from April 1942.130 In June 1942, Japanese troops attacked Nauru and 
Banaba; and on 23 August 1942, Nauru was officially surrendered to Japan.131 Only limited 
research into the Japanese occupation of Nauru has been undertaken, both in Japanese and 
in English.132 What has been documented goes little beyond statistics, although post-war 
testimony given by Nauruans indicated that the five Australian officials who remained on 
Nauru were executed by Japanese officers soon after the occupation.133 Over 300 Japanese 
troops were initially stationed in Nauru in 1942, and over the course of the next two years, 
that number increased to over 2,600.134 In addition to the troops, over 70 officials of the 
Japanese South Seas Development Company were installed to run the phosphate plant, and 
over 1,000 Japanese construction workers were shipped to Nauru to construct an airfield.135  
Yet with Japanese supply lines from the mandated islands increasingly blockaded by Allied 
forces and the phosphate plant practically inoperable, conditions on Nauru deteriorated 
rapidly.136 As the Australian Parliament debated agricultural subsidies, food supply on Nauru 
dropped sharply, with an unprovisioned population of nearly 3,000 Japanese in addition to 
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over 2,000 Nauruans and around 180 Chinese labourers.137 The Japanese army’s response to 
the food shortage was to relocate the majority of Nauruan men and some Nauruan women 
to Truk Atoll, the site of Japan’s military base in the Japanese mandated islands.138 Between 
1942 and 1943, 1,200 Nauruans were moved from Nauru to Truk, where food supply was 
initially better but quickly run down to indigenous atoll flora and fauna.139 On Truk, the 
malnourished Nauruans were made to work, many contracting dysentery, tuberculosis and 
yaws.140 By the time the Nauruans were returned to Nauru on 31 January 1945 after the 
Japanese surrender, over 460 had died, most of starvation.141    
From January 1944, the United States was reversing the Japanese offensive in the Pacific.142 
Over the following year, the US Army forced Japanese troops back out of pre-war Allied 
territories, and occupied the Japanese mandated islands north of the equator.143 In February 
1944, the Americans bombarded the Japanese military base at Truk, severely damaging 
Japanese capability in the Pacific.144 Nauru, too, was bombarded by US planes for a year 
before it was retaken.145 As the Japanese offensive was reversed, calls to retake Nauru and 
recommence phosphate production emerged immediately in the media and in Parliament; 
yet Nauru was left in Japanese hands, as the US prioritised the occupation of Truk and the 
rest of the Japanese mandated islands.146 Following the end of the war in Europe in May 
1945, the Australian government and the BPC entreatied the British High Commissioner to 
prioritise the retaking of Nauru, so that production of phosphate could resume.147 In early 
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September 1945, the United States officially handed military control of the Western Pacific 
south of the Equator to Britain, whilst maintaining its military occupation of Truk and the 
Japanese mandated islands.148 The Australian government moved immediately to retake 
Nauru. On 13 September 1945, Nauru was surrendered by the small Japanese contingent 
remaining on the island, to an equally small Australian convoy led by Brigadier Stevenson. 
Amongst the convoy was Albert Ellis, self-proclaimed luminary of the Pacific Phosphate 
Company and the New Zealand Commissioner on the BPC.149  
7. The formation of the United Nations and the Trusteeship Council  
Four months prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, the renovation of the 
mandate system of international administration had begun, with the declaration of the 
Atlantic Charter by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.150 In its eight principles, the Atlantic Charter declared that neither Britain nor the 
US would seek territorial aggrandisement from the war, and that any territorial gains made 
would be in accordance with the ‘freely expressed wishes of the people concerned’.151 
Echoing Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech of 1919,152 the Atlantic Charter 
affirmed a principle of ‘open door’ trade, defined as ‘access, on equal terms, to the trade and 
to the raw materials of the world which are necessary for…economic prosperity’, and a 
principle of self-government, defined as the ‘right of all peoples to choose the government 
under which they live’.153 On January 1942, as Japan occupied Guam and Rabaul, the Atlantic 
Charter was endorsed by 26 nations, including the British Dominions. The ‘Declaration of 
the United Nations’ provided the consensus needed to reconstitute the Assembly of the 
League.154 In October 1943, as 1,200 Nauruans were interned by the Japanese on Truk Atoll, 
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British and US negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the 
Republic of China on the terms of a peace settlement resulted in the Moscow Declarations. 
The Moscow Declarations endorsed the United Nations Declaration and the creation of an 
international organization to replace the League, ‘based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all peace-loving States and open to membership by all such States, large or small, 
for the maintenance of international peace and security’.155 As the United States occupied 
Truk Atoll in May 1944, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference – the successor to 
the Imperial Conferences commenced in the late nineteenth century – was held in London, 
and the United Kingdom secured the support of the Dominion governments for the Moscow 
Declarations.156  
In July 1944, delegates of 44 nations met at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire to negotiate 
the general terms of international financial and monetary organisation, resulting in the 
creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the 
International Monetary Fund.157 In October 1944, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met at 
Dumbarton Oaks Manor in Washington DC to agree on the constitution of the successor to 
the League, and the principles according to which it would operate.158 Laying down the 
general terms of the composition and procedure of a General Assembly, Security Council, 
International Court of Justice, and Secretariat, the Dumbarton Oaks communiqués omitted 
any official treatment of the mandates or of colonial territories, focusing instead on 
‘international peace and security’ and ‘economic and social co-operation’.159 In February 1945 
at Yalta in the Crimea, with Japan still in occupation of Nauru, Churchill, Roosevelt and 
Stalin met to agree on the terms of defeat of Germany; and it was resolved to hold the 
inaugural Conference of the United Nations General Assembly.160 Rather than opening the 
‘colonial question’ to the General Assembly, it was agreed at Yalta that each of the Allied 
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Powers would put forward individual proposals at San Francisco on a system to replace the 
mandates, and that an ad hoc committee would be tasked with deciding between them.161  
In April 1945, three months after the interned Nauruans had been returned, the United 
Nations met in San Francisco to settle the drafting of a new Charter to replace the Covenant 
of the League.162 As planned, a technical committee was formed to decide on five proposals 
put forward by the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, and Australia, for an 
international system of ‘trusteeship’ to replace the mandates.163 Whereas all five drafts 
contemplated ‘self-government’ of subject peoples as the aspiration of a trusteeship system, 
the definition of self-government remained disputed. So too did the question of whether 
trusteeship principles would apply to the former mandates only, or to both mandates and 
imperial territories.164 The Chinese proposal described the objective of trusteeship as 
‘independence or self-government’ - the only proposal of the five to include reference to 
independence.165 In contrast, the UK proposal described ‘self-government in forms 
appropriate to the varying circumstances of each territory’, reflecting Churchill’s concern that 
the trusteeship system would be deemed to apply to the entirety of the British empire.166  
The compromise between the five proposals reached by the ad hoc committee - later renamed 
the Trusteeship Council, the sixth committee of the United Nations - was to maintain the 
categorical distinction between former mandates and other imperial territories, whilst 
stipulating administrative obligations for both, reconstituted as ‘trust territories’ in the former 
instance, and ‘non-self-governing territories’ in the latter.167 A general set of administrative 
obligations would apply to all non-self-governing territories, including colonies and 
protectorates; and an additional set of more specific obligations would apply to all trust 
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territories.168 International trusteeship obligations were to apply to the former mandates, as 
well as to additional territories confiscated from Germany, Japan and Italy; however, 
transition from mandate to trusteeship would in each instance require a renovated agreement 
between the new UN and the administering power.169 This mechanism of individual 
negotiation of trusteeship terms obviated the need for a hierarchical classification of 
territories under international oversight, as had proven the major outcome of mandate 
negotiations two decades earlier.170   
In another contrast to the Versailles negotiations, the issue of military fortification of 
territories under international trusteeship proved a major point of disagreement between the 
Allies, and particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union. Whereas the 
prohibition of fortification in the mandates had proven uncontroversial in 1919, rapid 
developments in aerial warfare had by 1945 made the matter of military utilisation of 
mandated territory a point of dispute.171 The United States insisted on continued occupation 
for military purposes of the former Japanese C Mandate of the Islands North of the 
Equator.172 The Soviet Union held that military fortification of territories under international 
administration was tantamount to the territorial annexation that had been disavowed in the 
Atlantic Charter.173 Arguing that the Dumbarton Oaks imperative of ‘international peace and 
security’ supported its case for military fortification of trust territories, the US, French and 
Chinese delegations proposed that two types of trust be created – ‘strategic’, and ‘non-
strategic’.174 With respect to ‘strategic trusts’, military fortification would be permitted. The 
deal struck with the Soviet Union was that if strategic trusts were to be allowed, then 
oversight would be exercised by the Trusteeship Council reporting to the Security Council, 
and not to the General Assembly as would be the case for ‘non-strategic’ trusts.175  
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The outcomes of the trusteeship negotiations at San Francisco thus resulted in Chapters XI 
and XII of the Charter, respectively titled ‘Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing 
Territories’ and ‘International Trusteeship System’.176 In Chapter XI, Article 73 stipulated 
general principles for the administration of non-self-governing territories, which was stated 
to apply to all UN members which ‘have or assume responsibilities for the administration of 
territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government’.177 
Administering authorities were exhorted to ‘recognize the principle that the interests of the 
inhabitants of these territories are paramount’, and to ‘accept as a sacred trust the obligation 
to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established 
by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories’.178 With respect 
to the principle of self-government, however, the success of the United Kingdom’s attempt 
to attenuate the obligation to promote self-government in the British empire via reference 
to local ‘circumstance’ is evident. Article 73 placed on UN members the obligation ‘to 
develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and 
to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to 
the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of 
advancement’.179  
The articulation of the trusteeship system in Chapter XII reflects the compromise struck 
between the five proposals and their competing objectives of military security, free trade, and 
self-government. The success of the United States with respect to the primary objectives of 
the trusteeship system is clear: the first objective of the trusteeship system was listed in Article 
76(a) as the furtherance of ‘international peace and security’.180 The second objective of self-
government listed in Article 76(b) bore the mark of the Chinese insistence on the inclusion 
of independence as a goal of international administration, whilst again moderating any 
corresponding obligation through reference to local circumstance: administering authorities 
were obliged to ‘promote the ‘political, economic, social, and educational advancement of 
the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-
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government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each 
territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned’.181 The 
third objective of free trade is included in Article 76(d), and defined as the assurance of ‘equal 
treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United 
Nations and their nationals…without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing 
objectives’.182 Article 76(c) imported the language of human rights into the trusteeship 
system, defining a fourth objective of trusteeship as the ‘[encouragement of] respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all’.183  
The mechanism for accession to the new trusteeship system was laid out in Article 79, which  
provided that the terms of trusteeship for each territory were to be agreed to by the ‘states 
directly concerned’, and approved by the Security Council in the case of a strategic trust, and 
by the General Assembly in all other instances.184 Chapter XIII stipulated the functions and 
powers of the Trusteeship Council. As provided in Article 86, the Council would comprise 
representatives of all UN Members administering trust territories, all remaining Members of 
the Security Council, and representatives of as many other Members as required to ensure 
that the Council was comprised of an equal number of non-trust administering states as trust 
administering states.185 The Trusteeship Council was thus not only much larger, but 
fundamentally different in its constitution.186 Whereas the PMC had been comprised by and 
large of European ‘experts’ in imperial administration sitting in a personal capacity, the 
Trusteeship Council included representatives of states ideologically opposed to European 
imperialism, such as the Soviet Union and China, and in non-permanent capacity, states 
formerly subject to European imperialism.187 Furthermore, the Council was given more 
power than the PMC had held. In addition to the PMC’s sole functions of receiving reports 
from mandatory powers and reporting in turn to the Council of the League, the Trusteeship 
Council was delegated the authority to consider the annual reports of the administering 
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authorities, to accept petitions directly from trust subjects, to visit trust territories to review 
administration, and to report to the General Assembly.188  
8. Nauru becomes a Trust Territory  
New Zealand was the first mandatory power to propose a trusteeship agreement, submitting 
a draft for Western Samoa to the UN on 1 January 1946.189 Over the following eighteen 
months, as proposed trusteeship agreements for the rest of the mandates were submitted for 
approval, Australia and South Africa lagged on proposing agreements for New Guinea, 
Nauru and South West Africa. In San Francisco, South Africa had submitted a memorandum 
stating its case for territorial incorporation of the C Mandate of South West Africa into the 
Union of South Africa.190 The proposal was rejected, however South Africa maintained that 
despite the demise of the League, existing mandates remained on foot, and that the UN 
lacked the power to amend terms of mandatory administration without securing the 
agreement of the Mandatory Power.191 In the South African Senate after the signing of the 
Charter, General Smuts made clear that the South African government had no intention of 
acceding to the trusteeship system: South West Africa would be more efficiently incorporated 
into the Union of South Africa, as the white population of the Mandate desired.192 The 
Australian government’s delay in proposing trusteeship agreements for its C Mandates was 
largely due to its desire to incorporate the administrations of the protectorate of Papua and 
the mandate of New Guinea into a single administrative unit of Papua and New Guinea, to 
comprise the entire eastern half of the island of New Guinea plus the islands to the north, 
still known internationally as the Bismarck Archipelago.193 Both administrations had been 
severely disrupted during Japanese occupation. As was the case for the British in relation to 
Togo, and the French in relation to Cameroon, the Australian government’s policy was to 
seek administrative union of the former Mandate with the adjacent protectorate, whilst 
limiting the application of trusteeship obligations to the former mandate only. Australia’s 
gambit was to accept as inevitable the independence of New Guinea, whilst seeking 
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incorporation of Papua into Queensland, an annexation first attempted in 1884.194 The 
Australian government opted to proceed in two stages. A trusteeship agreement for New 
Guinea was approved by the UN in December 1946; and in 1949, territory and protectorate 
were incorporated via domestic legislation into the singular Territory of Papua and New 
Guinea.195 The western half of the island of New Guinea, also occupied by the Japanese 
during the war, was still recognised internationally as the colonial territory of the Dutch East 
Indies; however the declaration of Indonesian independence in 1945 on the withdrawal of 
the Japanese placed the legitimacy of the international status of the western half of New 
Guinea into a limbo which remains unresolved.196          
In September 1947, a month after the legal partition of British India into the independent 
Union of India and Dominion of Pakistan, Australia submitted the draft Nauru Trusteeship 
Agreement to the Trusteeship Council for approval.197 Expressed as a continuation of the 
Mandate for Nauru, the proposed trusteeship agreement was the only one to nominate a 
group of three states as Administering Authority. Article 4 of the draft indirectly incorporated 
the Nauru Island Agreement into the Trusteeship Agreement, thus effectively excluding the 
BPC’s phosphate operation from administrative and thus international oversight:  
‘(t)he Administering Authority will be responsible for the peace, order, good government and 
defence of the Territory, and for this purpose, in pursuance of an Agreement made by the 
Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the Government of Australia 
will on behalf of the Administering Authority and except and until otherwise agreed by the 
Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom continue to exercise full 
powers of legislation, administration and jurisdiction in and over the Territory’.198 
With respect to trusteeship obligations stipulated in Article 76(b) of the Charter to promote 
the ‘progressive development toward self-government or independence’, Article 5 of the 
Nauru draft agreement emphasised the caveat of local circumstance insisted upon by the 
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British in San Francisco, placing on the Administering Authority the responsibility only for 
‘assur(ing) the inhabitants of the Territory, as may be appropriate to the particular 
circumstances of the Territory and its peoples, a progressively increasing share in the 
administrative and other services of the Territory’.199   
The Trusteeship Council formed a sub-committee to review the draft, chaired by Awni 
Khalidy of Iraq, and including representatives of India and Yugoslavia.200 Australian Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs H.V. Evatt, who had taken part in the 
drafting of the UN Charter, presented the draft.201 Evatt defended the arrangement between 
the Administration and the BPC provided for in the Nauru Island Agreement as in the 
interests not only of the three partner governments, but also of Nauru and the world.202 The 
agricultural sectors of Australia and New Zealand were dependent on BPC phosphate, and 
in turn, Australia and New Zealand exported wheat and dairy to the world: ‘(t)hus Nauru 
under Australian administration is making an important contribution to the world’s greatest 
need. This is being done not only without prejudicing the native people but under conditions 
which assure them an entirely satisfactory standard of living, adequate social services, and an 
assured future’.203 The ‘conditions’ Evatt pointed to as securing an ‘entirely satisfactory 
standard of living’ were the provision of education and health programs; and on his account, 
Nauru’s ‘assured future’ was secured by the Nauru Landowners Phosphate Royalty Trust.  
The Soviet representative on the Trusteeship Council, Professor Boris Stein, did not agree 
with Evatt’s logic. According to Stein, Australia’s proposed trusteeship agreement for Nauru 
represented ‘a backwards step’ toward resuscitation of the mandate system.204 It failed to 
articulate clear obligations on how Nauruan involvement in administration would be 
increased; and in specifying in Article 7 that ‘matters of international peace and security’ 
could be taken into account in interpreting trusteeship obligations, the proposed agreement 
opened the door to the instrumentalisation of Nauru for military purposes in the Pacific.205 
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The Yugoslav and Ukrainian representatives on the sub-committee raised related objections: 
the administrative regime contemplated in the draft trusteeship agreement was ‘static’ in that 
it disclosed no real measures of political advancement; and the emphasis on local 
circumstance limited the trusteeship obligation to nominal rather than substantive promotion 
of self-government, thereby contradicting the spirit of Chapter XII.206 Despite the 
reservations of the Soviet bloc, when the Nauru draft was brought before the General 
Assembly, it was approved by 46 to 6 votes.207 On the same day that the Nauru Trusteeship 
Agreement was approved, the General Assembly passed a motion calling on South Africa to 
submit a draft proposal for South West Africa, the final of the C Mandates to remain outside 
the trusteeship system.208 No draft proved forthcoming.  
9. Conclusion  
During the mandate period, the ambivalent status of the C Mandates in international law was 
not resolved. Authorised by the Nauru Island Agreement to exercise mandatory control 
granted under the Mandate for Nauru, the new Australian Administration built upon the 
existing order of legal rights and obligations established under German rule with a growing 
yet still skeletal set of executive ordinances regulating Nauruan life. Whilst Nauruan real 
property rights continued to be recognised as had been the case in the protectorate period, 
in 1922 Nauruans were by ordinance prohibited from disposing of their land other than via 
lease to the BPC, and were paid a nominal royalty, part of which was paid directly in the new 
Nauru Landowners Phosphate Royalty Trust. The phosphate industry expanded rapidly 
under the tripartite monopoly of the British Phosphate Commissioners in whom property in 
Nauruan phosphate, as well as the mining concession, was now purported to vest. Under the 
terms of the Nauru Island Agreement, the BPC was insulated from administrative oversight, 
and thus from the oversight of the Permanent Mandates Council and the Council of the 
League in which, some analyses suggested, joint sovereignty over Nauru was vested. The 
weak response of the PMC to the Nauruan arrangement reflected both its limited powers 
under the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant, and the steady delegitimisation of both the 
mandate system and the League itself over the interwar period.   
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At the same time, a guaranteed supply of Nauruan superphosphate at cost price facilitated 
the conversion of inland regions of Australia otherwise unsuitable for the raising of crops to 
farmland, and insulated the flourishing Australian agricultural industry from the worst effects 
of economic depression. The connection between phosphate, food supply and population 
was framed in Australia as a problem for the White Australia policy, which exacerbated 
tension between Australia and Japan over the racial motivations behind restricted trade in 
the C Mandates. The Japanese offensive in the Pacific from 1941, launched from Truk Atoll 
in the Japanese mandated islands, included the occupation of the Mandates of Nauru and 
New Guinea. As over a thousand Nauruan men were interned on Truk, negotiations in 
Europe and the United States resulted in the reconstitution of the League as the United 
Nations, and the expansion of Article 22 of the Covenant into three Chapters of the new 
Charter of the United Nations. The transition from mandate to trusteeship status for Nauru 
was finalised in 1947 with the approval by the Trusteeship Council of the Trusteeship 
Agreement for Nauru.  
Yet as significant as the formation of the United Nations was, the transition in international 
status from mandate to trust prompted no major alterations in the administrative structure 
of Nauru. The Nauru Island Agreement that had established the tripartite monopoly over 
the Nauruan phosphate industry and insulated it from administrative oversight was indirectly 
incorporated into the Trusteeship Agreement approved by the Trusteeship Council. As will 
be seen in Chapter 5, however, the transition League to UN, and from mandate to trusteeship 
system, produced the conditions under which Nauruan independence moved from an 
effective impossibility to a political inevitability. The transformation of the vague mandatory 
principle into a codified set of trusteeship obligations - including the promotion of ‘self-
government or independence’ - and the expanded membership of the Trusteeship with 
significantly increased powers of review undermined the justifications for differentiated 
treatment of the C Mandates, and with it the international position of both Australia and 




Chapter 5   
From Trust Territory to Sovereign State, 1968 
1. Introduction 
This chapter traces the impacts on Nauruan administration of the shift to trusteeship and 
the development of the principle of self-government under the new United Nations.  The 
chapter argues that the shift in status from mandate to trust territory in 1947 provided a 
conceptual vocabulary through which the Nauruan people were able to negotiate terms of 
political independence with the Australian government, resulting in the shift from trust 
territory to sovereign state in 1968; but at the administrative level, the shift into independence 
as a constitutional Republic precipitated accretions in form that did not dismantle so much 
as further expand upon the existing structure of governmental relations first instantiated in 
the late nineteenth century.   
The juridification of the concept of international trusteeship after the second World War and 
the removal of differentiated international status for the C Mandates significantly altered the 
international context of Australia’s administration of Nauru. Firstly, Australia as 
Administering Authority was now charged with meeting the clearer and broader obligations 
of trusteeship stipulated in the UN Charter and the Nauru Trusteeship Agreement, in 
substitution for the ambiguous terms of Article 22 and the Mandate for Nauru.1 Secondly, 
in contrast to the mandate system the trusteeship system did not classify a hierarchy of status 
designations, instead applying the same Charter-based trusteeship principles to all trust 
territories. As such, the object of self-government – now defined as ‘self-government or 
independence’, rather than as the right to choose which imperial power to be governed by, 
as US President Woodrow Wilson had articulated almost twenty years previously in his 
Fourteen Points speech2 – was rendered common to all externally administered territories. 
The sudden removal of differentiated status for the C Mandates placed their administering 
powers out of step with the international trend toward political self-determination. Over the 
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trusteeship period, attempts to continue administering the former C Mandates of South West 
Africa, the Islands North of the Equator, Western Samoa, Nauru and New Guinea in the 
same way as during the mandate period attracted international opprobrium, particularly from 
the Soviet Union and the increasing body of newly decolonised states. South Africa’s refusal 
to bring its administration of South West Africa into the new UN trusteeship system 
prompted a protracted series of cases in the International Court of Justice that drew 
international attention to the maintenance of unwanted administrative control in the former 
C Mandates.3 The ICJ’s decisions in the South West Africa Cases became emblematic of the 
political divisions in the United Nations system between the old European imperial powers 
and the newly decolonised states, supported by the Soviet Union and China.  
Thirdly, the United Nations Charter included principles of external administration applicable 
not only to the former mandates, or to territory seized during the Second World War, but to 
all ‘non-self-governing territories’, including colonies, protectorates and other forms of 
imperial administration. The differentiation between mandatory and other forms of external 
administration lessened as the United Nations General Assembly assumed to itself the power 
to scrutinise the administration of all ‘non-self-governing territories’.4 In contrast to the 
interwar period, the former C Mandates were no longer quarantined from the broader push 
toward decolonisation. Fourthly, the new Trusteeship Council wielded more powers in the 
United Nations structure than its predecessor, the Permanent Mandates Council, had done 
in the League. In addition to the PMC’s truncated powers of receiving reports and issuing 
questionnaires to mandatories, and making recommendations to the Council of the League, 
the Charter of the United Nations gave the Trusteeship Council powers of territorial 
visitation, which greatly expanded its capacity to criticise administrative practice in the trust 
territories.5 Furthermore, the Trusteeship Council reported to the General Assembly, not to 
the Security Council. As the General Assembly came to be increasingly constituted of post-
imperial and post-colonial states, the administering powers’ justifications for continued 
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deviations from Charter principles of trusteeship initially met with less tolerant, and then 
openly critical, institutional responses.    
At the local level, the shift to trusteeship status and the development of the concept of 
international trusteeship placed pressure on Australia as Administering Authority to 
formalise Nauruan participation in the administrative structure. The renovation of the object 
of international territorial administration away from the amorphousness of native ‘well-being 
and development’ as defined in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, and toward ‘self-
government or independence’ as provided for in the UN Charter, prompted the 
formalisation of the Nauruan ‘Council of Chiefs’ as the Nauru Local Government Council 
(the ‘NLGC’). Although the NLGC lacked substantive administrative power and remained 
entirely subordinate to the Administrator, it came to function as a vehicle through which 
Nauruan requests for greater autonomy and ultimately full political independence were 
relayed to the UN. The series of negotiations between the Australian Department of 
Territories and the NLGC that came to be known as the ‘Nauru Talks’ commenced in the 
mid-1960s under active Trusteeship Council oversight. The original issue that prompted the 
Nauru Talks was the NLGC’s demand that the phosphate royalty rate be calculated according 
to the world phosphate price, rather than fixed at arbitrary ‘needs-based’ rates by the 
Administration as had been the practice since the commencement of phosphate mining 
under German rule, in nominal recognition of Nauruan land ownership.6 As the principle of 
trusteeship developed over the 1950s and the 1960s from a vague principle into a juridical 
doctrine that drew heavily on private law notions of the trust relationship, the NLGC’s 
demands for increased royalty payments developed into calls for property in Nauruan 
phosphate to be recognised as vesting in Nauruan landowners, and for the central plateau of 
the island to be rehabilitated at the tripartite governments’ expense. Australia refused the 
rehabilitation request, offering instead the wholesale resettlement of the Nauruan population 
on Curtis Island off the coast of Queensland, and political assimilation as Australian citizens. 
Although the NLGC’s refusal of the resettlement and assimilation proposal was supported 
by the UN, both the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly assumed with the 
Administering Authority that the resettlement of the Nauruan people on the exhaustion of 
phosphate was a foregone conclusion. Despite the assumption of impending inhabitability 
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of the island, in the international political climate of the mid-1960s the push toward 
recognition of Nauru as a sovereign state overwhelmed Australian objections. By the mid-
1960s, what remained to be decided was not whether Nauru would become a sovereign state, 
but the manner in and extent to which administrative control on the one hand, and control 
of the phosphate operation on the other, would be transferred into Nauruan hands. In the 
businesslike negotiations that followed, the Australian government yielded only slowly and 
begrudgingly on both fronts.   
The central contention of this chapter is that a historical focus on the shift from trusteeship 
to sovereign status in international law works to obscure the fact that the administrative form 
of the new Republic of Nauru was fundamentally continuous with the imperial 
administration that preceded it. Recognition of sovereign status at the international level 
prompted the rapid drafting of a Constitution providing for a ‘Westminster-style’ 
parliamentary system that did not disrupt the existing structure of Nauruan administration 
but provided for its bureaucratic expansion. In both its express provisions and its silences, 
the 1968 Constitution codified an administrative structure that risked autocratic 
concentration of executive and legislative power in the office of President, excluded the 
commercial phosphate operation from public administrative oversight, and failed to establish 
financial transparency both of that phosphate operation and of the disposal of phosphate 
royalty trust funds, despite its status as the primary revenue base of the state. The chapter 
concludes that while the achievement of the Nauruan people as represented via the Nauru 
Local Government Council under head Chief Hammer DeRoburt in gaining independence 
in 1968 should not be underestimated, the international status of sovereign statehood 
attached to an administrative form gradually expanded upon over eighty year period on the 
blueprint of a 1888 agreement between a Hanseatic trading company and the Bismarckian 
Reich.     
2. Administration of Nauru as a Trust Territory  
The re-establishment of Australian administration on Nauru after the war was focused 
almost exclusively on the restoration of the BPC phosphate operation.7 However, the 
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Nauruan Council of Chiefs – including many of the ‘Geelong boys’, led by Head Chief 
Timothy Detudamo - objected to the Administration’s prioritisation of repair of the 
phosphate plant over repair of Nauruan homes and villages.8 This post-war tension between 
Australian and Nauruan perspectives on the best interests of the Nauruan people came to 
mark the next twenty years of administration. From the late 1940s, the concept of 
international administration came to be more consistently interpreted as a juridically 
definable trust relationship. This eliminated the ambivalence that had characterised the C 
Mandate in theory and in practice, and threw into question the British empire’s default 
position of defining its relationship with ‘non-self-governing territories’ as political, rather 
than legal. Yet despite the expansions in bureaucratic practice implemented by the 
Administering Authority ostensibly in satisfaction of these more defined obligations of 
trusteeship, the basic form of the administration of Nauru remained intact. The tripartite 
Nauru Island Agreement remained on foot, with Nauru the only UN Trust Territory 
nominally administered by a board of three governments. As Administering Authority, 
Australia continued to wield executive, legislative and judicial power. The administration of 
Nauru continued to be funded exclusively from the profits of the BPC, with little obligation 
of financial transparency as between the BPC and the Administration. The Trusteeship 
Council thus had limited access to BPC financial records. Property in phosphate continued 
to purportedly vest in the BPC, and phosphate exports continued at ever increasing rates, 
primarily to Australia and New Zealand. However, two significant differences marked the 
trusteeship period from the mandate period that preceded it. The first, as explained above, 
was the strengthened powers of Trusteeship Council oversight of Nauruan administration. 
The second was that from the early 1950s, the administration of Nauru proceeded on the 
assumption that the island would be uninhabitable on the exhaustion of phosphate supplies.  
In 1948, Australia submitted its first Annual Report on the Administration of the Trust 
Territory of Nauru to the United Nations.9 All pre-war laws and ordinances had been re-
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restablished, and ‘(f)ull powers of legislation, administration and jurisdiction’ were restated 
as vesting in the Administrator.10 The Trusteeship Reports were organised as a response to 
the provisions of Article 76 of the Charter, and became far longer and more comprehensive 
than had been the case under the mandate system. Each Report contained sections on 
political, social, educational and economic advancement, on international peace and security, 
and fundamental rights and freedoms. The paternal tone of the first Trusteeship Report is 
evident in its Introduction which, in an echo of the logic of the C Mandate, articulates for 
the first time the Administration’s position of endorsing the general principles of UN 
trusteeship and local self-government as the aspirational objectives of administration, whilst 
insisting on their untimeliness in the Nauruan case:  
(t)he principles outlined in the Charter are strongly rooted in the Territory, although in a physical 
sense some are in embryo form only. The chief tasks of the Administration are to adapt the 
indigenous inhabitants in a changing environment, to educate them to accept responsibility and 
to show them predominance of reason over instinctive modes of thought. The Administration 
by sowing these seeds is developing the political, economic, social and educational advancement 
of the Nauruan people and paving the way for their self-determination’.11  
As such, the Administering Authority reported that the trusteeship objective of ‘self-
government or independence’ stated in Article 76(b) of the Charter would be interpreted in 
the Nauruan case as ‘ultimately to train these people for administrative positions in their own 
Territory’.12 A new organisation chart of the ‘Administrative Structure of Government’ made 
the point visually. Under the office of Administrator in a band marked ‘Europeans’ was a 
tier of managerial offices – including ‘Director of Public Health’, ‘Native Affairs Officer’, 
‘Supervisor of Works’ and ‘Director of Police’. Under each managerial office was a list of 
administrative offices – including ‘Store Keeper’, ‘Clerk Typist’, ‘House Orderly’, ‘Senior 
Postal Clerk’ and ‘Labourer’ - grouped together in a band marked ‘Nauruans’.13 The Council 
of Chiefs appeared outside the hierarchy in the bottom right of the chart, reporting directly 
to the Administrator.14  
The Trusteeship Reports appended a growing list of statistics on health, justice, and 
expenditure.  The 1948 Report updated phosphate statistics which had last been made public 
                                                          
10 Ibid 12. 
11 Ibid 1. 
12 Ibid 59. 
13 Ibid appendix II. 
14 Ibid appendix II. 
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in 1940, and in its language made clear the anticipation of eventual exhaustion.15 Of the 
island’s total area of 5,263 acres, 4,116 acres or 78% were estimated to be phosphate-bearing; 
prior to the war, 459 acres had already been mined out, producing 11,000,000 tons of 
phosphate; as such, the Report concluded, on the basis of a rate of extraction of 1,000,000 
tons per year, Nauru’s phosphate industry would ‘continue for at least another 70 years’.16 In 
the section on ‘Economic Advancement’, the Report noted that the total royalty payable on 
each ton of phosphate had been increased on the restoration of the operation from three 
pence to thirteen pence, inclusive of the portion paid directly to the landowner, the portion 
paid into the Nauru Phosphate Royalty Trust, and a new portion paid into a new Long Term 
Investment Fund.17 The purpose of the Long Term Investment Fund, the Report stated, was 
to provide for the inevitable resettlement of the Nauruan people on the exhaustion of the 
island’s phosphate.18 In a section entitled ‘Conservation of Natural Resources’, the Report 
stated that the mined out areas were converted into ‘waste land’, but that conservation was 
not necessary as the central plateau of the island was ‘not, and has never been, arable land’; 
and that in any event, it was ‘not practicable to level the worked-out fields as part of a land 
reclamation project’.19 In 1951, the Administration reported that possibilities for eventual 
resettlement were being explored: ‘when the deposits are exhausted Nauru may not provide 
sufficient space or opportunity for the Nauruan population to continue there, and it may be 
necessary to transfer them elsewhere’.20      
By the early 1950s, the Trusteeship Council’s responses to the Nauru Trusteeship Reports 
had started to focus on two Article 76(b) obligations: firstly, the obligation to promote 
political advancement via progressive development toward ‘self-government or 
independence as may be appropriate’; and secondly, the obligation to promote economic 
advancement. This focus reflected a growing attentiveness in the General Assembly to 
conditions in the former C Mandates. In 1949, the General Assembly had passed resolutions 
calling for Administering Authorities of all Trust Territories to adopt measures to ‘hasten the 
                                                          
15 Ibid 9. 
16 Ibid 9. 
17 Ibid 24. 
18 Ibid 24; Barrie Macdonald, In Pursuit of the Sacred Trust: Trusteeship and Independence in Nauru (New Zealand 
Institute of International Affairs, 1988), 38. 
19 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 
Administration of the Territory of Nauru from 1st July 1947 to 30th June 1948, above n 9, 29. 
20 Ibid 38.  
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advancement…toward self-government or independence’ in accordance with Article 76(b).21  
Addressing the former C Mandates specifically – all established by trading companies and 
formerly exempt from obligations of economic equality - the General Assembly expressed 
‘concern that the lack of budgetary autonomy’ of Administering Authorities ‘did not allow 
the Trusteeship Council to make a thorough examination’ of the financial status of the 
Territories, and called for the promotion of ‘greater participation of indigenous inhabitants 
in the profits and management of entities, public and private, engaged in the exploitation of 
mineral and other natural resources…basic to the economy of Trust Territories’.22 In same 
resolution, however, the General Assembly held Nauru up as a model of economic 
advancement: it ‘noted with satisfaction’ the ‘excellent financial situation’ in Nauru, and 
called for ‘formulation of plans laying down a sound economic foundation’ for the 
Territory.23       
In 1951, the Commonwealth government under Liberal Prime Minister Robert Menzies 
created the Department of Territories, with oversight of the UN Trust Territories of Nauru 
and Papua and New Guinea, as well as Norfolk Island, the Cocos Islands, and the Northern 
Territory.24 Menzies appointed the West Australian historian Paul Hasluck as the Minister 
for Territories.25 In response to the push toward political advancement of trust territories in 
the General Assembly, the Administration moved to further bureaucratise the role played by 
the Nauruan Council of Chiefs. The Council of Chiefs was renamed the ‘Nauru Local 
Government Council’ by ordinance, and reconstituted as a publically elected municipal 
council with legal personality and a secretariat.26 The NLGC Ordinance of 1951 stipulated rules 
of procedure for the Council, delegated a limited set of administrative powers - including 
                                                          
21 Political Advancement of Trust Territories, GA Res 320, UN GAOR, 240th plen mtg (15 November 1949); and 
Economic Advancement in Trust Territories, GA Res 322, UN GAOR, 40th plen mtg (15 November 1949) (‘Economic 
Advancement in Trust Territories, Resolution 322’).  
22 Ibid.  
23 Economic Advancement in Trust Territories, Resolution 322. 
24 Commonwealth of Australia, The Progress of the Australian Territories 1950–1956 (Canberra: A J Arthur, 
Commonwealth Government Printer, 1957). The Cocos Islands were transferred from British control as part 
of the Colony of Singapore to Australian control in 1955. Ibid 8. 
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26 Nauru Local Government Council Ordinance No. 2 of 1951, cited in Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Administration of the Territory of Nauru from 1st July 1951 to 
30th June 1952 (L F Johnson, Government Printer, 1952), 12. 
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powers of the appointment of Nauruan district constables and managerial control of the 
Nauru Co-operative Store - and provided for funding of the NLCG from the Nauru 
Phosphate Royalty Trust.27 However, the NLGC’s role with respect to legislative, executive 
and judicial decisions of the Administrator remained advisory only, and subject to 
disallowance.28 Throughout the 1950s, the Trusteeship Council repeatedly queried the 
Administration’s annual refrain that the limited powers of the NLGC represented progress 
toward political advancement; and in response, Australia maintained that the NLGC 
Ordinance provided for substantive administrative powers, but the members of the NLGC 
lacked the capacity to understand or fully exercise them.29  
In response to Trusteeship Council questions on economic advancement, the Administration 
developed a practice of reporting incremental increases in the royalty payable by the BPC to 
Nauruan landowners and into the two Trust Funds, whilst insisting that as a market price for 
Nauruan phosphate was not calculable due to the tripartite monopoly, the royalties were 
calculated according to the ‘needs’ of the Nauruan people, as opposed to the profits of the 
BPC.30 Despite its questioning on Article 76 obligations regarding political and economic 
advancement, the Trusteeship Council did not in the 1950s dispute Australia’s assertion that 
independence was inappropriate for the Nauruan people; in fact, it openly endorsed this 
interpretation, as well as the inevitability of resettlement.31 The 1953 Trusteeship Council 
Visiting Mission to the Territory of Nauru reported that there was ‘no alternative to 
resettlement of the population elsewhere’; and that it was ‘imperative to observe that the 
Nauruan people cannot be regarded as more than a small community, and in no case as a 
potential state’.32  
As the international political momentum toward decolonisation gathered pace over the 1950s 
and found expression via the increased powers of the Trusteeship Council, the Australian 
strategy of reading down its trusteeship obligations on political and economic advancement 
                                                          
27 Nauru Local Government Council Ordinance No. 2 of 1951; also Nancy Viviani, Nauru: Phosphate and Political Progress 
(Australian National University Press, 1970), 104–106. 
28 Nauru Local Government Council Ordinance No. 2 of 1951; also Viviani, above n 27, 104–106. 
29 Viviani, above n 27, 106. 
30 Report of the Trusteeship Council 1952–53, UN GAOR, 8th sess, supp no 4, 112–113; also Viviani, above n 27, 
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31 United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in the Pacific 1953: Report on Nauru, UN Trusteeship Council 
Official Records, 12th sess, UN Doc T/1054 (26 May 1953) 2 (‘Trusteeship Council Report 1953 on Nauru’); also 
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in Nauru via the caveat of local circumstance gradually lost legitimacy. In 1956, Hammer 
DeRoburt of Boe was elected Head Chief of the NLGC. DeRoburt had attended the Gordon 
Institute of Technology in Geelong in the 1930s, and had been interned on Truk Atoll by 
the Japanese during the war.33 On his return, he had worked in the Nauruan administration 
under the Director of Education, was appointed to the NLGC in 1951, and in 1953 led a 
four-month strike of the Nauru Workers Organisation that had succeeded in securing 
increased wages and training for Nauruans working in the Administration.34 In his role as 
Head Chief, DeRoburt made good use of the power of the Trusteeship Council to accept 
petitions directly under Article 87(b) of the Charter, formally raising issues with each Visiting 
Mission. These ranged from the calculation of phosphate royalties, to the absence of 
secondary education on Nauru, and the lack of Administration investment in subsidiary 
industries.35 In 1957, DeRoburt sent a letter directly to the BPC in his capacity as Head Chief 
of the NLGC, openly disputing the assertion that the interests of the Nauruan people were 
not affected by the strip-mining of the island’s central plateau:   
‘(t)here is a prevailing belief which is born of distorted facts remaining unchallenged for many 
years concerning the hinterland area that the Nauruans never used this land…It was from this 
area that half his normal foods were grown: pandanus and almond trees; roots and greens he 
obtained mostly from this area…He turned to this area for preserved foods for drought. 
Materials for a house were from the hinterland (Tomano and pandanus)…In short, it was this 
area which afforded him and his children their means of livelihood. You removed his and his 
posterity their means of living, when you deprived him of this area’.36  
With this letter, DeRoburt directly challenged the premise on which the partner governments 
had relied to justify the exploitation of Nauruan phosphate under mandatory and then 
trusteeship rule.   
                                                          
33 For colloquial accounts of Hammer DeRoburt’s place in Nauruan politics, see Don Chambers, ‘Boss’ Hurst 
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34 Macdonald, above n 18, 38.  
35 Petition 324 (‘Petitions from the Nauruan Council of Chiefs concerning Nauru’), Trusteeship Council Report 1951 on Nauru, 
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3. Trusteeship, decolonisation and the South West Africa cases  
The increasing ability of the NLGC under DeRoburt to formally articulate its protest against 
exploitation of Nauru in the language of international principle took place in the broader 
context of the post-war movement toward decolonisation. As had been the case in the Dutch 
East Indies, the European empires had struggled to re-establish administrative control after 
the war in many erstwhile colonial territories, where the administration had either been 
ousted by hostile occupation, or heavily stripped back during the war. Local independence 
movements in Indonesia, French Indochina, Iran and Egypt moved to take advantage both 
of the political fact of weakened rule and the juridification of principles of self-government 
in the Charter to declare independence and resist the re-establishment of European 
administrative control.37 At the same time, the removal of differentiated status for the C 
Mandates placed the administrative structure that had developed in Nauru, New Guinea, 
South West Africa and the former Japanese mandated islands under the increasing scrutiny 
of the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly to which it reported. The scrutiny of 
the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council reflected legal and political shifts that 
occurred in the reconstitution of the international legal order after the war. Charter principles 
of trusteeship and ‘self-government or independence’ were increasingly juridified on the basis 
of the more detailed text given in Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter and the growing 
body of jurisprudence that developed in interpretation of that text. At the same time, the 
‘political fact’ of imperial administrative rule lost legitimacy as the international political 
dominance of the European imperial powers was eroded, principally by the United States 
but also by the USSR and China.38 As the institutional formalisation of the balance of power 
shifted in the transition from the Europe-dominated Council of the League to the Security 
Council, the reconstitution of the General Assembly with increased scope of activity and 
power institutionalised the participation of former colonies and protectorates in decision-
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making processes that had only decades previously been reserved to the rooms of 
Versailles.39   
The tension between the juridification of international principles of trusteeship and self-
government and the political fact of continued imperial administrative rule came to a head 
in the protracted dispute between South Africa and the United Nations over the post-war 
status of South West Africa. In response to the formalisation of obligations of trusteeship as 
positive international law, South Africa began to articulate its refusal to recognise the shift in 
status of the C Mandates to trust territories, and its attempt to perfect the annexation that 
Smuts had made effective in 1919, in terms of international legal procedure.40 South Africa 
submitted a final report on South West Africa to the United Nations in 1947, purporting to 
meet the obligations listed under Article 73 of the Charter, which applied to non-self-
governing territories, not trust territories, which all of the former mandates were expected 
to become.41 Echoing submissions made in 1945 by the South African delegation to the 
General Assembly, the report insisted that the Mandate for South West Africa, as a treaty 
between South Africa and the Allied Powers made in December 1920, continued on foot 
and could not be revoked without South African consent. 42 At the same time, South Africa 
insisted that as it had not voluntarily submitted to the trusteeship system, the United Nations 
wielded no powers of oversight over its administration of South West Africa.43 Despite South 
Africa’s refusal to acknowledge trusteeship obligations, in 1948 the General Assembly 
resolved to submit South Africa’s report to the Trusteeship Council for review.44 The 
Trusteeship Council’s report on South West Africa was strongly critical of South Africa’s 
administration, even after moderation at the insistence of the Australian representative.45 It 
criticised the absence of a franchise or any administrative representation of the indigenous 
population; minimal expenditure on indigenous education; state-supported monopolisation 
of arable land by the European population of the territory; and the physical segregation of 
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indigenous Africans in ‘native reserves’.46 In a barely veiled criticism of South African 
domestic policy, the Trusteeship Council insisting that racial segregation was ‘to be deplored 
in principle’.47   
From the late 1940s, international response to the continued administrative occupation of 
South West Africa was thus strongly related to the statutory institutionalisation of apartheid 
in South Africa by the right wing National Party coalition following its election in 1948.48 
Unable to achieve legal annexation of South West Africa at the international level, the 
National Party executive legislated domestically for representation of the white population 
of South West Africa in the South African Parliament, and the extension of apartheid 
legislation to the territory. 49 In July 1949, the government sent a letter to the United Nations 
advising that no further reports on South West Africa would be submitted, as the Trusteeship 
Council’s critical response to its 1947 report had had ‘deleterious effects of the maintenance 
of the harmonious relations which had hitherto existed and were so essential to successful 
administration’ in the territory.50 Five months later, the General Assembly resolved to submit 
the question of the international status of South West Africa to the International Court of 
Justice with a request for an advisory opinion.51    
The 1950 Advisory Opinion on the Status of South-West Africa was the first of a series of ICJ 
treatments of the dispute that spanned over the 1950s and 1960s into the 1970s. The South 
West Africa Cases revealed tensions between the political and legal facilities of the UN 
system, and between the old imperial powers and the new post-imperial states. In the 1950 
Advisory Opinion, the ICJ held eight to six that the Charter created no positive legal obligation 
for Mandatory Powers to submit a draft Trusteeship Agreement as required to bring 
mandates within the trusteeship system.52 However, the ICJ opined, the international 
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obligations assumed by South Africa with respect to South West Africa were ‘of two kinds’; 
the first arose from the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ ‘referred to’ – as opposed to created - in 
Article 22 of the Covenant and the text of the Mandate, and the second concerned the 
‘machinery for implementation’ by which ‘performance of the trust’ was secured’.53 The 
Opinion held twelve to two that uncertainty with respect to the correct procedure for 
succession of international oversight did not affect the first order of mandatory obligation 
South Africa had assumed in 1920 – a position South Africa had itself adopted in its 1947 
report to the UN.54 As such, in the ICJ’s opinion South Africa lacked the power to unilaterally 
alter the international status of South West Africa without the consent of the UN, and the 
UN was competent to exercise oversight of mandatory obligations by receiving reports as 
contemplated in the Covenant of the League.55   
Unsurprisingly, South Africa rejected the 1950 Advisory Opinion on the post-war continuance 
of mandatory obligations and lack of competence to unilaterally alter the status of South 
West Africa. Debates over whether and how the UN should take further action in the matter 
occupied the General Assembly for the following decade. Over the course of the 1950s, the 
UN divided into two loose blocs on the issue. One comprised the USSR, the new African 
and Asian states, India, Brazil, Syria and Uruguay, and called for UN intervention in support 
of South West African independence against South African occupation.56 The second 
comprised the former imperial powers including Britain, France, the United States, the 
Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand, and called for a UN-negotiated transition from 
mandate to trusteeship.57 Attempts to negotiate UN supervision of the territory via an ad hoc 
Committee on South West Africa failed, and after a further two ICJ Advisory Opinions in 1955 
and 1956 on procedural questions, in November 1959 the General Assembly adopted a 
Resolution that ‘drew attention’ to the capacity of Member States to bring direct legal action 
against South Africa in the ICJ under the terms of the 1920 Mandate.58  
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In November 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia filed Applications in the ICJ instituting proceedings 
against South Africa – six months after the Ovamboland People’s Congress was 
reconstituted as the South West Africa People’s Congress or SWAPO, and one month before 
the United Nations General Assembly passed the ‘Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’.59 The Applications alleged that South 
Africa had violated the obligation under Article 22 and the Mandate to ‘promote the well-
being and development’ of the indigenous population, firstly through the refusal to subject 
the administration to UN oversight, and secondly, through the formal institutionalisation of 
apartheid in the territory. The Applications submitted that Ethiopia and Liberia, as Members 
of the UN (and Ethiopia, of the League before it), had a legal interest in South Africa’s 
‘proper exercise’ of the Mandate.60 In May 1961, South Africa voted by referendum to leave 
the British Commonwealth and become a Republic, the first of the Dominions to formally 
sever ties with the British empire.61 In December 1961, the new Republic of South Africa 
submitted its Preliminary Objections to the ICJ.62 South Africa argued that the Mandate was 
no longer in force due to the dissolution of the League; that if it was, it could not be enforced 
by Ethiopia or Liberia, as neither continued to be a ‘Member of the League’ and were 
therefore incapable of enforcing the Mandate terms; and that both states otherwise lacked 
standing to bring the action, as neither had established a sufficient material interest in the 
dispute.63 The ICJ decided eight to seven against South Africa in its 1962 Judgment on the 
Preliminary Objections.64 Consisting of Judges Alfaro (Panama), Badawi (United Arab 
Republic), Moreno Quintana (Argentina), Wellington Koo (China), Koretsky (Soviet Union), 
Bustamante (Peru), Jessup (United States) and the Applicants’ Judge ad hoc Mbanefo 
(Nigeria), the majority held that despite the dissolution of the League, the dispute resolution 
provision of the Mandate was still in force, and the ICJ Statute confirmed the Court’s 
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jurisdiction to hear the matter.65 In the minority, Judges Percy Spender of Australia and 
Gerald Fitzmaurice of the United Kingdom delivered a joint dissenting opinion holding that 
the Mandate had expired on the dissolution of the League; and that even if mandatory 
obligation remained on foot, Liberia and Ethiopia were not ‘members of the League’ given 
its dissolution and thus did not have standing to enforce the terms of the Mandate.66        
The 1960 Applications proceeded to hearing. After five years of more than a hundred 
hearings amounting to over six thousand pages of testimony, the ICJ delivered a judgment 
in 1966.  Whereas in 1962, the Court had held that it had jurisdiction to hear the merits, the 
1966 majority declined to do so, holding that Ethiopia and Liberia had not established 
standing to bring the case.67 The Court divided evenly on the issue; however Australian Judge 
Spender, now President, used his casting vote to reject the Applicants’ case for the same 
reasons given in his joint dissent with Fitzmaurice in 1962.68 In its reasons, the majority 
applied a strict interpretive approach to the ‘judicial function’ of the ICJ, holding that – 
contrary to the 1962 Judgment - the principle of the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ could not in 
and of itself generate binding rights and obligations, particularly given that its scope was 
‘highly controversial’.69 Rights and obligations could only be created positively through the 
text of legal instruments, and on a strict reading of the terms of the Covenant and the 
Mandate, neither Ethiopia nor Liberia evinced sufficient interest to establish standing.70 
President Spender attached a Declaration to the Judgment, stating that the minority judges 
in their dissents should not opine on matters not dealt with in the majority judgment – 
namely, whether the Mandate for South West Africa continued to exist, and if so, whether 
South Africa had breached its mandatory obligations.71      
Notwithstanding Spender’s reproving Declaration, strident dissenting opinions were given 
by Judges Wellington Koo of China, Jessup of the United States, Padilla Nervo of Mexico, 
Forster of Senegal, Tanaka of Japan, Koretsky of the USSR, and Mbafeno of Nigeria.72 The 
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common arguments in the dissents ranged from the technical to the interpretive to the 
political. For Koretsky, the majority judgment had breached the principle of res judicata in 
reaching a contradictory conclusion on the same question of jurisdiction and standing that 
had come before it in 1962.73 For Wellington Koo, the intention of the mandate system - 
namely to uphold the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ - was directly relevant to the interpretation 
of the text of the Mandate.74 For Jessup, the fact that the Court had proceeded to lengthy 
hearings on the merits only to uphold South Africa’s Preliminary Objections on the 
Applicants’ standing undermined the political legitimacy of the Court, and suggested the 
‘utter futility’ of the ICJ itself.75 Writing on the ‘jurisprudential implications’ of the 1966 
decision, German-American international lawyer Wolfgang Friedmann echoed Judge 
Tanaka’s assessment of the split between the majority and the minority as reflecting a split 
between ‘strict juristic formalism’ and a ‘sociological’ approach to judicial function.76 
Friedmann then moved to consider the political impact of the case on the international 
reputation of the Court:  
‘the fact is that the International Court of Justice is on record as having rejected the claim of 
Ethiopia and Liberia. This is what will be remembered by the great majority of nations and 
especially the African states…the division of representatives (on the Court) between the older 
and newer countries, or, in a different perspective, between the ‘developed’ and the ‘less-
developed’ countries that inevitably will be analysed and remembered’.77  
From August 1966, SWAPO and the South African Defence Force were in open armed 
conflict in South West Africa.78 In October 1966, the United Nations General Assembly 
resolved to determine politically what the ICJ had declined to determine legally. Opening 
with an affirmation of the ‘inalienable right of the people of South West Africa to freedom 
and independence’ as stated in the 1960 Declaration, the General Assembly resolved to 
declare the Mandate for South West Africa terminated and to revert the power of 
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administration of the territory to the United Nations in order to prepare the territory for 
independence.79 The Security Council, however, took three more years to reach consensus: 
in March 1969, with Britain and France abstaining, Security Council Resolution 264 
recognised the General Assembly’s 1966 termination of the Mandate, declared the continued 
presence of South Africa in Namibia to be an illegal occupation, and called upon South Africa 
to withdraw from the territory.80 It took twenty-one more years of armed conflict between 
SWAPO and SADF for the status of the former South West Africa to be settled as a matter 
of international law. In March 1990, the Republic of Namibia officially gained independence 
as a sovereign state - 106 years after Chancellor Bismarck’s declaration of the first German 
protectorate in Angra Pequeña in response to the demands of Bremen tobacco merchant 
F.A.E. Lüderitz.81  
4. The Nauru Talks: resettlement, political independence, and control of phosphate  
In drawing international attention to the status of the former C Mandates, the South West 
Africa Cases sharpened the political isolation of Australia in its attempt to maintain 
paternalistic administrative control over Nauru. The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples undermined the legitimacy of the 
Administering Authority’s interpretation of its trusteeship obligations of promoting political 
and economic advancement in Nauru as requiring no more than Nauruan participation in 
the lower levels of administration and the maintenance of the two phosphate royalty funds. 
The Declaration stated plainly that ‘(i)nadequacy of political, economic, social or educational 
preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence’ - a direct repudiation 
of the logic of Article 22 that had grounded the mandate system, and of the Administering 
Authority’s argument that ‘local circumstance’ rendered independence inappropriate in the 
Nauruan case.82 Furthermore, the Declaration insisted that ‘peoples may, for their own ends, 
freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations 
arising out of international economic co-operation’, a principle difficult to reconcile with the 
Administering Authority’s practice of calculating phosphate royalties on a needs- as opposed 
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to market-based rate.83 The Declaration also effectively contradicted the Trusteeship 
Council’s 1953 position that independence would not be appropriate for the Nauruan people 
due to the community’s size, asserting a ‘belief’ that the ‘process of liberation’ was ‘irresistible 
and irreversible’, and calling for ‘immediate steps’ to be taken to ‘transfer all powers to the 
peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their 
freely expressed will and desire’.84 Between 1960 and 1968, the Trusteeship Council and the 
General Assembly made periodic resolutions in support of Nauruan independence, 
becoming more and more specific as to terms.85    
In stark contrast to the protracted armed conflict that characterised South West Africa’s 
recognition as the independent state of Namibia, the shift in the international status of Nauru 
toward sovereign statehood occurred via a series of business-like negotiations between the 
Australian Department of Territories and the NLGC, under the oversight of the Trusteeship 
Council. The negotiations focused on two main issues: the terms of transfer of administrative 
power on the one hand, and of ownership and control of phosphate on the other. Yet the 
negotiated transition to independence occurred in almost paradoxical context: both the 
Australian Department of Territories and the Trusteeship Council continued to presume 
that, whether or not Nauru became a sovereign state in the meantime, the need for 
resettlement of the Nauruan population on the exhaustion of the island’s phosphate was a 
foregone conclusion.86 The shared assumption of resettlement was tolerated by the NLGC 
into the mid-1960s. Pre-empting Nauruan calls for total political independence, in October 
1960 the Minister for Territories proposed to the NLGC that the Nauruan population be 
resettled via fully funded immigration to any of the three partner states, leaving the island of 
Nauru under BPC control.87 The NLGC refused this proposal.88 In 1962, Hammer 
DeRoburt attended the Trusteeship Council meeting that followed the 1962 Visiting Mission 
to Nauru, and made good use of the 1960 Declaration in his representations. DeRoburt 
submitted that although the need for resettlement was accepted, the people of Nauru ‘wished 
to retain their identity as a race and community, and to control their own affairs, which means 
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sovereign independence’.89 In consideration of the issue – during which the Soviet 
representative, Mr Brykin, accused Australia of displaying ‘contempt for the UN in general 
and the Trusteeship Council in particular’90 - the Trusteeship Council proposed a 
compromise: resettlement of the Nauruan population as a distinct community within 
Australia, with some level of local administrative control over their own affairs.91  
In line with the Trusteeship Council’s proposal, in 1962 the Department of Territories 
proposed a plan for resettlement of the Nauruan population on one of a number of 
Queensland islands that were already administered under federal control as national parks. 
Those earmarked for resettlement included Fraser Island, Prince of Wales Island, Curtis 
Island, and Great Palm Island.92  An NLGC Resettlement Sub-Committee was formed to 
tour the proposed islands, and an Australian Director of Nauruan Resettlement was 
appointed by the Department to negotiate terms.93 Initial Nauruan interest in Fraser Island, 
preferred by the NLGC Sub-Committee for its distance of 6km from the coast of Australia 
which would allow for relative seclusion, was rejected by Minister for Territories Paul 
Hasluck for the same reason.94 In February 1963, the NLGC Sub-Committee relayed an 
interest in Curtis Island to the Director of Resettlement; and in August, terms of a potential 
resettlement to Curtis Island were negotiated on Nauru.95 The Director proposed a plan of 
resettlement as political assimilation into Queensland, including full Australian citizenship, 
with Nauruan control of a local government council for Curtis Island.96 In the Director’s 
view, this proposal amounted to the ‘self-government’ required under the Trusteeship 
Agreement. 97 The NLGC countered with a proposal for full Nauruan sovereignty over Curtis 
Island; and in the alternative, full sovereignty over Nauru.98 On the Minister’s rejection of 
the proposal for Nauruan sovereignty over Curtis, the NLGC resolved to reject resettlement 
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altogether, and push for sovereign independence on Nauru - including rehabilitation of the 
island’s central plateau at the expense of the tripartite governments.99   
Over the course of 1965, the prospect of sovereign independence for the Nauruan people 
on the island of Nauru moved quickly from possibility to probability. Three years earlier in 
January 1962, the former C Mandate of Western Samoa had been recognised as independent 
by New Zealand, after which New Zealand had accepted the inevitability of Nauruan 
independence and distanced itself from Australia’s intransigence on the question in the 
Trusteeship Council.100 Following the April 1965 Trusteeship Council Visiting Mission to 
Nauru, the General Assembly took note of the failed resettlement talks, and resolved to 
support the Nauruan request for independence and for rehabilitation of the central plateau 
by the Administering Authority.101 The independence negotiations now known as the ‘Nauru 
Talks’ that took place between 1965 and 1967 focused on four points of contention between 
the NLGC and the Department of Territories: ownership of phosphate and control over the 
phosphate industry; responsibility for rehabilitation of mined out land; the legal relationship 
with Australia that was to replace that of UN trusteeship; and a timeline for transition of 
domestic administrative control.    
Negotiations over phosphate ownership and control proved more contentious during the 
Nauru Talks than did the devolution of political independence. With the separation of public 
administration and phosphate administration formalised in 1919 in the Nauru Island 
Agreement still technically on foot, the Australian government’s strategy throughout the 
Nauru Talks was to negotiate on devolution of public administrative power from the 
Administering Authority to the NLGC, whilst insisting on continued BPC control of the 
mining operation. To that end, the Department of Territories adopted a corporate bargaining 
strategy of offering increases to the phosphate royalty and increased Nauruan participation 
in BPC operations, whilst flatly rejecting Nauruan requests for transfer of phosphate 
ownership and managerial control of the BPC.102 At the same time, the BPC responded to 
NLGC requests to slow the rate of phosphate extraction whilst negotiations took place with 
plans to significantly increase extraction, arguing that an increased extraction rate under BPC 
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control was to Nauruan benefit, given the increase in royalties proffered by the 
Department.103 Yet by 1966, the Department had moved only as far as offering a phosphate 
royalty based on a world phosphate price in substitution of the fixed rate set by ordinance, 
and a ‘partnership’ arrangement of joint ownership of Nauruan phosphate, under the control 
of the BPC for at least five years after independence.104 DeRoburt rejected the partnership 
deal, insisting on sole Nauruan ownership of the phosphate, and offered a counterproposal 
of a gradual buy-out of the BPC operation and assets over a ten year period by the 
prospective Nauruan state.105      
On the question of rehabilitation, the Department responded to NLGC demands by 
appointing a Nauru Lands Rehabilitation Committee in 1965, charged with ‘examining the 
practicability, costs and usefulness of rehabilitating the mined out areas of the phosphate 
island of Nauru’.106 In 1966, the Rehabilitation Committee issued its report, concluding that 
while ‘technically feasible’, rehabilitation was ‘impracticable’ due to prohibitive cost.107 The 
Committee further commented on the absence of legal responsibility for rehabilitation, 
reporting that ‘it would seem inconsistent with the general trend in regulatory policies for 
extractive industries to require such treatment to be a responsibility of the phosphate-
extractive industry’.108 The NLGC rejected the findings of the Rehabilitation Committee, 
arguing that it had gone beyond its terms of reference in commenting on legal responsibility, 
and reiterated the Nauruan position maintained throughout negotiations that responsibility 
for rehabilitation of lands mined from 1920 lay with the governments party to the Nauru 
Island Agreement.109 From 1966, with mounting pressure on all three governments in the 
United Nations, New Zealand made clear it preferred full political independence for Nauru 
and cessation of all trusteeship responsibilities.110 In the Trusteeship Council, the United 
Kingdom indicated it was open to independence for Nauru, but privately expressed concern 
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over the repercussions of Nauruan independence for the nearby Gilbert and Ellice Islands, 
Fiji, and the Solomon Islands, over which it maintained territorial administrative control.111  
On the matter of the nature of Nauru’s future legal relationship with Australia, the 
Department of Territories moved over the course of the Nauru Talks from a refusal to 
entertain any definite prospect of sovereign independence, to a proposed arrangement 
whereby administrative control for local affairs would be devolved to the NLGC, but 
Australia would retain control over Nauru’s external affairs – a strong echo of the classic 
protectorate form.112 The NLGC’s response was that any such arrangement could only be 
negotiated after full political independence, on the basis of sovereign equality.113 With respect 
to a timeline for transition of administrative power, from 1965 the NLGC insisted upon 31 
January 1968 as the date for official independence, to coincide with the anniversary of the 
1945 return to Nauru of Nauruans interned on Truk by the Japanese. The Department 
responded that a date for independence should not be fixed; rather, the NLGC should be 
gradually prepared for ‘political responsibility’.114 To that end, the Department agreed to the 
formation of a new Legislative Council and Executive Council to be added to the existing 
administrative structure.115 The Legislative Council would consist of the nine members of 
the NLGC, plus the five Australian heads of department on Nauru, to be chaired by the 
Administrator; yet in accordance with the Nauru Island Agreement, matters concerning the 
phosphate industry would be excluded from its remit.116 An Executive Council consisting of 
two Nauruan and two ‘official’ members would be drawn from the Legislative Council, and 
would also be chaired by the Administrator.117 The NLGC agreed to the creation of the new 
Legislative and Executive Councils, yet continued to insisting that full control be devolved 
to the expanded administration by 31 January 1968. 
In December 1965, the Nauru Act was passed in the Australian federal Parliament, providing 
for the establishment of the Nauru Legislative and Executive Councils.118 The Legislative 
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Council was vested with the power to make ordinances, subject to disallowance by the 
Administrator and the Australian Governor-General, and excluding matters of phosphate 
royalties, ownership and control of phosphate-bearing land, external affairs, and defence.119 
The Executive Council was delegated the function of ‘advis(ing) the Administrator’ on any 
matters referred to it by the Administrator.120 The Nauru Act codified in Australian legislation 
the existing Nauruan judicial structure which had developed via executive ordinance, 
including the District Court, Central Court (formerly the Supreme Court), and Court of 
Appeal, from which a right of appeal to the Australian High Court would lie.121 The 
Legislative and Executive Councils were inaugurated on 31 January 1966. However, the 
Department of Territories continued to maintain that a date for independence should not be 
established until the new Legislative Council had gained ‘practical experience’ of 
administration and its ‘political progress’ could be appreciably observed.122 With respect to 
phosphate, the Department of Territories continued to maintain that ownership and control 
of Nauruan phosphate remained legally vested in the BPC.123 
Australian intransigence on both full independence and transfer of ownership and control 
of phosphate was finally rendered politically untenable in December 1966 by a General 
Assembly resolution in support of the NLGC’s position on all points of contention.124 Head 
Chief Hammer DeRoburt had insisted that documentation of the Nauru Talks be submitted 
to the Trusteeship Council for review, subjecting Australia’s conduct during negotiations to 
international oversight.125 Two months after it resolved to terminate the Mandate for South 
West Africa, the General Assembly acted on the advice of the Trusteeship Council and 
recommended that the Administering Authority fix a date for Nauruan independence not 
later than 31 January 1968, as insisted upon the NLGC; that ownership in phosphate and 
control over the phosphate industry be transferred to the ‘Nauruan people’; and that the 
Administration take ‘immediate steps, irrespective of the cost involved, towards restoring the 
island of Nauru for habitation by the Nauruan people as a sovereign nation’.126 By the end 
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of 1966, the Department of Territories’ protracted attempt to maintain BPC ownership and 
control of Nauruan phosphate by trading off increased Nauruan self-government had failed.   
In April 1967, four months after the General Assembly’s resolution in favour of Nauru, 
another round of negotiations was held in Canberra, this time attended not only by the 
Department of Territories and the new Nauru Legislative Council, but by representatives of 
the New Zealand government and the UK Foreign Office.127 Also in attendance was New 
Zealand historian James Wightman Davidson, Chair in Pacific History at the Australian 
National University in Canberra, as constitutional adviser to Nauru.128 The Department 
proposed a final agreement whereby full political independence would be transferred to the 
Nauru Legislative Council and Executive Council; property in phosphate would vest in 
Nauruan landowners; and ownership and control of the BPC operation would be bought by 
the Nauruan administration progressively over a three year transition period, to be vested in 
a substitute entity, the Nauru Phosphate Corporation.129 In return, Nauru would be required 
to guarantee phosphate supply to the BPC at 1967 levels for at least three years, and to 
indemnify Australia and the partner governments from any future claims for rehabilitation 
of the island.130 Having lost its attempt to maintain control over the phosphate industry, the 
Department focused its energy on arguing that legal responsibility for rehabilitation was not 
owed as a matter of mining law; and that with respect to trusteeship obligations, the Long 
Term Investment Fund established in 1947 by the Administering Authority and funded 
entirely by sequestered Nauruan phosphate royalties was sufficient to meet the cost of 
rehabilitation.131 The NLGC delegation agreed to the substantive terms of the proposal, 
agreeing to buy out the BPC between 1968 and 1971 at a cost of AUD$21 million, in 
exchange for full ownership and control over phosphate and BPC assets. However, the 
Nauruan delegation refused to accept that the agreement implied indemnity from future 
claims for rehabilitation.132     
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5. Independence Day: Nauru becomes a Republic 
In the negotiated transition to Nauruan independence, administrative control and control 
over the phosphate industry passed separately, as had been the case in the transition from 
protectorate to mandate in 1919. On 15 June 1967, the Nauru Phosphate Agreement was 
signed by the NLGC and the Department of Territories, transferring control of the 
phosphate operation; and in October 1967, the Nauru Independence Act was passed in the 
Australian federal Parliament, providing for the independence of the Nauruan 
administration.133 The Nauru Phosphate Agreement provided that the NLGC would 
purchase the assets of the BPC over a three year period on an agreed basis of valuation, with 
ownership of phosphate, the phosphate mining right, and property in plant and equipment 
vesting in a new Nauru Phosphate Corporation.134 Phosphate would continue to be supplied 
exclusively to the BPC at an agreed volume and price, rather than on the open market, with 
cessation of supply requiring twelve months’ notice.135 On its terms, the Nauru Phosphate 
Agreement did not deal with the question of rehabilitation; still, the Australian government 
maintained that the ‘settlement’ represented in the Agreement was sufficient to meet the 
costs of rehabilitation, and therefore released the partner governments from liability.136 After 
the 1967 Agreement was signed, Head Chief DeRoburt again expressly rejected Australia’s 
claim that the Agreement somehow constituted an indemnity against a future rehabilitation 
claim. 137  
By late 1967, the shift in the international status of Nauru from UN Trust Territory to 
sovereign state remained to be approved by the United Nations. In November 1967, a special 
session of the Trusteeship Council was called to consider the terms of Nauruan 
independence provided in the Nauru Phosphate Agreement and the Nauru Independence Act, 
in order to decide whether the Trusteeship Agreement had been determined in accordance 
with the Charter and Trusteeship Council procedure.138 Head Chief Hammer DeRoburt 
attended the meeting, and reported that full agreement had been reached between the 
Department of Territories and the NLGC on all matters except rehabilitation; yet requested 
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that while the outstanding disagreement on rehabilitation was to be placed on UN record, 
the issue of liability for rehabilitation should not be regarded as grounds for delaying the 
termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.139 DeRoburt’s statement to the Trusteeship 
Council deployed the language of trusteeship to expert effect: 
‘I hope that the Council will have reached the conclusion that we are now ready to take the great 
step forward which is the deeply cherished aim of all dependent peoples – to move from tutelage 
to sovereign independence. We ourselves have no doubts. We face our future with the anxieties 
that are common to all people and Governments in this troubled world, but with confidence 
that we can acquit ourselves creditably, handle our affairs efficiently, and demonstrate that the 
responsibilities of independence were not placed on our shoulders before the time was ripe. 
Nauru will be the smallest of the world’s nations; but it will be one, we deeply believe, that will 
bring no discredit to the world community’.140 
Australia’s obduracy on the matter of responsibility for rehabilitation was explicitly criticised 
by the Liberian Chair, Angie Brooks, and the Soviet representative, P.F. Shlakov, both of 
whom supported the Nauruan claim for full rehabilitation at the cost of the partner 
governments.141 Despite these reservations, the Trusteeship Council resolved to approve the 
determination of the Trusteeship Agreement and the accession of Nauru to independence 
on 31 January 1968.142  
The question of the administrative form to be adopted by an independent Nauru was dealt 
with hurriedly during the Nauru Talks. With the assistance of Professor Davidson, the 
Nauruan delegation had in June 1967 produced the Statement on the Constitutional Future 
of Nauru.143 Professor Davidson had acted as constitutional adviser to Western Samoa prior 
to independence from New Zealand in 1962, and to the Cook Islands, a New Zealand Trust 
Territory which had opted for self-government within New Zealand.144 The Nauruan 
Statement proposed a Republic taking the form of a government ‘based on the British 
parliamentary system’, as had occurred in Western Samoa, and expanding on the existing 
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administrative structure of Nauru.145 On the question of external affairs, the Statement 
reiterated that any prospective treaty relationship with Australia would be negotiated as 
sovereign equals after the devolution of full political independence to Nauru.146 The new 
constitution would provide for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of 
Nauruan citizens; and citizenship would be defined by Nauruan descent, rather than 
naturalisation, to limit the acquisition of citizenship rights by emigrant workers in the 
phosphate industry.147  
The Nauruan Statement went on to propose a government consisting of a Legislative 
Assembly of ‘around fifteen’, with members elected by each of the nine constituencies 
represented in the NLGC, an extension of the existing Legislative Council; a President, 
elected by the Legislative Assembly, to take over executive authority from the Administrator; 
an Executive, consisting of the President in capacity as Chief Minister and a Cabinet of three 
or four Ministers appointed by the President, a reframing of the existing Executive Council; 
a Judiciary, consisting of a District Court, a Supreme Court and a right of appeal to the High 
Court of Australia, with the Magistrates of the District Court and the Judge of the Supreme 
Court to be appointed by the President; and a public service, overseen by a Head of 
Department, appointed by the President.148 The public service itself would be streamlined 
from the existing administration in order to create four ministerial portfolios for the four 
Ministers that would comprise the Executive.149 In the proposed reconstitution of the 
existing administration as a Republic, the office of President would comprise both head of 
state and head of government, and exercise powers of appointment with respect to both the 
judiciary and the public service. The Nauruan Statement explicitly addressed this 
concentration of power in the office of President, reasoning that the size of Nauru meant 
that a stronger separation of offices would be excessive. To balance the risk of abuse of 
office, the Statement proposed a mechanism of executive accountability to the Legislative 
Assembly, whereby the Assembly would be empowered to remove the President and the 
Cabinet from office via a motion of no confidence.150 The Statement strongly advocated for 
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the adoption of this constitutional structure by a Constitutional Convention elected from the 
Nauruan people, rather than by an instrument of the Australian Parliament.151  
The administrative form of the new Republic was settled rapidly over the following months. 
In October 1967, the Nauru Independence Act was passed in the Australian federal Parliament. 
Consisting of four sections only, the Independence Act vested in the Nauru Legislative Council 
the power to make ‘an Ordinance establishing a convention for the purpose of establishing 
a constitution for Nauru’. 152 It provided that on the ‘expiration of the day preceding’ 31 
January 1968, the Nauru Act that only two years previous established the Legislative and 
Executive Councils would cease to operate; and that ‘on and after’ 31 January 1968, ‘Australia 
shall not exercise any powers of legislation, administration or jurisdiction in and over 
Nauru’.153 On 19 December 1967, an election was held in Nauru to appoint three members 
of each constituency to the Constitutional Convention, the balance of which would consist 
of the nine sitting members of the Legislative Council.154 The Convention met in January 
1968 to settle the text of the constitution drafted by Professor Davidson and Victorian lawyer 
Rowena Armstrong.155 Elections for the eighteen positions on the new Legislative Assembly 
were held on 26 January 1968, consisting of two positions for each of the nine represented 
constituencies.156 All nine members of the erstwhile Legislative Council were elected as 
members of the new Legislative Assembly.157 On 29 January 1968, the Convention 
unanimously adopted a text for the Constitution as described in the Statement produced 
during the Nauru Talks in 1967, to be enacted after independence.158 Two days later on 31 
January 1968, the Republic of Nauru celebrated its Independence Day. During a ceremony 
attended by UN Under-Secretary General Issoufou Saidou-Djermakoye of Niger and the 
Australian Governor-General Baron Richard Casey, Head Chief Hammer DeRoburt was 
voted President by the new Legislative Assembly.159 DeRoburt and the Governor-General 
                                                          
151 Ibid 9–10. 
152 Nauru Independence Act 1967 (Cth), s 2. 
153 Nauru Independence Act 1967 (Cth), ss 3, 4. 
154 Viviani, above n 27, 173. 
155 Ibid 173. 
156 Ibid 176. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Australian Associated Press, ‘Guns Boom and People Grave as Nauru is ‘Born’’, Canberra Times (Canberra) 
1 February 1968; Macdonald, above n 18, 60. 
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Casey signed the Proclamation of Independence, and Nauru formally became a sovereign 
state.160   
6. The Constitution of the Republic of Nauru 
In May 1968, the Constitution of the Republic of Nauru came into effect.161 Transitional 
provisions preserved the existing administrative structure, subject to the express terms of the 
Constitution. Article 85(1) provided that the all existing laws remained in force; and Article 
86 provided that any reference in an existing law to the Australian Governor-General, the 
Minister of Territories or the Administrator should be read as a reference to the President, 
unless the context required otherwise. Article 87 provided that, with the exception of the 
Administrator, all other administrative officeholders remained in their positions.162 The 
powers of the Legislative Assembly, Executive and President were codified as proposed in 
the 1967 Statement. Article 24 empowered the Legislative Assembly to remove a Cabinet 
including the President by a vote of no confidence passed by at least nine of the eighteen 
members of Parliament – not a majority, but an even half. With respect to economic 
structure, Article 58 provided that all revenue raised and not payable into another fund was 
to be paid into a Treasury Fund, accessible in ‘accordance with law’. Article 62(1) codified 
the existence of the Long Term Investment Fund established in the early years of the trust 
period, and provided for investments from the fund in accordance with law. Article 63 
empowered the Legislative Assembly to create a royalty trust fund, but did not codify the 
terms of management of the Nauru Landowners Phosphate Royalty Fund, established in the 
early years of the mandate period and excluded from international oversight. With respect to 
phosphate operations, Article 93 provided that the Nauru Phosphate Agreement of 1967 
entered into by the NLGC would bind the Government of the Republic of Nauru. Beyond 
this, the Constitution provided only minimal codification of the phosphate operation, 
omitting from its purview the constitution of the new Nauru Phosphate Corporation formed 
to take over from the BPC. Article 83(1) vested the right to mine phosphate, previously held 
by the BPC as purportedly purchased from the Pacific Phosphate Company in 1919, in the 
                                                          
160 Australian Associated Press, above n 159. 
161 Constitution of Nauru 1968 (incorporating the alterations made by the Constitutional Convention of Nauru 
under Article 92 on 17 May 1968). 
162 Article 87 excluded the Public Service Commissioner and Official Secretary from continuation in office.  
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Republic of Nauru; and Article 83(2) explicitly exempted the Republic of Nauru from liability 
for rehabilitation of land mined prior to the enactment of the Nauru Phosphate Agreement.  
The 1968 Constitution thus codified central elements of the administrative structure that had 
developed in Nauru over an eighty year period, through transitions in status from 
protectorate to mandate to trust territory to state. Although providing for further 
bureaucratisation in the delineation of official powers and functions, in the expanded 
Legislative Assembly, addition of an Executive Cabinet, and codification of administrative 
appointment processes, the Constitution concentrated considerable executive power in the 
new office of President. Legislative and judicial powers, devolved to minor degree during the 
trusteeship period to the NLGC and the District and Supreme Courts, remained subject to 
significant executive influence. Ownership and control of the phosphate operation remained 
formally outside the purview of public administration, although indirectly incorporated via 
the reference to the Nauru Phosphate Agreement as binding the new Republic. As such, the 
Constitution included no express provision for financial transparency of the phosphate 
operation, nor of disposition of trust fund moneys - despite the phosphate operation and the 
Royalty Trusts constituting the exclusive revenue base of the new Republic. The body of 
domestic law that had been developed for Nauru by executive ordinance over the preceding 
eighty year period, and the legal rights and obligations it had created, remained in effect. As 
Nauru celebrated its first year of sovereign independence, the Nauruan people moved to 
occupy an administrative structure that did not dismantle but further expanded upon an 
imperial form of relations established for the primary purpose of facilitating corporate 
extraction of natural resources from the island.     
7. Conclusion: the ironies of Nauruan independence 
The transition in international status from trust territory to sovereign statehood was an 
astounding achievement of the Nauruan people, as represented by the NLGC under Head 
Chief Hammer DeRoburt. The recognition of Nauruan ownership and control of phosphate 
was perhaps a greater achievement still, given the intransigence of the Australian Department 
of Territories and its adoption of a corporate bargaining strategy with respect to its Trust 
Territory’s accession to the independence Australia had ostensibly undertaken to promote. 
However, international recognition of Nauruan independence, as urged by the Trusteeship 
Council and the General Assembly, was in many respects profoundly ironic. The 
presumption of the inevitable uninhabitability of the island on the exhaustion of phosphate 
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was widely shared, and the accession to sovereign statehood was regarded at the international 
level less as the inauguration of a viable state, than as a principled means by which the 
Nauruan people would be free to determine for themselves how to respond to that 
uninhabitability.  
The push toward international recognition of Nauruan sovereignty was to a large extent a 
result of the juridification of the obligations of trusteeship after the second World War, 
propelled by the elaboration of the trust relationship in the Charter of the United Nations, 
and the efforts of the representatives of post-colonial and anti-imperial states on the 
Trusteeship Council and in the General Assembly. In the Nauruan case at least, the language 
of trusteeship proved a far more effective a tool for negotiating devolution of political 
control to the local population than it did for protecting the territory from vigorous 
economic and environmental exploitation. Since independence, the environmental harm 
wrought on the island of Nauru has become an infamous fable of unsustainable resource 
exploitation.163 The exploitation of Nauru correlated directly to the immense financial benefit 
that flowed to Australia under the Nauru Island Agreement, and to a lesser extent to New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom. The scale of that benefit is difficult to estimate, although 
the political significance of Nauruan phosphate supply in Australia is telling; as historian 
David Goldsworthy has noted of Australian attitudes, ‘the principle of cheap [phosphate] 
was embedded in the political and economic order, and threats to it were not to be 
countenanced’.164  
As significant as the shift in the international status of Nauru was, the administrative 
structure codified in the 1968 Constitution of the Republic of Nauru was not a novel 
institution, but a palimpsest of administrative forms that had accreted under eighty years of 
imperial rule. The Constitution of the Republic of Nauru was drafted, adopted and ratified 
in less than twelve months. Despite further expansion of the legislature and judiciary, the 
concentration of executive power in the office of President echoed the concentration of 
power in the office of Administrator, mitigated only by a blunt mechanism of no confidence 
                                                          
163 See for example Carl N. McDaniel and John M. Gowdy, Paradise for Sale: A Parable of Nature (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000); and Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs The Climate 
(London: Allen Lane, 2014), 161–170.   
164 David Goldsworthy, ‘British Territories and Australian Mini-Imperialism in the 1950s’ (1995) 41 Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 3, 356–372 at 357. Also Gregory T. Cushman, Guano and the Opening of the Pacific 
World: A Global Ecological History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 129–132; and Weeramantry, 
above n 8, 361–362.  
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motions passable by a simple half of the Legislative Assembly. Despite the phosphate 
industry comprising the only planned source of revenue, the structure of the Nauru 
Phosphate Corporation was left outside the purview of the Constitution, leaving the issue of 
financial transparency between the administration and the phosphate industry to legislative 
control. The management and disposition of royalty trust funds was similarly left to 
legislative control, and thus left susceptible to significant executive intervention. All existing 
laws were left on foot until repealed or amended by the Legislative Assembly; all existing 
administrative offices were left in place, to be occupied by Nauruans; and all references to 
the Administering Authority were replaced with references to the President. In 1968, the 
Nauruan people secured their sovereign independence, and the status of Nauru shifted from 
trust territory to sovereign state in international law, a moment easily associated with clean 
beginnings and political promise. Yet a focus on the story of international status at the 
expense of an attentiveness to administrative form works to obscure a far more burdened 
transition. The administrative structure to which Nauru’s sovereign status attached was built 
on the foundations of an arrangement struck eighty years previous between a trading 
company and a reluctant empire.  
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Chapter 6   
Conclusion: Nauru and the histories of international law 
 
1. Summary of argument 
This thesis has offered an historical account of how the tiny island of Naoero in the Western 
Pacific ocean became the Republic of Nauru in 1968, the smallest sovereign state by area and 
by population, excluding the Holy See. Departing from an intuition that Nauru is not 
anomalous to but somehow representative of the international order, this history has adopted 
a method of critical redescription in order to focus on administrative practice in an apparently 
‘marginal’ place as a key site of international legal formation. This close reading of the history 
of Nauru as an object of international legal administration reveals an element of the 
relationship between imperialism and international law that historical accounts that focus on 
the articulation of legal concepts in apparently ‘central’ sites of international law do not: in 
the post-independence era, the legacies of colonialism and imperialism persist in the 
administrative forms of the postcolonial state. To be more specific, the shift to sovereign 
status for Nauru and the expansion of the existing trusteeship administration into a ‘British-
style parliamentary system’ did not dismantle the forms of power relation that had developed 
under eighty years of imperial rule, but further expanded upon those relations in an accretive 
way. As such, the notorious post-independence ‘flaws’ in the Nauruan state identified by the 
Constitutional Convention in the mid-2000s – the concentration of executive power in a 
single office, the imbrications of public and private power established under imperial rule, 
the financial dependence of public administration and services on corporate profit from 
natural resource exploitation, and the lack of financial transparency or accountability around 
phosphate profit, royalty calculation and trust fund disposition – are better understood not 
as peculiar to independence-era administration, but as directly continuous of imperial 
administrative forms of relation.   
In tracing the continuities in administrative form from the late nineteenth century through 
to independence, this thesis has sought to make two related arguments, one specific to the 
history of Nauru, the other a general point about histories of international law. The first 
argument is that while the status of Nauru in international law has shifted – from 
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protectorate, to mandate, to trust territory, to sovereign state – the forms of relation at the 
level of local administration have not shifted, but accreted. Throughout the series of shifts 
in status traced in this project, the administrative form applied to the island has not radically 
changed structure so much as undergone a process of internal bureaucratisation and external 
restatement according to the prevailing concepts of the period. The key implication, then, is 
that the shift in the international status of Nauru from trust territory to state in 1968 was not 
a departure from but a stage in the bureaucratisation of an imperial administrative form 
instantiated in the late nineteenth century. 
The second argument concerns the relation between this insight and histories of international 
law more generally. It is an effect of fixing Nauru at the centre of the narrative that the 
history of international law from the late nineteenth century to decolonisation in the 1960s 
can be read as the steady bureaucratisation of an administrative form originally set up to 
facilitate imperial extraction of resources without regard for place or people. Yet this 
extended observation of the effect on historical perspective of fixing one place over another 
as central to the construction of narrative is in many respects the fundamental argument this 
thesis attempts to make. All histories of international law require narrative choices that 
centralise certain sites of international legal formation over others, whether they are made 
consciously or not. This privileging of place necessarily affects the historical narrative that is 
constructed, perhaps as significantly as does ideological presumption. The wager that this 
thesis has made is that the presumption that the received ‘centres’ of international law – 
Berlin, Versailles, San Francisco, The Hague, and New York – are self-evidently the sites that 
should take centre stage in the construction of the history of international law erases as much 
about the international legal order as it reveals.  
What emerges from this attempt to hold Nauru – a marginal outpost of a marginal empire - 
at the centre of a narrative about the relationship between imperialism and international law 
from the late nineteenth century through to the independence era is a sense of the distinction 
between ‘the’ history of international law as a mode of conceptual reasoning or an ideal 
framework for governing the world, and the histories of international law as actually practised 
in place. This re-orientation emphasises different historical associations than are otherwise 
privileged in accounts of the relationship between imperialism and international law. Firstly, 
the centralisation of Nauru necessitates an engagement with the economic activity of the 
Hanseatic firms, and the relationship between the Hanseatic firms and the imperial policies 
216 
 
of the new German Reich. This engagement with the complex relations between the 
Hanseatic companies, German federalism and imperial expansion sheds light on an empire 
that has been habitually marginalised in histories of imperialism, at least in English. It also 
casts a web of historical and political associations over the globe that would otherwise be 
difficult to see: between Nauru, Hamburg and Berlin; between Nauru, Namibia and New 
Guinea; between Nauru, Banaba and Peru. The connections between the complex political 
and economic difficulties faced in many of the former German colonies and the inherited 
administrative forms developed accretively under imperial rule – a group that includes Nauru, 
New Guinea, Samoa, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Namibia, 
Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Togo and Cameroon – warrant closer consideration than has 
been possible in this project. More generally, analysis of the former C Mandates as a group 
remains a matter for future research.    
Secondly, the focus on the western Pacific also reveals elements of the internal relations of 
the British empire, and particularly between the Dominions and the Imperial government. 
Juridical attempts to taxonomise the British empire, and the position of the white settler 
colonies of Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and Canada within it, reveal the extent to 
which claims for greater autonomy and control over external affairs and defence powers were 
related to the Dominions’ ‘sub-imperial’ aspirations. With respect to Australia, the extent to 
which German imperialism - and British acquiescence toward Germany’s formation of a 
Pacific ‘sphere of influence’ - influenced the push in the Australian colonies toward 
federation is often sidelined in more triumphalist accounts of Australia’s protracted path to 
sovereign independence.  So too is the relationship between the recognition of Australian 
sovereignty at the international level, and the Australian government’s sub-imperial policies 
regarding Nauru and New Guinea. The resonances in this regard between the Australian and 
South African paths to international personality and their assumption of control over their 
respective C Mandates are notable, a connection frequently overshadowed by the open 
violence of apartheid and South Africa’s annexationist aggression in South West Africa. The 
Nauruan story gestures toward a close historical relationship between imperialism and 
constitutionalism in both German and British empires, a relationship that remains to be more 
productively understood.   
Thirdly, the centralisation of Nauru requires that phosphate be taken seriously, not only as 
the physical heart of Nauru’s central plateau but as a geological phenomenon and as an 
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exhaustible global commodity. The commodification of phosphate had a significant impact 
not only on modes of imperial expansion into the Pacific, but also on the rapid 
industrialisation of agricultural production across the world. Not only has the use of 
phosphate as a fertiliser dramatically altered patterns of food production and land use, it has 
had devastating impact on the ecosystems in which it has been extensively used. From an 
Australian perspective, it bears pointing out that it is not only Nauru’s environment that has 
been irrevocably altered by the aggressive mining practices of the tripartite BPC. Subsidised 
access to superphosphate, insulated entirely from world price fluctuations for over sixty 
years, facilitated the rapid development of Australia’s wheat, sugar and dairy industries in 
areas that would otherwise not have been arable. The long term effects of the exploitation 
of Nauruan phosphate on Australian land use practices – and indeed on Australian cultural 
identity - deserves greater attention, as does the status of phosphate as an exhaustible global 
resource.1    
To summarise, this thesis is offered as a contribution to the field of histories of imperialism 
and international law, and aims to offer insight not only into the Nauruan case, but into the 
way that writing from a specific place ‘up’ to international law, as opposed to writing from 
international law ‘down’ to the world, radically reconfigures the construction of international 
law that emerges. The political intention in this move is to suggest that in uncritically 
privileging certain places over others as of formative importance to international law as 
discipline and practice, all histories of international law are affected by the geographic 
parochialism that is consciously performed in this project. As such, a more nuanced 
understanding of - and therefore resistance to - the Eurocentricity of the discipline might be 
achieved through a greater awareness of the effect on historical narrative of presuming that 
the received sites of international legal power are necessarily co-extensive with sites of 
analytical value. Even within the confines of disciplinary practice, which obliges an 
epistemological Eurocentricity in its insistence on certain modes of knowledge production, 
there is much to be gained from consciously grounding historical narratives of ‘international 
law’ in ‘marginal’, ‘unimportant’, or ‘anomalous’ places. Not only is it easier to perceive the 
                                                          
1 On peak phosphorous, see Stuart White and Dana Cordell, ‘Peak Phosphorus: Clarifying the Key Issues of a 
Vigorous Debate about Long-Term Phosphorus Security’ (2011) 3(10) Sustainability 2027; and Sarah M McGill, 
‘‘Peak’ Phosphorous? The Implications of Phosphate Scarcity for Sustainable Investors’ (2012) 2 Journal of 
Sustainable Finance and Investment 222.  
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gaps between the concepts of international law and the practices those concepts are assumed 
to inform, it is easier to understand how and why those gaps occur.  
In this project, I have endeavoured to maintain focus on Nauru by borrowing firstly from 
jurisdictional thinking to construct an account of how law was used and understood by a 
succession of German, British and Australian administrations to authorise the imperial 
exploitation of Nauru; and secondly from Weber, to relate the development of that law to 
the actual form of the Nauruan administration. What becomes visible in this history of 
international law at the periphery that is obscured in accounts of international law at the 
centre is that while international status shifts, administrative form accretes; in the 
independence era, the legacies of imperialism persist in the structure of the postcolonial state. 
However, this is not to suggest that the focus on administrative practice developed in this 
project is the only means by which a history of international law might be grounded in place. 
In this regard, this thesis is offered as an invitation to international lawyers to consider how 
assumptions about the centrality of certain places over others might be undone, and the 
effect this might have on accounts of the relation between the theory and practice of 
international law.       
2. Concluding comments: Nauru v Australia and the issue of rehabilitation 
Within the discipline of international law, the history of Nauru is often refracted through the 
case brought by Nauru against Australia in the International Court of Justice in 1989. 
Although it is not the intention here to summarise the case or its outcomes, some comment 
is necessary. In May 1989, twenty years after independence, Nauru lodged an application 
instituting proceedings against Australia in the International Court of Justice, seeking 
resolution of the issue that remained outstanding on the negotiated transition to 
independence from Australia in 1968: liability for rehabilitation of mined-out lands on the 
central plateau of the island.2 In a section entitled ‘Background to the Dispute’, the 
Application summarises in fourteen paragraphs a version of the story presented in this thesis. 
Running through the protectorate, mandate, and trust territory periods, and ending with 
independence in 1968, the Background lists the principal legal instruments and events of war 
that have affected the international status of Nauru, and the claimed chain of title of Nauruan 
                                                          
2 Application Instituting Proceedings, Nauru v Australia (Phosphate Lands Case), International Court of Justice, 
General List, 19 May 1989.  
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phosphate: the agreement between the Bismarckian Reich and the Jaluit Gesellschaft, which 
included a concession to mine guano; the transfer of the concession from the Jaluit Gesellschaft 
to the Pacific Phosphate Company under German administration; the occupation of Nauru 
by Australian forces in 1914; the creation of the Mandate for Nauru under Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League, conferred upon ‘His Britannic Majesty’, frustrating Australia’s ambit 
for annexation; the Nauru Island Agreement, in which Britain, Australia and New Zealand 
agreed on terms of the tripartite state monopoly over Nauruan phosphate and the ‘provision 
for exercise of the said Mandate’ by an Administrator with executive powers limited only by 
the right of the new British Phosphate Commissioners (BPC) to mine phosphate without 
administrative intervention; the occupation of Nauru by Japanese forces in 1942; the 
resumption of Australian administration immediately after the war, and accession to UN 
trusteeship oversight in the Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru of 1947; the creation under 
trusteeship of the Nauru Local Government Council and then the Legislative and Executive 
Councils of Nauru, and the limited power exercised by them; the resolutions of the 
Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly on the satisfaction of trusteeship obligations; 
the Nauru Phosphate Agreement of 1967; and the independence of Nauru in 1968.3   
In its Application to the ICJ, Nauru submitted that the 1967 Phosphate Agreement did not 
include settlement of the issue of liability for rehabilitation, and that repeated attempts in the 
interim to secure an admission of liability from Australia had failed.4 As such, Nauru 
requested from the ICJ a declaration of Australia’s liability for rehabilitation, and an order 
for restitution.5 In its Preliminary Objections, Australia repeated its decades-old position that 
all claims relating to the administration of Nauru during the mandate and trusteeship periods 
were settled in the 1967 Nauru Phosphate Agreement.6 Australia also contested the 
jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of the case on various grounds.7 In its judgment 
on the Preliminary Objections, the ICJ held there was no evidence that the pre-independence 
Nauruan authorities had waived the claim for rehabilitation, and rejected Australia’s 
alternative arguments.8    
                                                          
3 Ibid 4–12. 
4 Ibid 24–28. 
5 Ibid 30–32. 
6 Preliminary Objections, Nauru v Australia (‘Phosphate Lands Case’) International Court of Justice, General List, 
December 1990.  
7 Ibid. 
8 ‘Nauru v Australia (‘Phosphate Lands Case’), (Judgment on the Preliminary Objections) [1992] ICJ Rep 240, 247–250. 
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Following the submission by both parties of exhaustive memorials on the merits, the case 
between Nauru and Australia settled in August 1993.9 The ‘Nauru Australia Compact of 
Settlement’ (NACOS) comprised a sum of AUD$107 million, to be paid by Australia to 
Nauru in a series of upfront payments with the balance paid in instalments over a twenty 
year period, and made ‘without prejudice to Australia's long-standing position that it bears 
no responsibility for the rehabilitation of the phosphate lands worked out before 1 July 
1967’.10 In exchange, Nauru agreed to discontinue its ICJ action and to indemnify Australia, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom from any future action ‘arising out of or concerning 
the administration of Nauru during the period of the Mandate or Trusteeship or the 
termination of that administration, as well as any matter pertaining to phosphate mining, 
including matters pertaining to the British Phosphate Commissioners, their assets or the 
winding up thereof’.11 The Settlement further provided that the annual payment of AUD$2.5 
million would disposed of by agreement between the parties.12  
In a revealing indication of Australia’s attitude toward the ICJ settlement, payments made in 
satisfaction of the Nauru Australia Compact of Settlement (NACOS) have been included in 
Australia’s annual reports of development aid paid to Nauru.13 That the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade categorised the NACOS payments as ‘aid’ - as opposed to damages 
for the sustained exploitation of Nauru to Australian advantage - is an almost poetic 
indictment of the post-independence paradigm of development.14 Yet the potential poetry 
of this observation is blunted by an appreciation of the purposes to which the NACOS ‘aid’ 
funds have been put. As well as having nominal responsibility for rehabilitation, The Nauru 
                                                          
9 ‘Nauru v Australia (‘Phosphate Lands Case’), (Order of 13 September 1993) [1993] ICJ Rep 322.  
10 ‘Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Nauru for the Settlement of the Case in the International 
Court of Justice concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru’ Nauru v Australia (‘Phosphate Lands Case’) [1993] 
ICJ Pleadings, vol III, 511, art 1 (‘NACOS’). 
11 Ibid art 3.  
12 Ibid art 1(d). 
13 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Australian Agency for International Development Annual 
Reports 1998–2013’ (Commonwealth of Australia), <http://dfat.gov.au/about-
us/publications/corporate/annual-reports/pages/annual-reports.aspx>; and Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, ‘Nauru Aid Program Performance Reports 2012–2016’ (Commonwealth of Australia), 
<http://dfat.gov.au/geo/nauru/development-assistance/Pages/development-assistance-in-nauru.aspx>. 
From 2001–2007, the first era of offshore detention of asylum seekers on Nauru under the Howard 
government, payments to Nauru in relation to the regime were described as ‘additional aid’ and ‘development 
assistance’ and included in total aid funds. See for example, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘AusAID 
Annual Report 2001–2002’ (Commonwealth of Australia), 44, 54. 
14 On the continuities between imperialism and the post-independence development paradigm, see Gilbert Rist, 
The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (Patrick Camiller trans, Zed Books, 1997); 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, 
Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
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Rehabilitation Corporation set up after the settlement now mines phosphate.15 In 2012-2013, 
the final year of the twenty year settlement, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
produced its annual Aid Program Performance Report for Nauru, which reported that the 
NACOS funds were put primarily toward phosphate mining, and that progress on 
rehabilitation had been ‘limited’.16 The DFAT report states that the failure of the 
rehabilitation program is mitigated by the benefits to Nauru of continued mining:   
‘(t)his is balanced to some extent by the economic and social benefits provided by Nauru’s more 
prosperous mining industry, including higher dividends for land owners and government and 
increased employment opportunities. Funds provided under NACOS represent a significant 
proportion of the operational budget for the Nauru Rehabilitation Corporation’s work on 
mining and land rehabilitation. It is as yet unclear how the corporation plans to fund these 
operations once the final payment due under the NACOS treaty is made in 2013–14’.17 
The Memorandum of Understanding that re-established Australia’s ‘Regional Processing 
Centre’ in Nauru for the detention of asylum seekers who arrive in Australian waters by sea 
was signed in August 2012, in anticipation of the determination of the NACOS Settlement.18 
Although the precise financial arrangement between the Australian and Nauruan 
governments has not been made public, between mid-2012 and mid-2015, over 
AUD$27,000,000 had been paid under the Memorandum to Nauru for its role in Australia’s 
offshore detention regime.19 On DFAT’s own statistics given in its ‘Aid Investment Plan’ for 
Nauru, the revenue of the Republic has increased by over 500% due to the re-opening of the 
Regional Processing Centre, from AUD $20 million in 2010-2011 to AUD$115 million in 
2015-2016.20 DFAT’s assessment of the benefit to Nauru of this rapid increase in revenue is 
a deft exercise in euphemism, sidestepping the notorious abandonment of the rule of law 
                                                          
15 See Republic of Nauru, ‘National Sustainable Development Strategy 2005–2025’ (Revised 2009) 24, 
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16 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Aid Program Performance Report 2012–13 Nauru’, 
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20 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Aid Investment Plan: Nauru 2015–16 to 2018–19’, 




that the Nauruan executive has engaged in since 2013:21 ‘Nauru continues to face capacity 
challenges to utilise those resources to achieve human development outcomes and build 
economic resilience in the medium to longer term’.22  
3. The past in the present: Nauru and the contemporary international order 
In conclusion, it is crucial to reiterate that this thesis does not purport to offer a history of 
the island of Naoero and the Nauruan people. What it does offer is an account of the 
formation of ‘Nauru’ as an object of international law, constructed using a particular 
methodology, applied to a particular set of legal sources. What I have sought to do, as an 
Australian international lawyer of German and British lineage, is to redescribe the actions of 
Europeans who presumed themselves to be justified in imposing administrative control on 
Nauru, and the ways in which law was used as a means of authorising imperial rule. The 
project seeks to demonstrate one way that those of us who inherit both Eurocentric 
narratives of international law and the responsibility of colonial lineage in a postcolonial place 
might better understand the continuities between imperial administration and the various 
administrative and disciplinary practices that happen today under the broad banner of 
international law. To that end, I have avoided offering representations of Nauruan 
experiences of and perspectives on imperialism and sovereign independence, other than 
those that appear in the set of administrative sources considered. I have done so in order to 
leave space for Nauruan accounts of the period of imperial rule and its effects on the 
contemporary state. The aim of this thesis is emphatically not to undermine the significance 
of the political struggle undertaken by the Nauruan people to achieve sovereign status, or to 
secure Nauruan occupation of the highest levels of administration. It is rather to suggest that 
recognition of sovereign status at the international level can only ever be a partial response 
to the complex effects of imperial administration. The imperial past continues to shape 
                                                          
21 See Melissa Clarke, ‘Nauru Expels Australian Magistrate Peter Law, Bars Chief Justice Geoffrey Eames from 
Returning to Country’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 20 January 2014 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-20/nauru-sacks-deports-australian-magistrate-chief-
justice/5207600>; Australian Associated Press, ‘Nauru Suspends Two More Opposition MPs Ahead of Budget 
Hand Down’, The Guardian (online), 5 June 2014 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/05/nauru-
suspends-two-more-opposition-mps>. For the Nauruan government’s position, see Republic of Nauru 
Government Information Office, ‘Nauru Government Sets the Record Straight’ (media release, 25 January 
2014) <http://www.naurugov.nr/government-information-office/media-release/nauru-government-sets-the-
record-straight.aspx>; and Republic of Nauru Government Information Office, ‘Supreme Court has Deemed 
Suspension of MPs Lawful’, (media release, 11 December 2014) <http://www.naurugov.nr/government-
information-office/media-release/supreme-court-has-deemed-suspension-of-mps-lawful.aspx>.  
22 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Aid Investment Plan’ above n 20, 2.  
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contemporary administrative form in ways that needs to be better understood, if the 
decolonial project is to continue to advance.    
This project does not deal in any depth with the independence period, and a detailed 
treatment of the history of the Republic of Nauru from 1968 to the present that resists the 
journalistic tendency to turn the island’s history into a dystopic fable remains to be written. 
Nevertheless, a few observations that flow from the analysis offered in this thesis might be 
useful here. Attempts to explain the particularity of the Nauruan state have seen it included 
in various political and developmental categories, including as a small island developing state 
(SIDS), and even as the ‘first Pacific failed state’.23 In presuming the anomalousness of the 
Republic of Nauru, such accounts reinforce the notion that there is a ‘normal’ state, and a 
‘normal’ way a state should conduct itself within the international order. Such presumptions 
work to obscure the myriad historical causes for ‘deviations’ from that supposed norm, and 
create a sense that the post-independence struggles of states formerly under imperial rule 
constitute some kind of inherent dereliction. 
There is a sense, however, in which the apparent dysfunction of the Republic of Nauru as a 
sovereign state can be viewed as a particular sort of functionality within the international 
order. The Nauru Local Government Council’s experience with the United Nations 
Trusteeship Council throughout the 1950s and 1960s laid the foundations for what has 
proved a canny record of international activity in diplomacy and institutionalised agreement 
making. Nauru has maintained strong diplomatic relations not only with Australia, but also 
with the Russian Federation and Japan, as well as with the Republic of China (Taiwan) and 
the Republic of Cuba. Under its Non-Project Aid Program, Japan supplies Nauru with the 
diesel fuel required to run the electricity plant, and therefore much of the island; and Nauru 
votes with Japan in the International Whaling Commission.24 In continuity with the 
relationship established through Soviet support of Nauruan independence in the Trusteeship 
Council, Nauru’s relations with the Russian Federation have proven particularly inventive. 
                                                          
23 Republic of Nauru, Nauru National Assessment Report for the Third International Conference on Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) (Report, 17 May 2013) 
<http://www.sids2014.org/content/documents/224NAURU%20National%20Assessment%20Report%20f
or%20Third%20SIDS%20Conference%202013.pdf>. John Connell, ‘Nauru: The First Failed Pacific State?’ 
(2006) 95(383) The Round Table: Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 47. 
24 ‘Early Win for Anti-Whaling Lobby at IWC’, ABC News (online) 20 June 2005 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-06-20/early-win-for-anti-whaling-lobby-at-iwc/1596878>; ‘Japan 





Although the source of the information is unknown, it is rumoured that over US$92 billion 
was laundered through Nauru from the USSR in the two years following its collapse. In 2009, 
Nauru recognised the independence of the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, announcing at the same time an estimated US$50 million aid deal with the Russian 
Federation.25 In 2015, Nauru voted with Israel and the United States in the United Nations 
against a set of resolutions protecting the non-member observer status of Palestine.26 So too 
did the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), 
and Palau, formerly the western chain of the Caroline Islands, together formerly known as 
the Islands North of the Equator under Japanese mandatory rule, and then the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands under US rule.27 That slip in perception I experienced one 
evening in Nauru, watching a container ship disappear over the horizon, was really just a 
realisation of my own parochialism. If the presumption of the centrality of certain places 
over others is undone, it is simply from the place in which you stand that the international 
order unfolds itself. 
                                                          
25 ‘Tiny Nauru Recognises Georgia's Other Rebel Enclave’, Reuters (online) 16 December 2009 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE5BF1LU>; and Luke Harding, ‘Tiny Nauru Struts World Stage 
by Recognising Breakaway Republics’, The Guardian (online) 15 December 2009 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/14/nauro-recognises-abkhazia-south-ossetia>. 
26 United Nations, ‘Traditional Voting Pattern Reflected in General Assembly’s Adoption of Drafts on 
Question of Palestine, Broader Middle East Issues’ (media release, 24 November 2015) 
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11732.doc.htm>.  
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